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This ethnographic study investigates the language ecology of Urumchi, Xinjiang 
with a focus on contextual factors as related to the language practices of Uyghur young 
adults. The thesis explores how the migration and settlement of Han Chinese, coupled 
with the expansion of Mandarin (and corresponding marginalization of Uyghur and other 
ethnic minority languages) in the Xinjiang education system has resulted in a punctuation 
of the linguistic equilibrium of the province. This study demonstrates how socio-political 
forces contribute to the devaluation of minority linguistic capital in a linguistic market, 
and how a language policy in the domestic field, as the primary structuring structure, may 
be utilized to stabilize diglossia and maintain the intergenerational transmission of a 
minority language. 
Participant observation, interview and documentary data were collected over an 
18-month period of fieldwork in Urumchi. The analysis of interview data from 26 
Uyghur adults, defined as early to mid-twenty years of age, who had been educated in 
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Mandarin classes (mínkăohàn), Uyghur classes (mínkăomín), and bilingual Mandarin-
Uyghur classes (shuāngyǔ) or a combination of these programs yielded four themes: 
context and language investments; expected returns; language choice; and linguistic 
anxiety. The data suggests a high degree of ambivalence among Uyghur young adults 
toward Mandarin; this form of cultural capital is conceived of as requisite for 
participation in the Han Chinese dominated economy, yet of a colonial nature and 
damaging to the demarcation of Uyghur social identity. 
Case study narratives are presented on four Uyghur young adults: one female 
educated in Mandarin classes (mínkăohàn); one male educated in Mandarin classes 
(mínkăohàn); one female educated in Uyghur primary and Mandarin-Uyghur secondary 
classes (mínkăomín/shuāngyǔ); and one male educated in Uyghur primary and Mandarin-
Uyghur secondary classes (mínkăomín/shuāngyǔ). Each case study consultant completed 
a 94-item expressive vocabulary assessment. The data suggests that the expansion of 
Mandarin as the language of instruction in the Xinjiang education system has resulted in 
unstable diglossia among Uyghur communities, evidenced by Uyghur language attrition 
and Mandarin-Uyghur code-switching. Findings emphasize contextual factors that are 
contributing to the disruption of the intergenerational transmission of Uyghur and actions 
to support the vitality of this cultural heritage.
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Note on Toponyms and Transliterations 
Place names associated with the territory that is the focus of this dissertation are 
loaded with implication and ideology. The Qing Dynasty in the late eighteenth century 
introduced the Chinese place name Xīnjiāng (new frontier). This toponym reflected the 
perspective of those who imposed it and has colonialist connotations (Millward & 
Perdue, 2004). The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) later designated this area as the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Others identify this territory as East Turkestan. 
This toponym was once widely used by Turkic nationalists and Russians to refer to the 
area west of the Pamir Mountains. However, “East Turkestan” now has subversive 
connotations (Dwyer, 2005). Through extensive CCP propaganda, dōng tūjuésītăn (East 
Turkestan) is now associated by many Chinese with the “three evil forces” of terrorism, 
separatism and religious extremism (Tan, 2009). 
Some Uyghurs continue to use the place name East Turkestan to “assert their 
cultural distinctiveness from China proper” (Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2009a). 
Others use it in recognition of the inaccuracy of the Chinese toponym. After all, to the 
Uyghurs, there is nothing new about the territory they have resided in for over 1,200 
years. Still, others use it to signify a pro-independence position. In this dissertation, I use 
the term “Xinjiang” because this is the highest frequency term for the area under 
consideration. 
I employed the hànyǔ pīnyīn romanization system with diacritics to mark tones 
when transliterating from Chinese. I used Uyghur Latin Yëziqi when transliterating from 
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Uyghur. Chinese and Uyghur words are italicized throughout this text. Upon initial usage 
of Chinese and Uyghur terms, I provide an English translation in parenthesis. 
Following the October 11, 2006 recommendation of the Terminology 
Normalization Committee for Ethnic Languages of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, I use the spelling “Uyghur” as the ethnonym signifying one group of sedentary 
Turkic urban dwellers and farmers of the Tarim Basin and Ili who follow traditional 
Central Asian sedentary practices (among Tajik, Uzbek, Tatar, Taranchi, Loptik, Dolan) 
as distinguished from nomadic Turkic populations in Central Asia (e.g. Äynu, Kirghiz, 
Tajik, Kazakh) (Benson, 1990). 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, also known as East Turkestan, is 
located in the northwest of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This territory shares 
borders with eight countries: Mongolia to the northeast; Russia to the north; Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to the west; and Afghanistan, Pakistan and India to the 
southwest. Xinjiang is at the crossroads of Eurasia; oasis settlements to the north and 
south of the expansive Taklamakan Desert served as transport hubs along the ancient Silk 
Road. Xinjiang is a vast territory accounting for nearly 1/6 of the total area of the PRC. 
From around 60 BCE, Chinese empires and governments have claimed sovereignty over 
this territory. 
The CCP strives to maintain tight control over Xinjiang. Some scholars, such as 
Toops (2004a) and Joseph (2010), attribute the tenacity of this grip to a fear that the loss 
of Xinjiang might trigger the secession of Taiwan and Tibet. Speculations aside, it is a 
fact that Xinjiang is both a valuable source of natural resources (e.g. oil, natural gas, coal, 
minerals and metals) and a strategically important link to the territories and economies of 
neighboring Central Asian states. Evidence of government measures taken to enhance 
social stability in the region are apparent in the form of public security expenditures 
($423 million in 2010, up 88% from 2009 (Wong, 2010)) and the 130,000 troops that 
were deployed to safeguard Xinjiang following the Uyghur uprising of July 5, 2009 
(Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2009a). 
 
 2 
The demographics of this region have shifted significantly since incorporation in 
the PRC. A 1953 census registered 4.87 million inhabitants of which 75% were Uyghur, 
6% Han Chinese, and the remainder consisting of smaller ethnic communities such as 
Hui, Kazakh, and Kirghiz (Toops, 2004a). By 2011, the population had increased to 
21.81 million with 40.1% Han Chinese and 59.9% “minority population” (Ling, 2011a). 
The demographic shift in Xinjiang is part of a broader government objective to develop 
minority nationality areas. In order to promote Han Chinese migration to Xinjiang, land 
and tax incentives have been offered to Han Chinese migrants and their dependents 
(Dana, 1998). Along with the promotion of Han Chinese immigration, the CCP has 
implemented measures to encourage Uyghurs, mostly young women, to leave Xinjiang 
for factory jobs in the interior of China (Liang, 2009). 
Scholars have noted that Han Chinese migration has intensified cultural and 
linguistic assimilative pressures on Uyghurs (Becquelin, 2000). Han Chinese occupy 
most top positions in the Xinjiang CCP bureaucracy while a disproportionate number of 
Han Chinese workers engage in the mining and export of the region’s natural resources 
(Wiemar, 2004). The Xinjiang education system also shows evidence of disproportionate 
ethnic representation. For example, in Aqsu, a notice of job vacancies in district schools 
reserved 347 of 436 positions for Han Chinese, with the remainder reserved for Uyghurs 
(Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2009d). These practices contradict the 
protections granted to ethnic minorities made explicit in the PRC constitution and laws 
related to regional autonomy (Bovingdon, 2004a). 
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The Uyghur culture and language is being marginalized in official institutions and 
public domains, a form of top-down pressure (Nettle & Romaine, 2000). A government 
policy shift toward cultural assimilation in the border regions began in the mid-1980s and 
continues until today, perhaps most intensely in Xinjiang and Tibet. A form of Mandarin 
dominant bilingual education is being standardized throughout the Xinjiang education 
system. Differing from bilingual education programs that use the first language as the 
initial medium of instruction or a first and second language continuously throughout 
instruction, the type of bilingual education practiced in Xinjiang bears a closer 
resemblance to immersion programs with marginal heritage language support: a second 
language (i.e. Mandarin) is the medium of instruction and the first language (i.e. Uyghur) 
is taught as a subject in grammar and literature courses (Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 2008a). 
From the 1980s, most Uyghur parents in urban locations could choose from 
schools (preschool through secondary) where the medium of instruction was Uyghur or 
Mandarin (Dwyer, 2005). Since the mid-1980s, the CCP has prioritized Mandarin as a 
language of instruction in the Xinjiang education system in order to linguistically 
assimilate the ethnic minority students of Xinjiang (Uyghur Human Rights Project, 
2007). The option of school choice is now obsolete; Uyghur as a language of instruction 
is being phased out through the process of school consolidation and the replacement of 
Uyghur with Mandarin as the sole language of instruction (Dwyer, 2005). This language 
policy promotes subtractive bilingualism and language shift. The CCP advertises a 
narrative and ideology that connects Mandarin language proficiency with economic 
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development (Tan, 2009). Whereas in the past, Uyghur and Mandarin had their own set 
of functions and spaces, the establishment of Mandarin as the sole language of instruction 
in the Xinjiang education system has resulted in unstable diglossia (Fishman, 1972). 
Mandarin now dominates the academic field, indicating a shift in the relative balance of 
power between the groups speaking these languages (Nettle & Romaine, 2000). 
1.2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
In the spring of 2006, while studying Mandarin in Kunming, I met a Han Chinese 
from Xinjiang who told me about her experience as a student and the sometimes-violent 
animosity between Han Chinese and Uyghurs. After some investigation, I learned that 
among the set of Uyghur grievances, many Uyghurs were upset that their language was 
being replaced with Mandarin in the Xinjiang education system. Much of the literature I 
encountered, while replete with proclamations issued by the CCP, lacked input (other 
than anecdotal) from a Uyghur perspective. 
From my time as a Peace Corps volunteer in Leyte, the Philippines (2002-04), I 
had a scholarly interest in language policy and language management. This is because 
members of my resident Waray-Waray community sometimes expressed frustrations that 
their language was not a primary language of instruction in the Tagalog-dominant 
education system. These conversations prompted a deep interest in state-sponsored 
efforts to manage language education in multiethnic contexts (Spolsky, 2004). This 
trajectory of experience, exposure and inquiry led me to develop a study to systematically 
investigate the language practices of Uyghur young adults. 
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The purpose of this study was to explore how domestic and academic fields 
structure the language practices of Uyghur young adults, defined as early to mid-twenty 
years of age. I was interested in how the home and school (i.e. structuring structures) 
promote or contribute to the disruption of the intergenerational transmission of Uyghur. 
From the 1980s, most urban Uyghur parents had a choice of schools for their children 
according to language of education (Dwyer, 2005). Options included mínkăohàn, defined 
as “minority testing using Han language” (i.e. Mandarin); and mínkăomín, defined as 
“minority testing using minority language.” More clearly, mínkăohàn refers to ethnic 
minority students educated in Mandarin-medium classes; mínkăomín refers to ethnic 
minority students educated in an ethnic minority language. 
This thesis focus on cultural, political and historical conditions germane to the 
language ecology of Xinjiang (Haugen, 1972; Mühlhäusler, 1996), and how these 
conditions influence language practices. This study explored how Uyghur young adults 
respond to assimilative pressures to join Han-stream society. This study also investigated 
how entrenched ethnic discrimination problematizes the conversion of linguistic capital 
into other forms of capital such as social and economic (Bourdieu, 1986). I employed 
ethnographic research methods in order to obtain empirical evidence to ground arguments 
regarding the impact of CCP language policy on the language practices of Uyghur young 
adults. 
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1.3 THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This dissertation draws upon concepts from the disciplines of sociology and 
language policy. Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological theory (C. J. Calhoun, LiPuma, & 
Postone, 1993), and theory of practice (1977b, 1991), form the theoretical and 
investigative framework of this dissertation. Through this lens, I analyzed the language 
practices of Uyghur young adults, including reproduction and forms of resistance to 
cultural and linguistic assimilation (Bourdieu, 1977c). 
From the field of language policy, this dissertation makes reference to a 
theoretical concern of Bernard Spolsky (2004), namely the recognition of contextual 
factors on language vitality. I also make reference to the concepts of forced and voluntary 
language shift (Nettle & Romaine, 2000). The disciplines of sociology and language 
policy are connected in that they emphasize the importance of structures and actions in 
the social world. My reading and extensions of these theories and constructs are 
influenced by my own secular ideology of humanism, manifest in advocacy for linguistic 
human rights and a belief in the value of linguistic diversity (Nettle & Romaine, 2000; 
Skutnabb-Kangas & Dunbar, 2010). 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice was a useful heuristic with which to investigate 
language practices in Xinjiang because of its emphasis on mechanisms of social 
reproduction and domination. In Xinjiang, there is a clear distribution and balance of 
power between the two most populous ethnic groups. Han Chinese, privileged by their 
association with the CCP, are the dominant group, while Uyghurs, an involuntary 
minority, are subordinate (Ogbu, 1978). Han Chinese and Uyghurs possess distinct 
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systems of habitus, defined as a matrix of dispositions developed in response to objective 
conditions. Bourdieu’s concept of field is relevant because my work is largely concerned 
with education – a structured social space with its own rules and schemes of domination. 
Apart from the visible curriculum, the academic field is a site of unconscious learning 
where habitus and linguistic capital (a form of embodied cultural capital) is acquired 
(Bourdieu, 1977b).  
Concerning language policy theory, this study explores dynamics associated with 
the impact of colonization on the linguistic equilibrium of a territory, and the responses 
of the colonized (Bovingdon, 2002; Dixon, 1997; Gladney, 1998). While many nation-
states have enforced policies toward the cultural and linguistic assimilation of ethnic 
minority peoples, the CCP is currently engaged in an aggressive brand of internal 
colonialism. Ethnic minorities within the CCP are compelled to comply with the 
mandates of the state, but however restricted, many members do create spaces for 
resistance and the maintenance of culture and language practices. 
1.4 PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This study was motivated in part by a practical concern to create knowledge that 
might be used to alleviate turmoil and contribute to social justice in Xinjiang. In many 
conversations, Han Chinese and Uyghurs confided in me their distrust and (sometimes 
vehement) dislike of one another. In order to obtain data on Han Chinese and Uyghur 
perceptions of each other, I administered a short-answer questionnaire (in English and 
Mandarin) in June 2009 to a group of Han Chinese and Uyghur freshman and sophomore 
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college students at a public university in Urumchi. I was fortunate to have administered 
this questionnaire prior to July 5, 2009 because after that date, I do not believe it would 
have been possible to elicit candid responses. Students in the Uyghur region have since 
been subjected to a succession of patriotic education campaigns aimed in part to 
“establish the ideology that the Han are inseparable from the ethnic minorities, the ethnic 
minorities are inseparable from the Han and the minorities cannot do without one 
another” (The Associated Press, 2010). One hypothetical question asked, “What advice 
would you give to a foreigner new to Urumchi? Are there any places or people he or she 
should avoid?” 
Some of the respondents specified Uyghur (and Muslim) areas as places 
foreigners should avoid, while others identified Uyghurs as dangerous. Two Han Chinese 
students and a Uyghur student made the following comments, respectively: 
If you are the first time been to [Urumchi] be careful for the [Uyghurs]. 
 
I will tell him/her not to get along with the [Uyghur] nationality and don’t 
surprised to the [Uyghur] nationality’s manner. 
 
Do not believe the words which Chinese talk about Uyghurs! Try to make friends 
with Uyghurs. They are not lazy, not dirty! 
 
In my experience, these responses were typical of comments made by Han 
Chinese and Uyghurs in conversations on perceptions of each other. Many Han Chinese 
characterize Uyghurs as lazy and ungrateful of CCP efforts to develop Xinjiang 
(Kaltman, 2007). 
The CCP promotes a narrative of ethnic unity that serves to obfuscate animosity 
among ethnic groups (Millward & Tursun, 2004). However, ethnic discrimination is 
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pervasive in Xinjiang – a subject of private conversation, but taboo in public discourse. 
People tend to make assumptions because many topics are deemed too sensitive to 
discuss in public. For example, Yan Sun, a Professor of Political Science at the City 
University of New York, offered a perspective on “the imposition of Chinese language 
instruction in schools” in Xinjiang that is possibly shared by many Han Chinese. She 
said, “Rather than seeing bilingual education as forced assimilation, my relatives see it as 
a good skill to have in the job market, because many modern-sector jobs will involve 
interaction with Han Chinese in and out of Xinjiang” (Yan, 2009). There is some truth to 
this statement but it is not complete. 
Many Uyghurs do want to learn Mandarin in order to participate in the Han 
Chinese-dominated labor market, but many also believe that the CCP is trying to weaken 
the vitality of their language – one of the most salient aspects of their identity. Some 
Uyghurs believe that the CCP is attempting to disrupt the intergenerational transmission 
of Uyghur culture and language in an effort to assimilate them and weave them more 
securely into the national fabric. In an effort to clarify assumptions, one purpose of this 
dissertation is to present Uyghur perceptions of CCP language policy in Xinjiang. 
In certain historical circumstances, government language policy has provoked 
protest among communities in opposition. This was the case on February 21, 1952 in 
Dhaka, Bangladesh when a demonstration by students and political activists against the 
imposition of Urdu turned bloody (Mohsin, 2003), and June 16, 1976 in Soweto, South 
Africa when a student protest against Afrikaans as a language of instruction turned into a 
riot resulting in hundreds of causalities (Makoni, 2003). The violence of July 5, 2009 in 
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Urumchi was not a direct result of Uyghur resentment toward the promotion of Mandarin 
in the Xinjiang education system, but language policy continues to contribute to the sum 
total of Uyghur discontent (Bovingdon, 2004a; Dwyer, 2005; Schluessel, 2007). 
Language policy is one item on a list of Uyghur grievances, including 
prohibitions and restrictions on religious practices, pro-Han Chinese hiring practices, the 
rapid in-migration of Han Chinese, the coerced out-migration of mostly young Uyghur 
women and the disenfranchisement of Uyghurs in decision-making processes at the 
government level (Bovingdon, 2002, 2004a; Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 2009a; Dwyer, 2005; Toops, 2004a; Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2009a). These 
factors, in aggregate, by 2009, had turned Xinjiang into a tense area. News of the Han 
Chinese-Uyghur ethnic brawl and anger at the CCP response in Shaoguan, Guangdong 
was the spark that set off the Uyghur protest on July 5, 2009. That peaceful 
demonstration was met with violent military action and escalated into a full blown riot 
(Millward, 2009). 
As many Uyghurs are hesitant to engage in public criticism of CCP policies, this 
dissertation is a platform for the expression of views that should be considered by parties 
interested in making Xinjiang a more humane environment (Amnesty International, 
2010b; Human Rights Watch, 2009b; S. Roberts, 2009). 
1.5 OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
In the preceding sections of this first chapter, I have broadly contextualized this 
study by providing data on recent shifts in the demographic composition of Xinjiang and 
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the implementation of policies that promote Mandarin, the language of the dominant 
group. The massive influx of Han Chinese migrants has punctuated the cultural and 
linguistic equilibrium of the Uyghur region (Dixon, 1997). That is, a state of continuity 
(or at least gradual change) has been punctuated by a period of dramatic change. Prior to 
the contemporary wave of CCP propaganda that encourages Uyghurs to identify as 
members of yījiārén (one big [Chinese] family), Uyghur identities were bound to the 
oasis or village of residency. The contemporary demographic shift, along with language 
policies that promote Mandarin in the academic field, threatens to disrupt the 
intergenerational transmission of Uyghur, an important component of Uyghur identity. 
In chapter two, I review literature relevant to this study, beginning with a history 
of the Uyghurs and Xinjiang. I describe the ideological foundations of Confucian and 
Communist civilizing projects. I provide an overview of the history of language policy 
and bilingual education in Xinjiang. I then present the theoretical framework of this 
study, Bourdieu’s theory of practice, and applications of this theory to the study of 
language. The conclusion of the literature review indicates the contributions of the 
present study to existent trends of inquiry. In the third chapter, I present the research 
methodologies used in this study, along with the study objectives and framework; a 
description of the research site; participant selection criteria; a synopsis of methods; and 
data analysis procedures. Content on Xinjiang in chapters two and three serve to 
historicize the socio-political milieu of this region, a necessary precondition for a 
Bourdieusian analysis of language practices. In chapters four and five, I present data 
collected during fieldwork in the form of four emergent themes and four case study 
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narratives. The case study narratives focus on the development of language practices of 
female and male mínkăohàn and bilingual students. In chapter six, I present conclusions 
on Uyghur language practices; Uyghur linguistic assimilation and discontent; and 
thoughts on the unequal distribution of symbolic power among Uyghur and Han Chinese 
ethnic communities in Xinjiang, and how these inequities contribute to the social 
stratification of “legitimate” and “illegitimate” speakers (Bourdieu, 1977a, p. 648). I 
conclude by suggesting actions to support the vitality of this cultural heritage. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This literature review consists of a body of research and knowledge related to the 
region of Xinjiang; the Uyghur ethnic community; sources of Uyghur discontent; the 
geopolitical significance of Xinjiang to China; Confucian and Communist ideologies; 
language policy as implemented by governments of Xinjiang; a critical analysis of 
bilingual education in Xinjiang; Bourdieusian thinking tools; and applications of these 
tools to the study of language. The concluding section serves to situate this study as an 
extension of existing scholarly pursuits, with a focus on ethnography and language 
policy; linguistic rights; case study methods in applied linguistics; and Bourdieusian 
approaches to the investigation of language minority practices in colonized contexts. 
2.2 BACKGROUND ON THE UYGHURS AND XINJIANG 
The modern Uyghurs, depending on where in Xinjiang they reside today, likely 
trace their ancestry to resettled Old Uyghurs, Tocharians (who resided in the area prior to 
the arrival of the Old Uyghurs), in addition to later arrivals of Kipchak speakers near 
Qumul, Turpan, and Lopnur, and later descendants of the Kharakhanids to the west, etc. 
A direct line cannot be drawn between the Uyghur khaghanate (Old Uyghurs) and the 
modern Uyghurs. Any attempt to do so would be ideological and ahistorical. Though the 
following paragraphs focus on the Old Uyghurs, it should be stressed that they are not the 
sole ancestors of the Modern Uyghurs (A. Dwyer, personal communication, November 
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15, 2011). 
The modern Uyghurs have some relation to the Old Uyghurs of the Uyghur 
Khanganate (744-846 CE), an empire based in the Orkhan River valley of Mongolia 
(Barat, 2009; Millward and Perdue, 2004). This empire rose to power after the fall of the 
Göktürk Khanganate, a nomadic confederation that had controlled much of Central Asia 
since the middle of the 6th century. The Göktürk Khanganate was overthrown by a 
conglomerate of tribes, but it was the Huíhú Uyghurs – a branch of the Göktürks – who 
wrested power and took control of Mongolia (Barat, 2009). The Uyghur Khanganate 
eventually extended its rule into Dzungaria, an area in northwest China that corresponds 
with the northern half of present-day Xinjiang and as far west as the Fergana valley of 
Central Asia. Under the Khan Tengri Bögü, the Uyghur Empire adopted Manichaeism as 
its religion. At the end of the 8th century, the Uyghur Khanganate began to fragment, and 
following a famine, civil war and raids by Kyrgyz marauders, collapsed in 846. 
A diaspora resulted, with groups of Old Uyghur people settling across Central 
Asia (Millward & Perdue, 2004). A large contingent of Old Uyghur tribes settled 
between present-day Urumchi and Turpan, establishing the Gāochāng Huíhú Khanate. 
Other tribes went west to the Chu River valley and established the Qarakhanid dynasty of 
Kashgar. The Uyghurs of the Gāochāng Huíhú Khanate intermarried with the indigenous 
populations of the Tarim Basin including Iranian and other Indo-European peoples. 
While this population had adherents of a number of religions including Buddhism, 
Manichaeism and Nestorian Christianity, Buddhism eventually became the dominant 
faith of the Gāochāng Huíhú Uyghurs (Rudelson, 1997). The Qarakhanids of the western 
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Chu River valley began converting to Islam in the middle of the 10th century, but it was 
not until the 18th century that the people of the Tarim Basin oasis, extending to Kumul 
(Hāmì), converted to Islam – often under the threat of violence. The historian Kahar 
Barat asserts that Buddhism continued to be practiced by some Uyghurs in villages in the 
eastern parts of Xinjiang until the 19th century (2009). 
Following a succession of overlords, Chaghatai, the second son of Genghis Khan 
asserted control of Xinjiang in 1227 (Millward & Perdue, 2004). The Moghul successors 
of the Chagatai Khanate ruled the region from the mid-14th century through the 16th 
century. Under the rule of these khans, the people of Xinjiang were heavily influenced by 
Turkic-Islamic culture. Barat identifies the type of rule that existed in Central Asia as 
having a dual nature: 
 [T]he two millenia from the Xiongnu to the Manchu, pastoral-nomadic powers of 
the grasslands and settled city-state powers existed in parallel. Two types of culture, 
two types of societies prospered and existed together. For the most part, the 
horseback peoples were the colonizers and the settled city-states were permitted 
self-rule (2009). 
 
The Manchu Qing invaded this region in 1759 and expelled the ruling Mongols. 
Toops estimates that in the early 1800s, Uyghurs made up around 320,000 (62%) of the 
population of the region, while Han and Hui Chinese constituted around 155,000 (30%) 
(2004a). The Qing settlement policy resulted in the establishment of Chinese towns 
juxtaposed with Uyghur towns or cities where Chinese areas were walled-off from 
Uyghur areas. The historical remnants of ethnic segregation in Urumchi can be discerned 
by the bus stops that feature the names of former city gates like běimén (north gate) and 
nánmén (south gate) (Gaubatz, 1996). 
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Peter Hopkirk captures the state of affairs in Xinjiang by the middle of the 19th 
century: 
 Chinese Turkestan, or Sinkiang as it is today called, had long been part of the 
Chinese Empire. However, the central authorities’ hold over it had always been 
tenuous, for the Muslim population had nothing in common with their Manchu 
rulers and everything in common with their ethnic cousins in Bokhara, Khokand 
and Khiva [all in Uzbekistan], lying on the far side of the Pamirs (1992, pp. 321-
322). 
 
In the early 1860s, the Dungan Revolt, an uprising by Hui Chinese and other 
Muslim ethnic groups, spread from east to west. Taking advantage of the turmoil, the 
Tajik Yaqub Beg captured Kashgar and Yeken (Shāchē Xiàn) from the Chinese and by 
1867 had extended his reign over most of Xinjiang (Shaw, 1871). Beg crowned himself 
Amir of Kashgaria and established his capital in Kashgar. In 1877, Yakub Beg died (by 
stroke or poison) and by 1878 General Zuo Zongtang had reclaimed Xinjiang for the 
Qing Empire (Hopkirk, 1992). On November 18, 1884, the vast northwest frontier was 
declared a province of the Qing Empire and named “xīnjiāng” (new frontier). After the 
collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, and through the Republic of China period, 
Xinjiang was ruled by a succession of Chinese warlords. 
In the early 20th century, most Uyghurs would have referred to themselves not as 
Uyghur, but by a term indicating their oasis or village, or if nomadic, their tribe 
(Shahrani, 1984). The Uyghur ethnonym, fell out of use for nearly 500 years, and not just 
because of Buddhism. It was also associated with Old Uyghur places near Turpan, and 
therefore not associated with Kashgar, Khotan, etc. (A. Dwyer, personal communication, 
November 15, 2011). This ethnonym was only resurrected and repurposed in 1921 when 
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Chinese government officials, coordinating with Soviet advisors, embarked on a naming 
project of “all the groups of these people who had been known hitherto by the names of 
the localities where they lived” (J. Chen, 1977, p. 100). Thus, the modern Uyghur 
ethnonym is a revival of a historical ethnonym. From that instance of revival, the 
ethnonym lost its linkage with Buddhism; “Uyghur” from that point until present denotes 
the sedentary Muslim, Turkic people of Xinjiang (Millward & Tursun, 2004; Rudelson, 
1997). 
In 1931, a Uyghur rebellion occurred in Kumul that spread to the southern rim of 
the Tarim Basin (Rudelson, 1997). This rebellion resulted in the establishment of the 
Turkish Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan (also called the Republic of Uyghurstan), 
comprising the territory from Aksu, along the northern rim of the Tarim Basin, to Hotan 
in the south. The Chinese warlord Sheng Shicai put down the Turkish Islamic Republic 
of Eastern Turkestan by the spring of 1934, aided by the Soviets, who feared that the 
rebellion would spread to neighboring Soviet Central Asian Republics. 
In 1944, this time with the assistance of the Soviets, the East Turkistan Republic 
was established in the northern Xinjiang districts of Ili, Tarbaghatai and Altai (Benson, 
1990). The leadership of the East Turkestan Republic advocated independence from 
Chinese rule and a cessation of Chinese migration to the region. They also called for 
equality among nationalities, the elevation in status of indigenous languages and positive 
relations with the Soviet Union. The East Turkestan Republic came to an end with the 
advance and entrenchment of the People’s Liberation Army in 1949. The leaders of the 
republic, who intended to negotiate the status of their independent state at a conference in 
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Beijing, died in an airplane crash en route to the conference. “Whether it was an accident 
or sabotage was never clarified” (Kadeer, 2009, p. 11). 
The state-sanctioned history of Xinjiang promotes the idea that Han Chinese 
occupation of and sovereignty over this territory originated sometime in deep antiquity 
(Bovingdon, 2004b). CCP texts on the history of Xinjiang feature identical content 
regardless of the language they are printed in, such as the publication History of the 
Xinjiang Region, written in both Uyghur and Chinese (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region Education Commission Higher Education History Teaching Materilas 
Compilation Group, 1992). In its first white paper on the region, the CCP asserted, “since 
the Western Han Dynasty (206 BCE – 24 CE), [Xinjiang] has been an inseparable part of 
the unitary multi-ethnic Chinese nation” (Information Office of the State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2003). Wang Emmao, then secretary of the Xinjiang CCP, 
proclaimed in 1986 that, “the Uyghur nation is not a branch of the great tree of the ‘Turki 
nation’; the Uyghur nation is a branch on the great tree of the Chinese nation” 
(Bovingdon, 2004b). 
At present, the CCP has softened its stance on assertions of Uyghur-Han Chinese 
shared ancestry, although some Chinese historians maintain that the forefathers of 
Uyghurs were related to Han Chinese (Rahman, 2005). The CCP has banned and burned 
books deemed antithetical to the official narrative (Dillon, 2002).1 Still, Uyghur counter-
narratives persist, passed down and around by Uyghur community members. Consistent 
                                                
1 In June 2002, the Kashgar Uyghur Press burned copies of Turghun Almas’ A Brief History of the Huns 
and Ancient Uyghur Literature because these texts were thought to support separatist ideas, i.e. information 
that contradicted the CCP assertion that Xinjiang has been an inalienable part of China since ancient times. 
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with Gladney, my experience was that “the Central Asian Uyghurs know a great deal 
about the two East Turkestan periods of sovereign rule, and they reflect on that quite 
frequently” (Bhattacharji, 2009). 
The history of post-1949 Xinjiang is marked by policies calculated to consolidate 
CCP power and territorial control. In 1954, a group of 100,000 demobilized troops, 
known as the xīnjiāng shēngchǎn jiànshè bīngtuán (Xinjiang Production and 
Construction Corps), were employed to reclaim farmland, build agricultural settlements 
and guard the PRC frontier (Millward & Tursun, 2004). In October 1955, Xinjiang was 
renamed an “autonomous region” of the PRC, a designation widely recognized as 
spurious (Bovingdon, 2004a; Dwyer, 2005; Ghai, 2000). Beginning in 1956, the CCP and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics began to divert ideologically; Maoist policies 
advocating “class struggle” gained ascendency over policies that advocated gradual 
development (Millward & Tursun, 2004). The people of Xinjiang suffered through a 
series of national calamities including The Hundred Flowers movement (1956), The 
Great Leap Forward (1959-1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Of this latter 
campaign, there are no detailed published accounts (Millward & Tursun, 2004), but I did 
hear some stories about this period. Messi2, a consultant, said that during the Cultural 
Revolution many Uyghurs were forced to raise pigs, a repugnant activity because 
Uyghurs, being Muslim, loathe these animals. By 1966, the demography of Xinjiang was 
further altered due to the two million Han Chinese refugees that migrated during The 
                                                
2 All consultants’ names are pseudonyms. 
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Great Leap Forward famine and the 1.6 million Han Chinese relocated for Maoist youth-
rustication programs during the Cultural Revolution. From a historical perspective, Han 
Chinese colonization was not a new policy; since imperial times, Chinese governments 
had implemented policies to settle Han Chinese on peripheral territories to which it laid 
claim (Millward, 2007; Toops, 2004a). However, the scale of Han Chinese settlement 
was remarkable. 
By the mid-1980s, the extremism of the Cultural Revolution had subsided, and the 
people of Xinjiang enjoyed a period of relative cultural and political liberalization; many 
mosques and unofficial religious schools re-opened (Ramzy, 2010). Uyghurs benefited 
from several affirmative action policies. These included exemption from the single-child 
policy (except in urban areas), a lower rate of taxation, better (albeit Mandarin) education 
for their children, greater access to public office, more freedom to speak and learn 
Uyghur, and more freedom to practice Islam (Gladney, 2009). Dwyer, cited in an Al 
Jazeera article (2008), summed up Uyghur popular sentiment in the 1980s and early 
1990s by saying there were many Uyghurs “particularly intellectuals and those in the 
northern area, who felt that the Chinese project in Xinjiang, though very far from perfect, 
was okay.” 
In the 1990s, the CCP began to implement a series of policies aimed at the 
Sinification of Xinjiang; Han Chinese migration was incentivized and the Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps population swelled again (Becquelin, 2000). Starting 
in the first decade of this century, the CCP introduced a policy of “China Western 
Development” to boost the economies of the western provinces. Han Chinese migration, 
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along with the transfer of natural resources to mainland China and a visible growth in 
prosperity in areas populated by Han Chinese, began to shape perceptions of internal 
colonization among the Uyghur population (Bovingdon, 2002; Gladney, 2004).3  
The September 11, 2001 attacks had a profound effect upon Uyghur communities 
in Xinjiang. CCP efforts to “combat separatism,” which had begun in response to the 
Ghulja (Yining) Protests in 1997 were refreshed within the framework of the global anti-
terrorism campaign (Channel Four News, 1997; Human Rights Watch, 2005).4 On 
August 27, 2002, the U.S. listed the East Turkestan Islamic Movement as a terrorist 
organization (Scheuer, 2004) although, according to Gladney, the majority of information 
on this group was not independently corroborated.5 The dubiousness of this information 
provided for “a real credibility gap” and was perhaps “part of a U.S.-China quid pro quo, 
where China supported the ‘war on terror’” and “support of the U.S. for the 
condemnation of [the East Turkestan Islamic Movement] was connected to that support” 
(Goldstein, 2009). Both U.S. and Chinese officials have claimed that the East Turkestan 
Islamic Movement has ties to al-Qaeda, although there is a paucity of evidence to 
substantiate this accusation. The CCP blamed this group, but provided no evidence, for a 
2008 attack in Kashgar that resulted in the deaths of 16 police officers (Wong, 2008). 
                                                
3 By definition, an internal colony typically produces wealth for the benefit of areas most closely 
associated with the state. Members of internal colonies are distinguished by cultural variables such as 
ethnicity, language or religion. They are excluded from prestigious social and political positions, which are 
held by members of the dominant group (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 2000). Although Uyghurs do 
occupy prominent political positions in Xinjiang, no Uyghurs are members of the CCP Politburo, the 
country’s effective ruling body. 
4 The phrase “combat separatism” is in quotes because the CCP typically classifies Uyghur protests as 
“separatist” regardless of the motives of the protestors. 
5 Gladney notes that many of the “terrorist incidents” that China attributes to the East Turkestan Islamic 
Movement are actually “spontaneous and rather disorganized” forms of civil unrest (Bhattacharji, 2009). 
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After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, 22 Uyghurs were captured in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan; these men were sent to the U.S. off-shore prison at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba (Fletcher & Bajoria, 2008). None were indicted for crimes 
against the U.S.; five remain in U.S. custody despite the fact that these men are not 
considered “enemy combatants.” The difficulties in resettling these men have been well-
documented; few nations are willing to accept the detainees because they fear economic 
retaliation from China (Stout, 2007). 
2.2.1 Sources of Uyghur discontent 
The primary sources of Uyghur discontent are CCP policies and projects that 
encourage the migration and settlement of Han Chinese in Xinjiang (Bovingdon, 2004a; 
Toops, 2004b), the forced or coerced migration of mostly young Uyghur women to 
factories located in China’s eastern provinces (Forced Migration Online, 2010; Human 
Rights Without Frontiers, 2010), and ethnic discrimination in the job market 
(Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2009d). Many of the Uyghurs who 
participate in labor-transfer programs do not find the working and living conditions 
satisfactory (Qiu, 2007) and sometimes encounter ethnic violence, as did the Uyghur 
workers of the Xuri toy factory in Shaoguan on June 26, 2009 (Millward, 2009). 
The Congressional-Executive Commission on China reported that the majority of 
employment opportunities in the civil service and state-owned enterprises in Xinjiang are 
consistently reserved for Han Chinese (2009a). The systematic form of ethnic 
discrimination in hiring practices has ramifications on socioeconomic stratification in 
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Xinjiang. In a study of income inequality by region over the years 1990, 1995, 2000 and 
2004, Xinjiang had the highest level of inequality in all four years (Lin, Zhuang, Yarcia, 
& Lin, 2008). Then Xinjiang CCP chief Wang Lequan explained that the disparity in 
hiring practices was due to the lack of qualified candidates. He stated, “One common 
problem of the western region is that the education and cultural level of the people here is 
quite low” (Lim, 2003). 
Uyghur Economist Ilham Tohti indicated that hiring practices were influenced by 
other factors. He estimated in 2010 that as few as 20% of Uyghur college graduates are 
employed. He stated, “Don’t talk about how big China’s GDP is. Even if it becomes the 
world’s largest, who gets to enjoy it? The cities are more and more beautiful, but even if 
it is all as beautiful as the Forbidden City, when we see those buildings, we just feel 
uncomfortable. This is not merely an economic problem. When it comes to looking for 
work, we face discrimination. But it’s not acknowledged” (Ramzy, 2010). 
Uyghurs also complain of discrimination in healthcare. In a survey of 34 Uyghurs 
in Urumchi, Kaltman found that 88% believed that members of their ethnic community 
did not receive the same quality of medical care as Han Chinese (2007). Kaltman 
hypothesized that language was a barrier to adequate treatment, but discovered that the 
majority of Uyghur interviewees believed that “Han doctors simply do not treat [Uyghur] 
patients as well as Han” (2007, p. 42). 
The Congressional-Executive Commission on China and the Uyghur Human 
Rights Project have documented many human rights violations against the Uyghurs of 
Xinjiang (2008b, 2009a; 2009a). Some of these violations are related to the suppression 
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of expressions of Uyghur identity including religion and language. These include the 
non-transparent selection process and arbitrary limitations on the number of Uyghurs 
permitted to make the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca; the prohibition of fasting by Uyghur 
government employees during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan; government 
regulation of training and appointment of Imams at mosques and supervision of sermons. 
Government policies to strengthen the implementation of bilingual education have 
marginalized the use of Uyghur and other minority languages in schools throughout 
Xinjiang by reducing or eliminating class instruction in languages other than Mandarin, 
flaunting protections for ethnic minority languages codified in Chinese law. In population 
control policy, non-Han Chinese ethnic groups, previously exempt from the one-child 
policy, have been targeted in the government’s effort to curb population growth 
(Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2006b).  
Uyghur grievances are not well known because public dissent is not tolerated. 
Those who do criticize CCP policy to foreigners put themselves at risk of detention and 
retaliation (Kadeer, 2009; Public Broadcasting Service, 2005; Radio Free Asia, 2010b). 
The CCP justice system is sometimes used as a weapon for punishing dissent; peaceful 
expressions of ethnic identity and religious activities are often penalized as “extremist” or 
“separatist” (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2009a). The Procuratorial 
Daily reported that arrests on state-security charges in Xinjiang numbered 1,300 in 2008. 
Arrests on these charges in the entire PRC in 2007 only amounted to 742 (Szadziewski, 
2010). Courts in Xinjiang handled a total of 437 cases of “endangering state security” in 
2009, compared with 268 such cases in 2008. “More than 250 people were sentenced to 
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ten years in prison or more for offenses related to endangering State security,” said Rozi 
Ismail, president of the Higher People’s Court of Xinjiang in his 2009 work report (Jia, 
2010b). On December 31, 2009, the Xinjiang CCP “adopted what appeared to be a 
sweeping law barring the spread of views deemed to threaten national unity” (Wong, 
2010). For Uyghurs in Xinjiang, there really is no “legal and peaceful means for 
disenfranchised people to voice their desires” (S. Roberts, 2009). 
On June 26, 2009, a massive ethnic clash, prompted by an Internet-based rumor 
that six Uyghur men had raped two Chinese girls, took place between Han Chinese and 
Uyghur workers at the Xuri toy factory in Shaoguan, in Guangdong Province in southern 
China (Millward, 2009). According to Chinese media, two Uyghurs were killed and 118 
injured (Xinhua News Agency, 2009c), although many suspected that the CCP 
underreported the death toll. One Han Chinese man claimed to have assisted in the 
murder of seven or eight Uyghurs during the riot and estimated the death toll to be more 
than 30, including a few Han Chinese (Watts, 2009). 
On the afternoon of July 5, 2009 in Urumchi, thousands of Uyghurs staged a 
protest demanding a more thorough investigation of the Shaoguan incident. No one will 
ever know who instigated the violence that day, but it is clear that the reservoir of 
discontent referred to above was ignited. Thousands of riot police and security forces 
flooded the city. According to Chinese media, 197 people were killed and 1,721 were 
injured (Hu & Lei, 2009), although those numbers are widely disputed as underestimates. 
The CCP has never provided any count of the Uyghurs killed and injured in revenge 
attacks by Han Chinese on July 7, 2009 or an accurate tally of Uyghurs killed by security 
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forces. The only thing certain is that many people died violent deaths. 
Amnesty International, along with the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights Navi Pillay, urged the Chinese government to launch an independent 
investigation into the July 5, 2009 violence, including the conditions of arrest of 1,400 
people, claims of unnecessary or excessive use of force, and torture and ill-treatment of 
detainees (2010b). A Human Rights Watch report We Are Afraid to Even Look for Them 
(2009b) documented the disappearances of 43 men and boys, although the true number of 
disappearances is thought to be higher. World Uyghur Congress leader Rebiya Kadeer 
claimed that “nearly 10,000” Uyghurs disappeared “overnight” (Jacobs & Fackler, 2009). 
A Uyghur policeman who fled to Kyrgyzstan claimed that 196 Uyghurs “were tortured 
and killed” at a detention center south of Urumchi (Agence France-Presse, 2009). 
Gheyret Niyaz, a Uyghur intellectual, had warned Xinjiang government officials 
that Uyghurs were not satisfied with the CCP handling of the June 26, 2009 Shaoguan 
Incident, but was ignored. After the unrest, Niyaz criticized the CCP when speaking with 
Hong Kong-based journalists. On July 23, 2010, Niyaz was sentenced to prison for 15 
years for charges of endangering state security. According to police, Niyaz had “given 
too many interviews” (Amnesty International, 2010a). 
The CCP blamed the July 5, 2009 violence on “mastermind” World Uyghur 
Congress leader Rebiya Kadeer for fomenting the “three evil forces” of “terrorism, 
separatism and religious extremism” (Human Rights Watch, 2009b). Although the CCP 
alleges that the violence was orchestrated, scant evidence has been produced thus far, the 
primary pieces being a phone call made by Kadeer to her brother, shortly before the 
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violence, warning him to stay off the streets (Jacobs & Fackler, 2009) and letters written 
by Kadeer’s imprisoned family members holding her to blame (Xinhua News Agency, 
2009a). 
“To prevent further unrest, the government blocked access to the Web and 
suspended international calls and short message services in the region 24 hours after the 
[July 5, 2009] riot because they were vital tools used by ringleaders to instigate the riots 
in Urumqi, capital of the region,” said Yang Maofa, director of the regional 
telecommunications administration (Cui, 2009). Thus began “the largest and longest such 
blackout in the world… No country [had] shut down an information infrastructure so 
widely for so long, said the Open Net Initiative, a Harvard-linked partnership that 
monitors Internet restrictions around the world” (Anna, 2010a). Text communication 
services (SMS), with a 20 text per-day limit, were restored on January 17, 2010; 
International calling capabilities were restored on January 20, 2010 and, more than 10 
months after the July 5, 2009 violence, the Internet was restored on May 14, 2010. 
As of April 2012, in connection with the July 5, 2009 violence, 26 people have 
been sentenced to death (Radio Free Asia, 2010a). Human rights organizations, such as 
Human Rights Watch (2009a) and Amnesty International (2009), contend that these trials 
did “not meet minimum international standards of due process and fair trials” (Human 
Rights Watch, 2009a). Nine people have been “hastily” executed thus far (Amnesty 
International, 2009). 
Another spate of protest and violence broke out on September 3 and 4, 2009 
when, incited by rumors that Uyghurs were stabbing Han Chinese with H.I.V.-tainted 
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hypodermic needles, tens of thousands of Han Chinese surrounded government buildings 
in Urumchi and demanded more aggressive government control of Uyghurs (Wong & 
Yang, 2009). In early August, the first syringe attacks had been reported to police, but the 
government did not disclose this information to the public until the middle of the month 
(Wong and Ansfield, 2009). Local officials confirmed 531 cases of reported syringe 
attacks, though only 171 people showed signs of wounds upon examination (BBC, 
2009b). According to the reports, the victims were mostly Han Chinese while the 
attackers were allegedly Uyghur. Many of the protestors called for the resignation of the 
Xinjiang CCP chief Wang Lequan; some called for his execution. At least five people 
were beaten to death during the demonstrations (Hornby, 2009). Three journalists from 
Hong Kong were “punched, kicked and tied up before being detained for three hours” by 
paramilitary police (BBC, 2009a). Xinjiang provincial information director Hou Hanmin 
accused the journalists of inciting crowds of demonstrators “by making hand gestures” 
(Radio Television Hong Kong, 2009). 
During this period of violence, the Uyghur calligrapher and journalist Kaynam 
Jappar was beaten by a Han Chinese mob. While Jappar escaped with his life, the Uyghur 
singer Mirzat Alim was not so fortunate; Alim was beaten to death, his eyes reportedly 
gouged out (Radio Free Asia, 2009a). Urumchi CCP chief Li Zhi and the Xinjiang police 
chief were sacked shortly after the protest. A total of 51 suspects were arrested for the 
syringe attacks – called “terror attacks” by Du Xintao, an official with the regional public 
security department (BBC, 2009b). On September 12, 2009, three Uyghurs, two male and 
one female, were sentenced after a three-hour court session for prison terms ranging from 
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7 to 15 years (Wong & Ansfield, 2009). Laboratory tests found no evidence of victims’ 
exposure to viruses or chemicals (Xinhua News Agency, 2009d). 
2.2.2 Geopolitics, natural resources and CCP investments 
Xinjiang is of incredible strategic importance to the CCP in terms of location and 
resources, including fossil fuels and renewable energy. The Sino-Kazak pipeline, a $700 
million project, which runs 2,798 km from the Caspian shore of Kazakhstan to Xinjiang 
came into operation in 2006, with millions of metric tons already pumped through 
(Xinhua News Agency, 2010). The Central Asia-China gas pipeline, a $7.3 billion 
project, which runs 1,833 km from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan to Xinjiang 
came into operation in December 2009, and will be capable of delivering 40 billion cubic 
meters of natural gas per year once it reaches full capacity between 2012 and 2013 
(Kramer, 2009). 
At 1.66 million square kilometers, Xinjiang is of vast size, and though much of its 
geography is composed of rugged mountains and desert, nearly 68 million hectares 
(41.2%) of the region’s total area is suitable for agriculture, forestry and animal 
husbandry (China Internet Information Center, 2009). Below ground, Xinjiang has 
substantial reserves of oil, natural gas, coal, minerals, ferrous metals (e.g. iron ore) and 
non-ferrous metals (e.g. jade). Oil and natural gas reserves are estimated at 30 billion 
tons, more than 25% of the national total while estimated coal reserves are about 38% of 
the national total (China Internet Information Center, 2009). 
As of December 2009, the Tarim Oilfield was supplying “nearly 50 million cubic 
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meters of [natural] gas each day to 80 [eastern] cities including Beijing and Shanghai” 
(Xinhua News Agency, 2009b). In part from the melting of massive glaciers set in the 
mountains, Xinjiang has an annual 88 billion cubic meters of surface water together with 
25 billion cubic meters of groundwater. Xinjiang is a source of solar energy region as it 
receives sunshine in the range of 2,600 to 3,400 hours per year (China Internet 
Information Center, 2009). Wind is another natural resource; numerous wind farms with 
giant wind turbines convert the winds of the region into energy. 
Between 2000 and 2009, the CCP invested nearly $48 billion in projects aimed at 
the development of infrastructure and transportation (i.e. aviation, railway and road), 
agriculture, forestry and energy sectors (Wines, 2010). Six new airports are scheduled 
open by 2015, bringing the regional total to 22; China’s civil aviation authorities has 
ordered that domestic airlines offer more flights connecting the cities in Xinjiang with 
cities in the mainland. On the ground, the rail network will be increased to more than 
12,000 km by 2020; another $17-20 billion will be spent on the roads of the region, 
including 7,155 km of highways (Xinhua News Agency, 2010). To further integrate the 
region, a pairing-assistance program will require 19 prosperous coastal provinces and 
cities to divert .3 to .6% of their revenues to impoverished parts of Xinjiang from 2011-
2020 (e.g. Beijing is expected to contribute more than $1 billion to the southern city of 
Hotan and surrounding counties) (Jia, 2010a). In addition to projects funded by the CCP, 
the World Bank has committed hundreds of millions of dollars toward transportation and 
agriculture projects throughout Xinjiang, many with the stated goal of raising rural 
incomes in places with predominantly minority populations. 
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The political leadership and economic policies in Xinjiang have undergone 
significant recent change. In April, Wang Lequan, who had served as the Xinjiang CCP 
chief for 15 years, was replaced by Zhang Chunxian (Wong & Ansfield, 2010). In the 
spring and summer of 2010, government-owned newspapers were publishing stories 
touting development and financial investment on a near-daily basis. Many of these 
articles celebrated the initiation of “leapfrog development” or “rapid economic 
development” in Xinjiang, to be funded by tax revenue on coal, oil and natural gas (X. 
Zhang, 2010). Businesses and commercial banks will be eligible for tax breaks, a move 
calculated to encourage expansion in the region. Local authorities will reportedly use 
resource-tax revenues to develop the places where the resources had been extracted. 
President Hu Jintao has pledged that per capita GDP in Xinjiang, now trailing the 
national average by about 25%, will reach parity with the national average by 2015 and 
that poverty will be mostly eliminated from the region by 2020 (Ramzy, 2010).  
As part of the CCP development plan, the Old City of Kashgar – a place that 
many consider a bastion of Uyghur culture – is currently being demolished (Wines, 
2009). The government claims that the Old City, an architectural marvel of mud-brick 
design, is not earthquake safe, despite having endured for centuries. Approximately 
200,000 Uyghurs will be relocated from their homes to Chinese-style apartment blocks 
(Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2009a). Kashgar has also been 
“awarded” status as a Special Economic Zone – a designation that is intended to bolster 
trade with Central Asian states. 
Despite these policy changes, questions persist regarding the beneficiaries of the 
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economic development projects launched in Xinjiang. Nicholas Bequelin, a researcher for 
Human Rights Watch, stated, “In respect of [Uyghur]-Han relations, the main issue is 
discrimination. That cuts across every social class…It’s very clear that [Uyghurs] did not 
have a say in the design of these polices, so it unlikely they will benefit from the 
outcome” (Ramzy, 2010). The CCP calculates that economic investment will resolve the 
ethnic tensions that simmer below the surface of a heavily militarized state of peace 
(Chan, 2010).6 But some are concerned that economic development will not resolve 
tensions in Xinjiang. Tohti remarked, “Xinjiang’s problem isn’t a lack of money, it’s how 
it is allocated” (Ramzy, 2010). Decisions regarding the distribution and investment of tax 
revenue and other funds fall under the purview of the government, from which Uyghurs 
are largely excluded (S. Roberts, 2009). 
2.3 CONFUCIAN AND COMMUNIST CIVILIZING PROJECTS 
A useful heuristic for interpreting CCP policy is the “civilizing project,” defined 
as “a kind of interaction between peoples, in which one group, the civilizing center, 
interacts with other groups (the peripheral peoples) in terms of a particular kind of 
inequality” (Harrell, 1995, p. 4). In this type of interaction, the center is positioned as the 
preeminent form of civilization within a state. Actors authorized by the center have a 
duty to elevate the peripheral peoples’ civilization to that of the center.7 Civilizing 
                                                
6 In addition to the thousands of troops currently stationed in Urumchi, 40,000 high-definition surveillance 
cameras fitted with “riot-proof” protective shells monitor the busses, bus stops, schools, supermarkets, 
department stores, streets and lanes of the city (Anna, 2010b). 
7 Zhōngguó (China) literally means “middle/center country.” Zhōngguórén (Chinese citizen) literally 
means “middle/center country people.” 
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projects are necessarily invasive enterprises where policy is used to re-orient peripheral 
people by altering their language, religion and other daily practices (i.e. habitus 
(Bourdieu, 1977b)). Harrell characterizes the center and periphery interactions as 
“asymmetrical dialogues” (Harrell, 1995, p. 7). This phrase captures the relative degrees 
of power vested by the center and periphery peoples of China whereby the hegemonic 
center manipulates the socio-cultural value system to create and perpetuate a world view 
justifying the status quo of Han Chinese domination over other ethnic communities 
(Gramsci, 1972). 
Chinese civilization has been deeply influenced by Confucianism, one component 
being a hierarchy of human development. This development is based on the training and 
acquisition of a set of philosophical, moral and ritual principles. The molding of the 
person is referred to as wénhùa (culture) – a process of “literary transformation” (Dwyer, 
1998, pp. 70, 72; 2005, pp. 7, 72). The center is in possession of culture, while peripheral 
peoples, lower on the scale of Confucian social evolution, are lacking or without culture. 
Through moral education, acculturation is possible.8 Like any ideology, defined as a set 
of beliefs that is in some degree partial and distorted and serves some specific set of 
social interests (C. Calhoun, 2003), Confucian ideology, and the Communist ideology 
that was to follow, functioned to legitimate an unequal social order. This ideology 
influences the center’s perception of and engagement with peripheral peoples. The center 
operates with the premise that they are obliged to bring the gift of civilization to the 
                                                
8 This idea of education (as designed and implemented by the center) as fundamental to elevate peripheral 
peoples toward civilization was also a central component of European imperialism (Willinsky, 1998). 
 
 34 
periphery; the center has a duty to impart and facilitate transformations. This ideology 
manifests as both altruism and chauvinism as the center asserts a superior cultural and 
political position, always above others (i.e. non-Chinese) who were “not even indirectly 
acquainted with the moral principles laid out in the classics” (Harrell, 1995, p. 18). 
Prior to the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, Chinese governments had tolerated 
the diverse cultural practices of peripheral peoples. Since the founding of the PRC on 
October 1, 1949, the CCP has been engaged in work to consolidate peripheral territories 
and peoples into a unified nation-state. Aspects of Confucian ideology have carried over 
into the Communist period and now inform the perspective and policy of the CCP 
civilizing project. Drawing from Gramsci’s theory of hegemony (1972), Harrell describes 
the CCP civilizing center as conducting a “civilizing project through the creation of 
hegemony, a relationship of superiority and inferiority that maintains the hierarchy by 
justifying it through ideology and institutions, making it seem both proper and natural to 
both the rulers and the ruled (in this case the center and the periphery) and enlisting both 
rulers and ruled in service of the institutions that maintain the order” (1995, p. 8). Harrell 
suggests that the ideology of the civilizing center is reinforced by metaphorical 
conceptions of peripheral peoples as women/children/ancient and the center as 
male/adult/modern (1995, pp. 10-17). 
Where the Confucian scale of development was organized according to variables 
related to culture and technology, the Communist Marxist categorization of the stages of 
societal development is organized according to modes of production. This latter scale 
consists of “the particular stage in the universal progression of history (the primitive, 
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slave, feudal, capitalist, and socialist modes of production) that people have reached at 
the time of [ethnic] classification” (Harrell, 1995, p. 23).9 Since the establishment of the 
PRC and through contemporary times, students in the Chinese education system learn 
this scale as objective fact.10 Unlike the Confucian project, the Communist civilizing 
project does not overtly promote a particular group as the preeminent model of 
civilization, but the de facto center of civilization in the Communist project is also the 
same group in power – the Han Chinese. 
Chinese social scientists conducted an ethnic classification campaign in the 
1950s. One objective of this campaign was to determine where each ethnic group fit on 
the scale of historical development.11 Han Chinese were recognized as having reached 
the highest point on the universal progression of history scale (i.e. socialism) sometime in 
the 1950s (Harrell, 1995). The CCP invested itself with a responsibility to raise the 
civilization levels of the ethnic groups within the borders of the PRC through educational 
and developmental plans (i.e. mínzúo gōngzuò (ethnic work)). 
Under CCP law, all ethnic groups have equal status, and according to Marxism-
Leninism, all ethnic groups are to work together toward common goals. However, in 
practice, pervasive ethnic discrimination obstructs the realization of these objectives. Han 
Chinese ethnic discrimination is described by Harrell as “ingrained prejudice and local 
negative evaluation of minorities. This manifests itself at practically every level of 
                                                
9 The universal progression of history scale is a good example of how “colonized knowledge perpetuates 
the hierarchical structure of society” (Carnoy, 1974, p. 3). 
10 This scale is not accepted without question; one Uyghur friend told me he found it “disgusting.” 
11 Uyghurs were classified as semi-slave, semi-feudal. 
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Chinese society today” (1995, p. 25). Harrell elucidates, “As long as such an innate, 
almost visceral Han sense of superiority remains, the actual program of the Communist 
project will be based on the assumption that Han ways are better, more modern ways. 
Peripheral peoples who act like Han – who are educated, Hanophone, cultured – will be 
treated equally with their Han compatriots. But it is Han culture that sets the standard” 
(1995, p. 26). 
The civilizing center promotes a conception of ethnicity that serves to reproduce 
the hegemony of the center and a divided, yet co-dependent, relationship between this 
center and the periphery. This relationship is often described in familial terms – that of a 
xiōngdì (brotherhood) under mother China (Dwyer, 2005, pp. 53-54). In this 
metaphorical order, Han Chinese are the big brother, while most ethnic minorities are 
little brothers. The little brother is dependent on his elder sibling for social and economic 
advancement.12 It is important to note that within the Chinese family, the older brother 
always has authority over the younger brother, so this xiōngdì relationship locks the 
positions of Han Chinese and other ethnic groups in a perpetual trajectory of dominance 
and subordination. However contrived this metaphor might be, many Chinese fully 
accept it as doctrine and the CCP uses it to justify and legitimize their reign. 
The Communist civilizing project is assimilative because one ideological tenet is 
the convergence of ethnicities, but as Harrell points out, this eventuality “is inconceivably 
                                                
12 This sibling metaphor has substantial currency in the Chinese imagination. When the U.S. sold billions 
of dollars worth of high-tech weaponry to Taiwan in the fall of 2008 (Shanker), many Chinese were 
infuriated. One Dongxiang man explained this anger to me by invoking the sibling metaphor. He 
characterized the fight between China and Taiwan as that between two brothers. He interpreted the 
American weapon deal as a form of interference in a family (i.e. internal) affair. The Dongxiang man told 
me, “When two brothers are fighting with their fists, you don’t sell one of them a gun.” 
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far in the future” (Harrell, 1995, p. 27). Han Chinese must set the standard to which other 
ethnic communities conform, and minority ethnic practices (e.g. religion, language) that 
are deemed impediments to progress must be eliminated. In practice, the Communist 
project is much like the Confucian project because hierarchies of development justify 
center policies that are imposed on the periphery. In this way, the contemporary rulers in 
Beijing constitute an authoritarian, paternalistic form of government that has much in 
common with the dynastic emperors of the past. 
2.4 LANGUAGE POLICY IN XINJIANG: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
This section will bring into focus a specific type of policy – language policy as 
imposed upon the peripheral peoples of Xinjiang in the past century. I first address the 
period spanning 1912-1944, that is, Xinjiang under the rule of Chinese warlords. I then 
describe language policy under the East Turkestan Republic, from 1944-1949. In 1949, 
the CCP took control of this territory and declared it a Chinese province. I will address 
CCP language policy in Xinjiang in terms of decades, working from the 1950s through 
the current millennium. Starting in 2008 and through 2010, the period that I lived in 
Urumchi, I describe CCP language policy in terms of years. 
After the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, Xinjiang was ruled by a series of 
Chinese warlords who used language policy as one tool to retain control of the region 
(Bellér-Hann, 2000). Yang Zengxin, the Governor of Xinjiang from 1912-1928, 
attempted to restrict external (i.e. Central Asian) influences on the peoples of the region 
by restricting the teaching of Russian and making Chinese language instruction 
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compulsory (Bellér-Hann, 2000). However, it is unlikely that Yang had the personnel to 
implement this language policy (Toops, 2004b). Sheng Shicai, the Governor of Xinjiang 
from 1933-1944, took a different approach and reestablished native languages in the 
schools of the region. His objective was not to maintain the vitality of the native 
languages of Xinjiang, but to use the native languages in order to achieve more complete 
government control over the native population (Bellér-Hann, 2000). During this period, 
government schools (staffed mostly by Soviet-trained teachers) co-existed with schools 
operated by ethnic and religious associations. These latter schools, some of which were 
Madrasas, provided education in the native languages of Xinjiang. Ethnic and religious 
schools increased in number and became more popular than government schools. By one 
estimate, between 1934 and 1937, ethnic and religious schools outnumbered government 
schools five-to-one and had nearly double the student enrollment (Bellér-Hann, 2000). 
In 1944, the East Turkestan Republic was established in the northern districts of 
Ili, Tarbaghatai and Altai. The Peace Agreement of January 2, 1946, signed by 
representatives of the East Turkestan Republic and representatives of the Chinese central 
government, had a specific provision for languages of formal school education: 
In all primary and middle schools, students will be educated in their own native 
languages; in middle schools, Chinese (guówén) will be used in all compulsory 
classes. At the university level, according to the needs of the subject, Chinese 
(guówén) or the Muslim language (Huíwén) will be used equally for education 
(Bellér-Hann, 2000, p. 191). 
 
 The East Turkestan Republic promoted both native languages, including Uyghur, 
Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik, Tatar and Taranchi, and Mandarin as languages of 
instruction in the education system. These languages were used as mediums of instruction 
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in primary school, and through junior secondary school, Mandarin was taught as a subject 
for six to eight hours a week (Schluessel, 2007). The education system of the East 
Turkestan Republic came to an end when the PRC took control over the territory in 1949. 
Starting in 1949 and through the 1950s, the founders of the PRC gave a certain 
amount of control over local education to the autonomous units established in the 
regional autonomy system; official language policies were tolerant of linguistic diversity 
(Benson, 2004; Dwyer, 2005; Zhou & Hongkai, 2004). The first constitution of the PRC 
decreed, “every ethnic group has the freedom to use and develop its own language and 
script” (Lam, 2005). In 1952, the State Council issued a set of guidelines for the 
autonomous regions of the PRC, which required autonomous governments “to adopt the 
languages of all minority nationalities within their jurisdiction for the development of 
these minorities’ culture and education” (Zhou, 2003, p. 44). 
The CCP concurrently maintained a language ideology that promoted a common 
language as indispensible – a tool for survival. Mandarin, the language of the most 
populous and most “developed” ethnic group was positioned at the top of the PRC 
linguistic hierarchy. In line with Marxist-Leninist thought, the spread of this language 
was deemed both natural and necessary. As asserted by Stalin, “without a language 
understood by society and common to all its members, that society must cease to 
produce, must disintegrate and cease to exist…while [language] is a medium of 
intercourse, it is at the same time an instrument of struggle and development of society” 
(Cheng & Lehmann, 1975). This ideology of monolingualism was not unique to Stalin or 
Marxism-Leninism. British linguist Randolph Quirk characterized the link between 
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language and nation as one of necessary unity: 
We have come to take it as axiomatic that the norm of national unity is linguistic 
unity: One nation, one language, with its standard determined by and emanating 
from the nation’s capital – the seat of political authority, as well as authority in 
other respects (taste in architecture, literature, couture) (Quirk, 1982, p. 57). 
 
In the early 1950s, Uyghur schools were modeled on the Soviet education system; 
the curriculum was designed by Uyghur and Russian educators and Uyghur was the 
language of instruction (W. C. Clark, 1999a). The CCP’s close relationship with the 
Soviet Union resulted in a language policy that replaced the Arabic-based script with a 
Cyrillic-based script (Dwyer, 2005). When the Sino-Soviet split occurred in 1958, the 
Cyrillic-based script was abandoned for a Latin-based script – the same orthography used 
in the transliteration system of hànyǔ pīnyīn (Benson, 2004; Dwyer, 2005). The selection 
of hànyǔ pīnyīn was motivated in part by a desire to facilitate the convergence of writing 
systems (Zhou, 2003). With each change in the Uyghur orthographic standard, new 
teaching materials had to be prepared and teachers retrained; these shifts had negative 
implications on Uyghur literacy. Han Chinese in Xinjiang were educated in separate 
Chinese schools, using materials prepared in mainland China (Benson, 2004). In 1956, 
the curriculum was modified, requiring all students attending native language schools to 
study Mandarin for two to three hours (Taussig, 1956). Starting in 1957, Uyghurs in 
Urumchi were permitted to attend Han Chinese schools, an attractive prospect to Uyghur 
parents who envisioned Mandarin fluency as a useful skill for their children to advance in 
the new Han Chinese dominated system (W. C. Clark, 1999a). 
Maoist policies for socialist construction and enforced labor that had begun in the 
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1950s continued into the 1960s. The ideological persecutions of The Hundred Flowers 
movement in 1956 were followed by the economic chaos and famine of the Great Leap 
Forward period of 1959-1961. Mao Zedong’s horrific succession of mass movements 
reached a catastrophic climax in the Cultural Revolution, beginning in 1966 (Millward & 
Tursun, 2004). Like other places in mainland China, the Xinjiang education system was 
brought to a halt during much of the Cultural Revolution (Benson, 2004). During this 
period, minority languages were considered useless and backward. “The use of some 
minority languages was discontinued by force” (Lam, 2005, p. 127) 
The Cultural Revolution “officially” ended with Mao’s death in 1976. A CCP 
Constitution promulgated in 1975, shortly before Mao’s passing, was amended so that 
while ethnic minorities were still allowed to use their languages, they were no longer 
encouraged to develop them (Zhou, 2003). In December 1978, linguistic rights were 
restored to ethnic minority groups. 
In 1979, another shift occurred in Uyghur orthography; the Arabic-based script 
was revived and the Latin-based script was abandoned (Dwyer, 2005). This resulted in a 
situation where Uyghurs educated in the 1950s and 1960s were literate in a Uyghur script 
that differed from the script being taught to their children. These script changes aroused 
suspicions among Uyghurs that the CCP was attempting to divide the Uyghur 
generations, but it is more likely that these changes were motivated by the CCP’s shifting 
foreign relations (Benson, 2004). 
In the 1980s, several pieces of legislation were passed that gave legal protection 
to ethnic minority languages and autonomous regions. A new constitution, the current 
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version, was adopted in 1982, which affirmed in Article 4 that “[t]he people of all 
nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written 
languages, and to preserve or reform their own ways and customs” (Chinese Communist 
Party, 1982). Article 121 provided for local language use in government functions and 
Article 134 provided for local language use in legal proceedings. 
The Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law of 1985 included several articles on 
language and education. Article 10 stated that “[a]utonomous agencies in ethnic 
autonomous areas guarantee the freedom of the nationalities in these areas to use and 
develop their own spoken and written languages and their freedom to preserve or reform 
their own folkways and customs” (Chinese Communist Party, 1984). Article 36 stated 
that “[i]n accordance with state guidelines on education and in accordance with the law, 
autonomous agencies in ethnic autonomous areas decide on educational plans in these 
areas, on the establishment of various kinds of schools at different levels, and on their 
educational system, forms, curricula, the language used in instruction and enrollment 
procedures” (Chinese Communist Party, 1984). Article 37 specified that “[s]chools 
(classes) and other educational organizations recruiting mostly ethnic minority students 
should, whenever possible, use textbooks in their own languages and use these languages 
as the media of instruction” (Chinese Communist Party, 1984). The role of Mandarin 
language education was also made explicit; Article 37 stated that “[b]eginning in the 
lower or senior grades of primary school, Han language and literature courses should be 
taught to popularize the common language used throughout the country and the use of 
Han Chinese characters” (Chinese Communist Party, 1984).  
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A separate-but-equal education system was established in Xinjiang for schools 
using Mandarin and ethnic minority languages as languages of instruction (Schluessel, 
2007). In practice, this segregated system was unequal – funds were not allocated 
uniformly and instructors at ethnic minority schools lacked sufficient training. Mandarin 
was taught as a second language at ethnic minority schools, typically four hours per 
week. Ethnic minority students were required to study Mandarin as a second language, 
which denied them the choice of studying English or another foreign language, options 
available to their Han Chinese counterparts (Benson, 2004). 
In 1984, Mandarin language education was expanded at ethnic minority schools 
through the region; the starting year for Mandarin language study was lowered to the 
third grade of primary school (Dwyer, 2005). A 1985 law made Mandarin language 
education compulsory in all cities and towns; schools serving nomads (i.e. boarding 
schools) were expected to make this transition by 1987 (Schluessel, 2007). Despite 
numerous laws and proclamations calling for Mandarin competency among the ethnic 
minority students of Xinjiang, levels of Mandarin competence in the mid-1980s were 
markedly lower than in other areas of China with sizable ethnic minority populations 
(Dwyer, 2005). 
In 1991, a note from the CCP State Council indicated that despite there being 
insufficient guidance, personnel and financial support for ethnic minority language 
development, bilingualism should be encouraged among government personnel, and 
minority languages should be used in education or bilingual education (Chinese 
Communist Party, 1996). Lam (2005) speculated that “[t]his bilingual policy stance could 
 
 44 
in part be motivated by the recognition that, without a good balance of accommodation 
and assimilation tendencies among its ethnic groups, a country with several nationalities 
might disintegrate into its component nationalities as in the case of the Soviet Union in 
1991” (2005, p. 128). 
In the early 1990s, bilingual education was made compulsory in large technical 
schools and universities and experimental bilingual language classes for minority 
students were established in several cities throughout Xinjiang (Uyghur Human Rights 
Project, 2007). Although bilingual education was conducted in both Uyghur and 
Mandarin, the high status accorded to Mandarin was demonstrated by the use of this 
language as the language of instruction in math and science courses. In 1997, “Xinjiang 
classes” (boarding schools in mainland China) were established in 12 cities; top 
performing minority students in Xinjiang are awarded the opportunity to attend these 
schools (Su, 2006). 
This first decade of the new millennium has been marked by CCP rhetoric 
denigrating the value of ethnic minority languages in Xinjiang. In 2002, Xinjiang CCP 
chief Wang Lequan suggested that ethnic minority languages were antiquated, had 
limited lexicons, and were unsuitable for formal education contexts (Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service, 2002). In 2005, Wang asserted that government authorities are 
“resolutely determined” to promote Mandarin language use, which he identified as “an 
extremely serious political issue” (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
2005). Officials consistently frame the conversation on bilingual education is terms of 
raising the “quality” of minority students so that students can receive a “modern 
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education.” One Uyghur professional commented, “This new wave is like a new Cultural 
Revolution for the Uyghurs. In the first Cultural Revolution the Chinese government 
destroyed the intellectuals. Now they are in the process of destroying the language” 
(Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2007). Dwyer, cited in an Al Jazeera article (2008), 
summarized the CCP and Uyghur perspectives: 
From the point of view of the government, this [change in language policy] is 
because Uighur pupils and university students don’t have the adequate Chinese 
language skills to be competitive in the market economy. But from the point of 
view of the Uighurs, this is a bold-faced attempt to be assimilated and it has not 
been viewed favourably. 
 
The CCP rhetoric has been backed up by a succession of language policies and 
financial support in favor of Mandarin. In September 2002, Xinjiang University was 
ordered to cease Uyghur language instruction (Wingfield-Hayes, 2002). The start of 
Mandarin instruction for ethnic minority students was lowered to the first grade (Dwyer, 
2005). Ethnic minority teachers at all levels are now required to pass the hànyǔ shuǐpíng 
kǎoshì (Chinese Language Proficiency Test), an exam of Mandarin proficiency for non-
native speakers. Veteran teachers who score too low are forced or retire or take Mandarin 
classes (Schluessel, 2007). In March 2004, the Xinjiang Daily decreed that “ethnic 
minority schools must be merged with ethnic Chinese schools and ethnic minority 
students must be mixed with ethnic Chinese students. Teaching should be conducted in 
Chinese language as much as possible” (Radio Free Asia, 2004). 
Ethnic minority schools have converted, or are converting, to a bilingual 
curriculum where Mandarin is the language of instruction and ethnic minority languages 
have subject status. By 2006, the number of students receiving bilingual education in 
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Xinjiang had expanded 50-fold within six years (Congressional-Executive Commission 
on China, 2008a). Schools that could not convert immediately were expected to adhere to 
a multiyear plan where they would annually increase the amount of Mandarin instruction 
(Schluessel, 2007). Also in 2006, preschools in seven agricultural prefectures began using 
Mandarin as a language of instruction, with cash subsidies offered to entice families and 
teachers to enroll children (Wu, 2006). The CCP also encouraged Mandarin language 
studies for ethnic minority peoples who did not develop proficiency in Mandarin during 
their formal education. Several rural villages and counties established programs to teach 
basic Mandarin to migrant workers. Adult ethnic minority peoples who did not attend 
Mandarin medium schools in their youth were provided with a $44 subsidy toward 
Mandarin-language training (Schluessel, 2007). 
In 2008, the government continued its push for bilingual education. In March of 
2008, Nur Bekri, CCP chairman of Xinjiang, linked bilingual education with the fight 
against terrorism, describing criticisms of bilingual education as an attack from the “three 
forces” of terrorism, separatism and extremism operating from abroad. Bekri asserted that 
the Xinjiang bilingual education program ascribed equal value to ethnic minority 
languages and Mandarin, despite wide recognition, including from official Chinese 
media, that language policies were favorable to Mandarin (Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 2008b). 
Bilingual preschools, already widespread in some areas of Xinjiang 
(Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2008a), with 180,458 ethnic minority 
students enrolled as of 2007, received a financial boost of $549 million, nearly a nine-
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fold increase in funding over amounts pledged in 2006. A target rate was set of over 85 
percent ethnic minority student preschool enrollment in rural areas by 2012 (Xinhua 
News Agency, 2008). 
Ethnic minority teachers continue to face language requirements, with penalty of 
dismissal or transfer to non-teaching positions for failure to conform (Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 2008b). Teachers above 35 years of age and those who 
do not have “appropriate” viewpoints toward religion, ethnicity and the Marxist state, as 
well as demonstrated loyalty to the CCP face additional barriers (Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 2009a; Radio Free Asia, 2009b). In the fall of 2008, the 
Xinhua News Agency reported that 15,600 bilingual primary school teachers would be 
recruited to Xinjiang between 2008 and 2013 to fill the “teacher shortage” for bilingual 
teachers at the primary school level and maintain the bilingual language education begun 
in preschool (2008). Ten colleges and universities in mainland China were enlisted to 
dispatch students to meet the “teacher shortage” (Dalin, 2008). By October 2008, the 
number of ethnic minority students in preschool through high school in Xinjiang who 
received bilingual education increased by more than 125,000 students year on year 
(Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2009c). 
The year on year increase in 2009 for Mandarin education reached 150,000 
(Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2010b). A total of 753,300 ethnic 
minority students at all education levels, representing 31.79 percent of the ethnic minority 
student population of Xinjiang, received bilingual education, an increase of over 25 
percent from the previous year. Combined with the bilingual student population, the two 
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groups of students receiving education in Mandarin made up almost 42 percent of the 
ethnic minority student population. 
In 2009, the promotion of bilingual education at the preschool level continued 
with more teacher recruitment and pledges of hundreds of millions of dollars in funding 
(Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2010b). The government set 2012 as 
the target date for the establishment of 2,237 more bilingual preschools throughout the 
region (Jia, 2009a). 
In June 2009, Xinjiang CCP chairman Nur Bekri again linked Mandarin language 
education with terrorism stating, “Terrorists from neighboring countries mainly target 
Uygurs that are relatively isolated from mainstream society as they cannot speak 
Mandarin” (Jia, 2009b). As opportunities for higher education are contingent on 
Mandarin language competence, an incentive structure has been entrenched that promotes 
Mandarin at the expense of other languages; however, this “need stems from government 
failures to implement autonomy in ethnic minority regions as provided in Chinese law” 
(Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2008b).  
The CCP language policy trends of previous years showed no signs of abating in 
2010. That year, the number of students enrolled in preschools throughout the Uyghur 
region climbed to 290,000 (Wang, 2010). In late May, Xinjiang CCP chief Zhang 
Chunxian announced a series of initiatives for the region, one calling for a further 
intensification of bilingual education with the objective of region-wide student 
competence in Mandarin by 2020 (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
2010a). The Congressional-Executive Commission on China has asserted that “the 
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[Chinese] government’s bilingual policy is tied to broader political objectives in the 
region” including the promotion of  “patriotism, ethnic unity, and stability” (2010b). 
My study was informed by the history of CCP language policy in Xinjiang 
because of my focus on how languages exist and evolve in an ecosystem along with other 
languages, and how they [their speakers] “interact with their socio-political, economic 
and cultural environments’” (Hornberger, 2002, p. 35). An ecological perspective on 
CCP language policy in Xinjiang is productive for the exploration of issues related to 
hegemony, including monolingual and monocultural ideologies. As Spolsky (2004) 
suggested, the investigation of language policy is meaningful because this activity 
facilitates our understanding of “what non-language variables co-vary with language 
variables” (p. 8). Language management, defined as a direct effort to manipulate a 
language situation (Spolsky, 2004, p. 8), is complex, whether a government is attempting 
to facilitate the language assimilation of a particular population or a community is 
engaging in language maintenance or revitalization. This study investigates CCP 
language policy as an activity with historical momentum and a tool (exercised through 
the school) for social and cultural reproduction (Apple, 1982; Bourdieu, 1977c; 
Valenzuela, 1999).      
2.5 CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BILINGUAL EDUCATION IN XINJIANG 
According to contemporary scholars (C. Baker, 2001), bilingual education refers 
to education in more than one language, often encompassing more than two languages. 
Bilingual education programs typically use the target language as a medium of 
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instruction, that is, bilingual education programs teach content through a language variety 
other than the children’s home language. According to García (2008), “Bilingual 
education programs operate with the broader general goal to “educate generally, 
meaningfully, equitably, and for tolerance and appreciation of diversity” (p. 38). The 
term “bilingual education” is used to denote both a type of program and in reference to “a 
wide range of programs that may have different ideological orientations toward linguistic 
and cultural diversity, different target populations and different goals for those target 
populations” (Freeman, 2007, p. 4; Hornberger, 1991).  
In Freeman’s (2007) review of bilingual education, models and program types are 
“organized around a major ideological distinction between the transitional bilingual 
model on the one hand and the dual language model on the other” (p. 4). Transitional 
bilingual programs use students’ first language as the language of instruction in the early 
years of formal education, and then transition to the use of a target language as the 
language of instruction, with the goal being target language development and academic 
achievement in the target language. Transitional bilingual programs tend to lead to 
subtractive bilingualism (Valenzuela, 1999) and deculturation (Spring, 1994). Dual 
language programs have the goal of bilingualism, biliteracy, and academic achievement 
in two languages, tending to support additive bilingualism. As Freeman (2007) 
emphasizes, these program orientations have “serious implications for individual 
students, for schools, and for society overall” (p. 4). 
According to Schluessel, “In the case of Xinjiang and of China in general, 
‘bilingual education’ is a euphemism for the mandatory increase in the use of Mandarin 
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in minority-language-speaking children’s school environments in place of the languages 
that are those students’ everyday medium of communication” (Schluessel, 2007, p. 251). 
This trend toward monolingual Mandarin education can be seen at all levels of instruction 
(Dwyer, 2005). At the tertiary level in Xinjiang, the shift to monolingual Mandarin 
education was completed in September 2002, when Xinjiang University discontinued 
Uyghur-language instruction, despite widespread protest (Groβe, 2002; Wingfield-Hayes, 
2002). Mandarin is now the main medium of instruction in the bilingual primary and 
secondary schools of Xinjiang (Schluessel, 2007). In the bilingual classrooms of 
Xinjiang, Mandarin language education and instruction through Mandarin is compulsory 
from the first grade, with Uyghur taught as if it were a second language (Dwyer, 2005). 
All subjects are taught in Mandarin, except for Uyghur language arts (i.e. reading, 
spelling, literature, and composition). 
Bilingual education in Xinjiang consists of marginal Uyghur language support. In 
theory, this language policy requires all bilingual schools in Xinjiang to use Mandarin as 
the language of instruction, with Uyghur to be taught as a subject, providing “the 
opportunity to learn Uyghur language, culture, and literature as part of their curriculum” 
(Radio Free Asia, 2011a). Schluessel (2007) suggests that in the standard parlance of 
bilingual education theory, bilingual education as implemented in Xinjiang bears closer 
resemblance to monolingual structured immersion programs, in which minority first-
language students are immersed in a second language, but with supplementary instruction 
in the second language or classes in the first language.  
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Ostensibly, bilingual education for Uyghurs in Xinjiang might be classified as a 
dual language program, but the dominance of Mandarin suggests that this form of 
bilingual education “is designed to transition minority students from education in their 
mother tongue to education in Chinese” (Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2007). In the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Party Committee 2010-2020 Education Reform 
and Development Plan (2011), the promotion of bilingual education is described as being 
of “strategic significance” for goals including “building a new model of socialist ethnic 
relations” and “promoting cohesion and centripetal force toward the Chinese nation 
(zhōnghùa mìnzù).” The stated goals of Mandarin language development and academic 
achievement, coupled with a nationalist and assimilationist ideology is suggestive of a 
transitional orientation. Perhaps this is why many agencies, including the CCP (2008a, 
2008b), U.S. (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2008a, 2009c, 2010b), 
and human rights organizations (Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2007), often use the 
word bilingual, in quotes when referring to bilingual education for ethnic minority 
students in Xinjiang. Bilingual education in Xinjiang might be called an ideological 
euphemism. 
The implementation of language policy in Xinjiang is not uniform, contingent 
upon the capacity in particular areas to teach Mandarin effectively, policy interpretations 
by local government officials, local ideologies and economic resources (Dwyer, 2005). 
As Strawbridge (2008) noted, “All minority children in Yining City since September 
2007, are required to learn Mandarin from grade one, and do not have any instruction in 
mother tongue. These children will continue to be taught in Mandarin as they progress 
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through primary school, and will learn basic skills in mother tongue only from grade four. 
In other areas of Xinjiang, including Urumchi Municipality, primary teachers will use 
Mandarin as the language of instruction from 2009, and minority children will have 
between two and four periods per week of mother tongue taught as a subject” (p. 2). 
Although implemented in different ways, the common denominator to bilingual 
education for Uyghurs in Xinjiang is that Mandarin is dominant and Uyghur is of 
marginal academic status. I make this latter claim because Uyghur language competence 
is not a component of the national college entrance exam, compulsory for entrance into 
almost all higher education institutions at the undergraduate level in China. As expressed 
by Zhou (2004), minority language policy in China is defined by “equality in theory and 
inequality in practice” (p. 71). 
2.6 BOURDIEU’S THEORY OF PRACTICE 
In the preceding sections, I presented information on the history of the Uyghurs 
and Xinjiang, including sources of contemporary Uyghur discontent, and geopolitics, 
natural resources and CCP investments. I provided an overview of some of the 
ideological tenets of Confucian and Communist civilizing projects. I then examined the 
past century of language policy in Xinjiang. These social and material conditions, 
historically produced, structure the milieu under investigation. This background 
information is intended to support a “diachronic, or historicized, approach to 
language…in order to highlight and explore how particular languages come to accrue 
status and power over time in particular social and political contexts” (May, 2011, p. 
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148). This is a central component to a Bourdieusian approach to the study of language. In 
this section, I provide on overview of Bourdieu’s theory of practice and the thinking tools 
I employ to analyze the language practices of my case study participants.  
Bourdieu invoked the metaphor of games to capture his sense of social life, but 
apart from being an activity that one enters or engages in with conscious deliberation, 
Bourdieu’s conception of social life involves games that require our active engagement, 
regardless of consent (1990). Agents in the game need not only grasp and follow the rules 
that define it, but develop a social sense of how to play. Agents learn how to conform to 
existing cultural practices. This conformity demonstrates a commitment to the stakes of 
the game – what is invested in the hope of gain. “There are different possible approaches 
to each contest, and to each moment in the contest” (C. Calhoun, 2003, p. 275). This 
game requires strategy and constant improvisation, with anticipation and responsiveness 
to the play of one’s opponent. Improvisations and movements are responses to social and 
cultural structures; they are informed by previous experience and influenced by external 
and internal constraints.  
One of Bourdieu’s intellectual projects was to challenge and transcend 
dichotomies that he considered false, such as theory versus practice, and objective 
structure versus subjective action. Bourdieu saw these oppositions as inseparably related 
to each other, forming dialectical relationships: “Seemingly fixed objective structures 
have to be created and produced; apparently voluntary subjective actions depend on and 
are shaped by objective conditions and constraints; knowledge and action consistently 
inform each other, rather than theory guiding practice by a fixed set of rules” (C. 
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Calhoun, 2003, p. 286). 
Bourdieu asserted that rules did govern complex social games, but that practical 
activity involves continuous adaptation and strategic action to circumstances. Culture 
does not consist of a finite set of rules that people must follow; individuals depend on 
resources, practical dispositions and strategies that allow for the improvisation of actions 
where no learned rules are applicable or available. Rules are “themselves the product of a 
small batch of schemes enabling agents to generate an infinity of practices adapted to 
endlessly changing situations, without those schemes ever having been considered as 
explicit principles” (Bourdieu, 1977b, p. 16). Players in the game attempt to accomplish 
things under conditions of uncertainty. “Not only is the future not yet settled, but the 
actor cannot see the whole of society, the player can only see the game from his or her 
particular position within it” (C. Calhoun, 2003, p. 287). The underlying conditions of 
possibility based on the practical subjective knowledge of the social world become the 
basis of human action. The ways human beings act are the result of practical, durable 
dispositions that they develop through their experience of objective structures. In this 
way, human action and objective structures exist in a dialectical relationship. A logic of 
interest shapes human action, even when not conscious, for action is interested even 
when it appears not to be. 
When we are born into this world, we are already involved in something much 
larger than ourselves – a nexus of social games. Much of the power of the socialization 
process, our orientation to these social games, is experienced in bodily terms; these 
experiences are internalized and become part of who we are and how we exist in the 
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world. Objective structures, the “material conditions of existence characteristic of a class 
condition,” are involved in the production of our habitus, defined as “systems and 
durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as 
structuring structures…collectively orchestrated without being the product of the 
orchestrating action of a conductor” (Bourdieu, 1977b, p. 72). These durable dispositions 
constitute our habitus – the embodiment of a highly consistent style. 
Habitus is both an ontological and cognitive disposition. Though we are born with 
different types of potential, habitus is not some innate characteristic. Habitus forms from 
interactions between institutions and bodies; it is the fundamental way in which each 
person as a biological being connects with the socio-cultural order. This connection 
ensures that social games are propagated and that their meaning is retained. In Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice, objective structures do not determine our habitus, nor do individuals 
possess full creativity or full free will, but through a combination of culture and 
cognition, we develop practical dispositions to act in certain ways. “Out of what meets 
with approval or doesn’t, what works or doesn’t, we develop a characteristic way of 
generating new actions, of improvising the moves of the game of our lives” (C. Calhoun, 
2003, p. 292).  
We learn and incorporate into our habitus a sense of what we can reasonably 
accept from our moves. These games require not just knowledge of the rules but a 
practical sense for the game. The habitus is “the durably installed generative principle of 
regulated improvisations” made up of “cognitive and motivating structures” which enable 
people to generate appropriate practices in response to demands placed on them by the 
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“objective potentialities in the situation” (Bourdieu, 1977b, p. 78). Habitus is each 
individual’s characteristic set of dispositions for action and also a source of strategies for 
the effective play of social games.  
Social activities are organized into different autonomous fields, such as the arts, 
education, politics, law and economy, each having its own distinctive set of rules and 
stakes of play. Habitus and field exist in a dialectical relationship: 
On one side, it is a relation of conditioning: the field structures the habitus, which 
is the product of the embodiment of the imminent necessity of a field (or of a set 
of intersecting fields, the extent of their intersection or discrepancy being at the 
root of a divided or even torn habitus). On the other side, it is a relation of 
knowledge or cognitive construction (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 127). 
 
Social agents who possess habitus predicate the existence of a field and the 
particular set of perceptual schemata necessary to constitute a field and imbue it with 
meaning. Participation in a field impinges on habitus because involvement results in 
ontological and cognitive incorporation into one’s habitus. The specific dispositions 
(including knowledge of rules and constraints) that form habitus provide for the 
constitution and propagation of the field. The meeting of habitus and field is one of 
incorporated (subjective) history and objectified history. Habitus structures the field and 
the field, as a structured social space, mediates between habitus and practice. 
The concept of capital is an intrinsic component of Bourdieu’s theory of practice 
because “capital does not exist and function except in relation to a field” (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992, p. 101). Capital is manifest in various forms such as material property 
(economic capital), networks of connections (social capital), language (cultural capital) 
and prestige (symbolic capital) (Bourdieu, 1984; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). All forms 
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of capital can be accumulated, lost and converted between fields, although the dynamics 
of conversion can be problematic. Resources and various forms of capital interact in the 
process of conversion. It is “[t]he specific kinds of resources accumulated by those who 
are winners in the struggles of various fields and the more general forms of capital – such 
as money and prestige – that make possible translations from one to the other” (C. 
Calhoun, 2003, p. 294). 
Each form of capital is tied to a different field of action and conversion between 
fields can take one of two forms. The first is intergenerational, where capital is passed on 
and reconverted, such as when a parent funds the education of a child at an elite school. 
Educational credentials form cultural capital that can be converted into symbolic capital 
and later material capital. This results in the reproduction of capital. The second form of 
conversion is more immediate where symbolic capital accumulated by an individual is 
directly converted into material wealth. Bourdieu’s theory of capital differs from the 
Marxist conception of capital in that, for Bourdieu, there are many different kinds of 
goods that people pursue and resources they accumulate. These resources are basically 
social because their meaning and value is derived from the social relationships that 
constitute diverse fields. Bourdieu asserts that the struggle to accumulate and reproduce 
capital is equally fundamental, and that successful conversions play an important role in 
these processes. 
Bourdieu conceives of language as a form of embodied cultural capital. Linguistic 
capital, one’s mastery of and relation to language, is a means of communication and self-
presentation acquired from one’s surrounding culture (Bourdieu, 1990). But language is 
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not only a system of communication passed down through generations. It is also a 
mechanism of power, shaped by and shaping socio-historical contexts (Bourdieu, 1991). 
The modern capitalist nation-state utilizes the education system in order to impose and 
naturalize the legitimate language and orthographic standard, thus sanctioning an 
environment of differential access. The legitimate language of instruction in the 
education system is also the official, standard language, and the language of the 
privileged or elite class. Differential access to linguistic forms, and socio-cultural 
experiences in which to develop notions of appropriateness, gives some students a 
relative advantage over others. In a stratified society, where linguistic forms exist in a 
hierarchy of communication, regional dialects and non-legitimate languages are socially 
devalued. Thus the school is a context for conflict, competition (and co-operation among 
the elite class) involving the corresponding levels of linguistic and social differentiation. 
Bourdieu argues that particular linguistic practices obtain value from their 
association with prestige (or dominant) groups and institutional authority (1991). In the 
linguistic market, a symbolic market made up of various social domains within which 
linguistic exchanges take place, value both emerges and is profited from. Practices that 
are embedded in an individual’s communicative and conceptual routines, as linguistic 
habitus, represent a stock of linguistic capital. As a symbolic unit of exchange, linguistic 
capital can be utilized to advance (or hinder) one’s social and linguistic projects. 
However, conversion between forms of capital can be problematic. 
The distribution of opportunities in a given society is shaped by power. Power is 
not only situated in stratified societies, but is an energy that can be exercised, transferred 
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and maintained. Stratified societies are not neutral – they must be reproduced and 
sustained (Hebdige, 1979). Reproduction occurs when an aggregate of social groups exert 
“total social authority” over other subordinate groups by “winning and shaping consent 
so that the power of the dominant classes appears both legitimate and natural” (S. Hall, 
1979). Social structures are internalized as we experience them – “they are inside each of 
us because we have learned from the experience of previous actions” (C. Calhoun, 2003, 
p. 289). We develop our practical understanding of these structures through our learning 
of categories (doxa) made available by culture and though our own active development of 
understanding. Social structures, like ideologies, appear as natural and are transparent 
because, through a process of historical continuance, stratification becomes 
conventionalized. 
Bourdieu’s framework integrates a theory of social structure (the field), a theory 
of power relations (the various forms of capital), and a theory of the individual (habitus) 
(Bourdieu, 1977a, 1977b, 1986). This is an appropriate theoretical lens for my study 
because I am interested in language practices as shaped by and shaping social structures 
and how unequal power relations legitimize or delegitimize speakers (Bourdieu, 1977a). 
This theory is appropriate to address my research questions because Bourdieu advocated 
for the analysis of language as embedded in a cultural context and with reference to 
social conditions of production and reception (Bourdieu, 1991). His emphasis on context 
complements an ecological approach to the exploration of language practices, and 
contributes to the illumination of aspects of language use in multilingual environments. 
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2.6.1 Applications of Bourdieu’s theory to the study of language 
In the absence of methodological orthodoxy in which to conform, researchers 
have applied Bourdieu’s perspective to a range of language and linguistic contexts 
(Grenfell, 2011c). The purpose of this section is to review a set of studies performed by 
scholars who have applied Bourdieu’s theory of practice to language and linguistics.  
Grenfell (2011b), working with a corpus of French collected in the town of 
Orléans, considers language variation, with a focus on phonetics, phonology and syntax. 
Grenfell employs quantitative and qualitative methods to investigate how and why 
linguistic variation occurs. This study demonstrates how the Bourdieusian concepts of 
linguistic capital (the legitimate language and local dialect), habitus and field can provide 
insight into the dynamics of language variation. Grenfell shows how national and local 
linguistic markets “define themselves relative to each other” (2011b, p. 90). National and 
local linguistic markets are a focal point of the present study because CCP language 
ideology consistently links Mandarin (the standard language of the national linguistic 
market) with increased employment opportunities (Jia, 2009a, 2009b). The present study 
also explores the instability of diglossia in Xinjiang among Uyghur communities, a 
consequence of Mandarin “leaking” (Dyers, 1999; Kamwangamalu, 2002) and spreading 
into formerly Uyghur domains, including education (Fishman, 1972). 
Vann (2011) conducted a study on the Spanish of Catalonia, Spain, demonstrating 
how academic investigations of national languages reproduce linguistic ideologies. This 
study utilizes Bourdieu’s concept of the linguistic market to reveal the way some 
languages come to accrue more value than others and why. Vann posits that language 
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ideologies in linguistic research impinge upon the description and documentation of a 
dominant language – “the product of the complex interaction of linguistic habitus and 
academic market in a political economy of language” (2011, p. 118). Vann shows how 
ideological issues influence researchers’ conceptualizations of language, including 
choices related to topics of study and methodological approaches. The present study, 
informed by reflexive and critical ethnography (Davies, 1999; Foley, 2002), explores 
language ideology as a mediating link between social structures and language practices 
(Bourdieu, 1977b; Woolard & Schieffelin, 1994). 
Blackledge (2011) analyzes micro-interactions in the marketplaces of four cities 
in England, arguing that Bourdieu’s metaphor of the linguistic market is “of particular 
value in understanding the ways in which access to resources is negotiated in multilingual 
settings” (pp. 130-131). Utilizing the interpretive stance of linguistic ethnography, this 
study “attempts to combine close detail of local action and interaction as embedded in a 
wider social world” (Blackledge, 2011, p. 123). Blackledge demonstrates how “different 
sets of linguistic resources function differentially as linguistic capital in particular 
markets, and accumulate different values in different contexts” (2011, p. 144). The 
present study also attends to the function of linguistic resources in the linguistic 
marketplace (Mühlhäusler, 1996, 2000), exploring how Uyghur-Mandarin code-
switching may be interpreted to be a form of adaptation to specific environmental 
conditions (2003, pp. 41-42) in order to resist or redefine the value of symbolic resources. 
May (2011) utilizes the Bourdieusian concepts of habitus and linguistic markets 
as heuristics for the interpretation of a body of research related to language policy and 
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language rights. May critiques the primary emphasis of language policy in the 1960s and 
1970s to “solve the immediate language problems of newly emergent postcolonial states 
in Africa (e.g. Sudan, Tanzania), Asia (e.g. India, Pakistan), the Pacific (e.g. Indonesia, 
Malaysia) and the Middle East (e.g. Israel, Palestine)” (2003, p. 151). Scholars of this era 
often expressed concern for the maintenance of minority languages, but the overriding 
priority was to establish and promote “unifying” national languages (Fishman, 1971). 
May recognizes diglossia, a form of bilingualism with high and low prestige 
languages (Ferguson, 1959), as inherently unstable because the high language (often the 
national or official language of the dominant group) is sustained by socio-economic and 
market forces, and an educational system that reproduces and legitimizes the relations of 
power and knowledge implicated with the national language (Dua, 1994). National 
languages come to be associated with modernity and progress while minority languages, 
relegated to private domains, are associated with tradition and obsolescence. 
May argues that “adopting a more pluralistic, inclusive approach to the public 
recognition and use of languages is actually crucial for enhancing social and political 
stability, rather than undermining it, as the political rhetoric of nationalism would have 
it” (2011, p. 167). Dwyer also argued for a pluralistic, inclusive approach to language 
recognition, stating in a policy recommendation that, “to maintain a stable nation-state 
and continue to develop the [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region] and the country, 
there is thus little other choice than to, at a minimum, support the maintenance of local 
languages and cultures if not their revitalization” (2005, pp. 63-64). These arguments are 
compelling, as is Dwyer’s admonition that the prohibition of “Uyghur-language teaching 
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in an area as sensitive as Xinjiang will radicalize a portion of once-indifferent students” 
(2005, p. 64). I support these positions because I encountered many Uyghur young adults 
who cited the marginalization of the Uyghur language as a state-sponsored assault on 
Uyghur cultural autonomy. 
Hardy (2011) considers how Bourdieu’s approach to language and linguistic study 
can inform the study of language and pedagogy. This study posits that, in the classroom 
context, linguistic competence is an amalgam of pedagogical capital and linguistic 
capital. Using data from three case examples, Hardy demonstrates that the form this 
capital takes is specific to a field at a particular time and place. Hardy suggests that 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice is “well suited to the field of education where change is not 
only frequent but endemic… Educational institutions do change over time since their 
continued existence and degree of consecration in relation to one another must vary in 
step with State policy” (2011, p. 191). As the present study focuses on the language 
practices of Uyghur young adults as shaped by and shaping the language ecology of 
Xinjiang, political conditions play a prominent role. Vacillations in CCP policy regarding 
economic development and cultural autonomy have implications for the academic field in 
Xinjiang, with educational institutions functioning to structures language practices 
(Bourdieu, 1977b).  
Chen (2009) performed a study on Uyghur students’ experience in a boarding 
school in mainland China, identifying four Uyghur ethnic norms on campus: a prevalence 
of Uyghur language use after classes; the maintenance of Muslim dietary practices; the 
maintenance of gendered greeting rituals; and a continuation of Uyghur ethnic dressing 
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customs. These norms were reinforced by Uyghur students’ tight and close social 
networks within the segregated boarding school context. Drawing from Bourdieu, Chen 
argues that “Uyghur students’ bonding social capital reinforces Uyghur ethnic 
boundaries, increases group solidarity, as well as creates a resistant culture toward school 
official ideology of ethnic integration” (Y. Chen & Postiglione, 2009, p. 304). The 
present study builds on Chen’s work by examining Uyghur counter-narratives associated 
with CCP ideology (Giroux, 1996); investments in Mandarin (and the development of 
social identities) as related to contextual conditions (J. K. Hall & Verplaetse, 2000; B. 
Norton & Toohey, 2001); deculturation (Spring, 1994); and subtractive schooling 
(Valenzuela, 1999). 
The above studies demonstrate how Bourdieu’s theory of practice can be applied 
to a range of languages and linguistic contexts. To reiterate, there is no definitive 
methodological approach, although scholars such as Grenfell (2011d) have initiated 
discussions on Bourdieusian methodology, including conceptions (and scrutiny of 
conceptions) of language across the academic disciplines; the study of language in terms 
of  field analysis; and aspects of reflexivity in participant observation.  
2.7 CONCLUSION 
In this section, I indicate how my dissertation project contributes to the study of 
ethnography and language policy; the ethnographic-sociolinguistic approach to the issue 
of linguistic rights; case study methods in applied linguistics; and Bourdieusian 
approaches to the investigation of language practices.  
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Ethnographic accounts of language policy are growing in prominence (K. S. 
Anderson, 2009; McCarty, 2011). These studies describe the power relations that 
structure social-linguistic hierarchies and how individuals “make” language policy in 
everyday social practice. In Xinjiang, the Uyghur and Mandarin linguistic communities 
have an unequal power relationship, and as a consequence of the encroachment of 
Mandarin in the Xinjiang education system, the diglossic situation is now unstable. This 
study explores the language practices of Uyghur young adults among and across fields in 
the linguistic markets of Xinjiang (Chiswic, 2008; Heller, 1999; Rampton, 1995). This 
study also investigates language maintenance and language shift at the Uyghur 
ethnolinguistic community level, focusing on relationships between change (or stability) 
in language usage patterns, and continuous psychological, social or cultural processes in a 
Uyghur population that utilizes more than one speech variety (e.g. Uyghur, Mandarin) for 
intra-group or for inter-group purposes (Fishman, 1972). 
Blommaert argues for an ethnographic-sociolinguistic approach to the issue of 
linguistic rights, stating: 
If we adopt an ethnographic viewpoint on the issue of language in society, we 
need to focus on how linguistic resources are actually employed, and under what 
conditions, in real societies. In order to arrive there, we can use a framework in 
which language use is seen as oriented towards multiple but stratified centering 
institutions that construct and offer opportunities to reproduce indexicalities. Such 
indexicalities determine the “social” in language use, and they are the basis of 
interpretive work. The way in which they are organized is the locus of inequality. 
(2005, pp. 409-410) 
 
The domestic and academic fields of Xinjiang play a role as “centering 
institutions,” or what Bourdieu called “structuring structures” (Bourdieu, 1977b). This 
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study utilizes ethnographic methodology in order to obtain a thick description of domains 
and social networks mediated by linguistic interactions (Geertz, 1973; May, 2011). This 
data is utilized as a point of reference to devise recommendations about what can be done 
to sustain the vitality of Uyghur, as opposed to starting with an ideal or static conception 
of language in society (Blommaert, 2005). I present three approaches for the maintenance 
of Uyghur language vitality, all at the level of the family unit (Spolsky, 2005), and one 
set of actions that may be taken by linguists, educators and activists in support of Uyghur 
language vitality, a cultural heritage of the Uyghur ethnolinguistic community.  
Case study methodology is an established tradition in applied linguistics research 
(Duff, 2007). Longitudinal ethnographic case studies in applied linguistics have been 
designed to explore linguistic and cultural identity (Schecter & Bayley, 2002); and the 
educational cultures and conditions for immigrants to the U.S. learning through the 
medium of English as a Second Language  (Harklau, 1994; Hunter, 1997; McKay & 
Wong, 1996; Toohey, 2000; Willett, 1995). Norton’s multiple case study of five 
immigrant women’s attempts to learn English in Canada examined issues of power, 
racism, reproduction, hybridity, identity, cultural capital, and the complex social histories 
and desires of learners (Bonny Norton, 2000). This study makes a contribution to 
ethnographic case studies in applied linguistics because I was an outsider performing 
fieldwork in an unstable place; future reserachers might find my experience at site, 
recorded in section 3.3.1.1, of interest or utility because of the danger management 
strategies I employed (Sluka, 1995). 
Finally, this study makes a contribution to our understanding of the language 
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practices of an involuntary minority13 (Bourdieu, 1991; Ogbu, 1978). This study will 
shed light on the socio-historical and socio-political processes behind language shift – the 
complex set of forces which “valorize majority languages and actively stigmatize 
minority languages” (May, 2011, pp. 148-149). This study serves to address the question: 
What does it mean to be in possession of linguistic capital when social conditions 
undermine equitable conversion? Many Uyghur young adults are competent speaks of 
Mandarin, the national standard and thus eminent “legitimate” language of the PRC, 
however symbolic power is unequally distributed among the ethnic communities of 
Xinjiang, resulting in social stratification and the positioning of Uyghurs as subordinate 
and “illegitimate” speakers (Bourdieu, 1977a, p. 648). This study explores what it means 
to be an “illegitimate” speaker of a “legitimate” language, and how linguistic capital is 
(un)successfully converted into other types of capital (e.g. economic, social, cultural, 
symbolic) (Bourdieu, 1986). 
                                                
13 Here I invoke “involuntary minority,” to suggest that Uyghurs have an oppositional cultural frame of 
reference, distrusting the dominant Han Chinese and their institutions and perceiving them as the 
gatekeepers obstructing them from channels to success and social mobility (Ogbu, 1978; L. F. Zhang & 
Sternberg, 2011, p. 20). For a forward-looking criticism of Ogbu’s Cultural Ecological Model, see Foster 
(2008). 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW 
I conducted 18 months of fieldwork in Urumchi to collect data on the language 
practices of Uyghur young adults. I utilized methods associated with ethnography and 
case study research: participant observation, interviews and documents (Clifford & 
Marcus, 1986; Davies, 1999; Geertz, 1973; LeCompte & Schensul, 2010; Spindler & 
Spindler, 1987; Yin, 2003, 2010). I also used one quantitative method, an expressive 
vocabulary assessment inspired by Dunn and Dunn’s Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test 
(1965, 1997). I utilized NVivo qualitative data analysis software to facilitate thematic 
analysis of the data, including inductive and deductive coding. In the following sections, I 
describe the methodologies used in this study. 
3.2 THE RESEARCH SITE 
Xinjiang is the largest administrative division of the PRC. At 1,660,000 square 
kilometers (one-sixth of the PRC), Xinjiang is nearly the size of Iran or almost 2½ times 
the size of Texas. Many Uyghurs in Urumchi refer to the Chinese territory outside of 
Xinjiang as “inner-land” or “mainland” China, signifying conscious of their location on 
the periphery of the PRC. 
Urumchi is located 2,417 kilometers from Beijing and 1,888 kilometers from 
Kabul, Afghanistan. Urumchi is the furthest city from any sea in the world (2,500 
kilometers from the nearest coastline) and the nearest major city to the Eurasian Pole of 
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inaccessibility (Harper, 2002). According to the sixth national census, conducted in 2010, 
the population of Urumchi was 3,110,280 (Ling, 2011b). The total area of Urumchi is 
nearly 11,000 square kilometers, about the size of Jamaica. Urumchi is divided into eight 
administrative sub-divisions and county-level units. The population density in 2000 was 
174 people per square kilometer. However, the aggregate measurement of population per 
unit area obscures the fact that the inhabitants of Urumchi are not equally distributed 
across the municipality. The Tiānshān District is densely populated, roughly equivalent 
to Los Angeles, while other districts are significantly less populated. 
The population in Xinjiang consists of 8,746,148 Han Chinese (40.1% of the total 
population) while the “minority population” is 13,067,186 (59.9% of the total 
population). The 2010 census does not provide detailed data on the minority ethnic 
demographics of Urumchi or Xinjiang (Ling, 2011b). According to the 2000 census, 
Urumchi was around 75% Han Chinese, 13% Uyghur and 8% Hui, with smaller numbers 
of other ethnic groups (National Bureau of Statistics and Population, 2003). Most 
Uyghurs reside in the area south of Nánmén and Èrdàoqiáo. Uyghur and Han Chinese 
commercial properties are concentrated in areas that serve their respective ethnic 
clientele, but there are some Han Chinese-owned businesses situated in the most densely 
populated Uyghur areas and there are some Uyghur-owned businesses (mostly 
restaurants) in predominantly Han Chinese areas, including the central business district. 
This segregation propagates a Uyghur and Han Chinese “dual economy” (Dillon, 2009b). 
Travelers to Urumchi sometimes remark that it looks like a “typical” Chinese city 
(Harper, 2007), perhaps because of the ubiquitous signs in Chinese script and the 
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numerous fast food chains (e.g. KFC, Dicos and Roast King) situated along the city 
blocks. Most public and commercial signs in Urumchi, aspects of the “linguistic 
landscape” (Landry & Bourhis, 1997), feature a dominant Chinese script. But above the 
Chinese script is usually a line (sometimes miniscule) of Uyghur kona yëziq (old [Arabic-
style] script). If interpreted as a marker of relative power, the Uyghur community is 
clearly marginal. 
3.3 ETHNOGRAPHY AND EARLIER ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDIES ON XINJIANG/UYGHURS 
Geertz described ethnography as “thick description,” a style of inscription where 
the flow of social discourse (i.e. symbolic action) of a cultural group is interpreted in 
context (Geertz, 1973). Duranti later described “successful ethnography” as a “style in 
which the researcher establishes a dialogue between different viewpoints and voices, 
including those of the people studied, of the ethnographer, and of his disciplinary and 
theoretical preferences” (Duranti, 1997, p. 87). This study describes a particular type of 
social discourse (i.e. language practices) of Uyghur young adults. In reference to Duranti 
(1997) and the critical ethnographic approach advocated by Foley (2002), this study 
holds dichotomies like insider/outsider status and reproduction/resistance in a “useful 
tension” (Foley, 2002, p. 486). I employ a reflexive, realist narrative style of writing 
where multiple perspectives and ideological stances are presented and interpreted. In this 
section, I describe ethnography, reviewing theoretical orientations, and as a strategy 
involving the use of a variety of data-collection methods. I then review a number of 
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ethnographies conducted in Xinjiang with a focus on methodology and challenges in 
conducting fieldwork. 
There is a general consensus that ethnography involves the “in-depth description 
of a culture or group of people sharing a culture” (Salamone, 2006), but difficult 
questions regarding subjectivity/objectivity, power, and privilege belie this clear 
objective. Clifford and Marcus brought attention to these issues in Writing Culture 
(1986), recognizing the issue of power in fieldwork  and the importance of presenting 
the viewpoints of cultural group members. Contemporary scholars advocate the need to 
identify and reflect upon, “personal assumptions, preconceptions, experiences, and 
feelings that affect your perceptions as a researcher” (Salamone, 2006). Because the 
ethnographer serves as a data-collection instrument, there is a need to examine (and 
revisit) how positionality and identity impact one’s fieldwork, including relationships at 
site. Regarding ethnographic research design, Johnson classified ethnography as having 
an “eclectic nature,” a strength exhibited in its “flexibility, multiple tests of a theory, 
increased chances for various types of validity, triangulation, and the potential for high 
levels of innovation and creativity” (1998, p. 143). 
I utilized ethnographic methodology to investigate the language practices of 
Uyghur young adults in Xinjiang because language practices are linked in a complex 
causal way to language ecology, language ideologies and language endangerment (Elinor 
Ochs & Schieffelin, 2011). I postulated that ethnographic data on language practices (i.e. 
real-world manifestations of linguistic phenomenon in situ) would shed light on the 
political, sociological and/or economic factors that elevate the status of Mandarin and the 
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long-term consequences for language shift or maintenance among Uyghur communities. I 
acknowledged that aspects of my identity, particularly my American nationality, would 
impact my data collection activities because Uyghurs have a “historically strongly pro-
American stance” (Dwyer, 2005, p. 70). I remained sensitive to my consultants’ biases 
and those of my own, particularly my advocacy for linguistic human rights (Nettle & 
Romaine, 2000; Skutnabb-Kangas & Dunbar, 2010), I felt that ethnography was 
appropriate for what I wanted to study because this approach involves repeated 
observations of the same variables over long periods of time, mitigating reactivity in 
language practices, defined as the alteration of individuals’ performance or behavior due 
to the awareness that they are being observed (Ellsworth & Gonzalez, 2003).  
Several scholars, such as Rudelson (1992), Clark (1999b), Dautcher (1999), and 
Roberts (2003), have conducted dissertation projects in Xinjiang that make use of 
ethnographic methodology. Predating these studies is an extensive body of literature 
compiled by late 19th and early 20th century explorers – Sven Hedin (1925), Aurel Stien 
(1907), Owen Lattimore (1928) – on travels and encounters in this region of Central Asia. 
Contemporary scholars of Xinjiang, such as Gladney (1992) and Millward (1994), have 
benefitted from the writings of earlier explorers of the region. And the contemporary 
dissertations may be seen as an extension of the earlier works. In the following 
paragraphs, I review four dissertation studies conducted in Xinjiang with a focus on 
methodology. I conclude this section by identifying the methodological commonalities 
among these studies. 
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Rudelson’s Bones in the Sand: The Struggle to Create Uighur Nationalist 
Ideologies in Xinjiang, China (1992) is a study of the “Uighur intellectual elite’s struggle 
to define their nationalist ideology” (p. ii). Rudelson conducted nearly two years of 
fieldwork in Xinjiang. In his section on Fieldwork Methodology and Sources, Rudelson 
wrote that he “chose to avoid any systematic way of meeting informants,” and opted to 
wander the streets, “stopping at homes when [he] received a smile” or an invitation for 
tea (1992, p. vii). Rudelson employed simple random sampling (Sproull, 1988), 
interviewing merchants, hotel workers, random pool-players, and doctors when 
undergoing treatment at hospitals. He had a work unit card from the Academy of 
Sciences, giving him “almost unlimited freedom” to access villages (1992, p. viii). His 
freedom was curtailed after the fall of the Berlin Wall. From that point forward, Rudelson 
had to travel with an official guide when visiting Uyghur areas and could not stay in any 
single place longer than ten days. After an armed rebellion near Kashgar in April 1990, 
Xinjiang was closed to foreigners and his fieldwork was “officially over” (Rudelson, 
1992, p. ix). 
Rudelson’s experience and scholarship impacted my methodology in two ways. 
First, his sampling procedure prompted me to consider the suitability of probability 
versus purposive sampling techniques. I ultimately chose purposive sampling techniques 
because of my objective to select information-rich cases for study in depth (Patton, 
2002). However, like Rudelson, I did engage in many casual conversations with Uyghur 
young adults I encountered on university campuses, restaurants and other public areas in 
Urumchi. I was frequently approached by Uyghur young adults at these locations; 
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conversations typically ended with an exchange of contact information. 14 I believe I was 
approached so often because many Uyghurs study English at school and there are few 
native English speakers with whom to practice their language skills.15 A second way that 
Rudelson’s experience impacted my own was related to his involuntary exit from site. 
The abrupt termination of his fieldwork, spurred by social unrest, served as motivation to 
protect consultants’ identity, and secure field notes and recordings (Sluka, 1995). 
Clark’s Convergence or Divergence: Uighur Family Change in Urumqi (1999b) 
is a study on Uyghur family change among educated urbanites of Urumchi, from a pre-
modern system before 1949 to a modern system by 1999 (p. iv).  Prior to conducting 
dissertation research, Clark and his family had lived and taught English for two years in 
Urumchi, and for three years in Ghulja (Yining). He left Xinjiang in 1990 to attend 
graduate school, and returned in 1994 to conduct twenty-one months of fieldwork in 
Urumchi.  From his previous stay in Urumchi, Clark had an established network of 
relationships with educated urbanite couples. Clark spent many hours with a particular 
extended family in Urumchi to obtain “ethnographic detail on family interaction” (1999b, 
p. 6). He met additional informants at restaurants, including proprietors. He employed 
participant observation and interview methods; he did not use standardized questionnaires 
because he did not possess a research visa (W. C. Clark, 1999b, p. x). 
                                                
14 On one occasion, in the fall of 2008, I was eating lunch at a restaurant on campus, when a Uyghur 
young woman approached me and asked me to be in a commercial for an electronic dictionary. This 
commercial (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1FIKv5pF8cY) was on rotation on several Uyghur 
language channels and broadcast throughout the region. Many Uyghurs recognized me from this 
commercial and it served as a convenient starting point for conversations. 
15 I met one Uyghur young man through a website (http://www.mylanguageexchange.com/) that matches 
individuals who are fluent in one language and learning another. 
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Clark altered his original dissertation topic, which was to investigate “the 
emergence of a Uighur ethnic identity among Urumqi’s Uighur population” because the 
tense political situation made “asking ethnicity questions uncomfortable for [him] and 
some of those [he] interviewed” (1999b, p. x). He also changed topics because “the focus 
on politics and ethnicity became a burden” and he “had to find a more neutral topic if 
[he] was to survive emotionally, and be able to write with integrity” (1999b, p. x). Clark 
found that almost everyone he knew or met was eager to talk about family relations; this 
experience motivated the development of his ultimate study. 
A recognized characteristic of ethnographic research is the emotional toll that it 
takes on the researcher (Hyde, 1994; Kleinman & Copp, 1993; Reinharz, 1979). As Jones 
writes, “Each ethnographic researcher struggles with ethical considerations within 
fieldwork and this can take an emotional toll on the researcher and the researched. Ethical 
researchers have a responsibility to uncover injustice and challenge power” (2010, pp. 
40-41). Clark’s decision to change the focus of his study from politics and ethnicity may 
be interpreted as an abdication of responsibility to “uncover injustice and challenge 
power (Jones, 2010, p. 41),” but this choice was possibly motivated by an ethical 
consideration to protect his informants, his family, and himself (including his scholarly 
career).16 Ethnicity and politics are widely considered “sensitive” topics in Xinjiang 
(Yee, 2003, p. 432). A critical ethnographic approach is suitable to the investigation of 
                                                
16 Victor Shih, a professor of political science at Northwestern University, testified to the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission that, “[a] problem is [that] Western academics and 
government officials…are self-censoring themselves…For example…People who do research in Xinjiang 
in a very serious way are barred from going to China. So many of us avoid that topic” (U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, 2009, pp. 299-300). 
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these topics, yet one function of critical ethnography is to invoke “social consciousness 
and societal change” (Thomas, 1992, p. 4). Clark opted to practice conventional 
ethnography, defined as “the tradition of cultural description and analysis that displays 
meanings by interpreting meanings,” as opposed to critical ethnography, defined as “the 
reflective process of choosing between conceptual alternatives and making value-laden 
judgments of meaning and method to challenge research, policy, and other forms of 
human activity” (Thomas, 1992; Thomas & O'Maolchatha, 1989).  
Dautcher’s Folklore and Identity in a Uighur Community in Xinjiang China 
(1999) is an ethnographic investigation of social identity in a predominantly Uyghur 
suburban community in Ghulja, Xinjiang in the 1990s. Dautcher stated that he “tended to 
avoid a proactive approach to field research” (1999, p. x). For one year, he lived with the 
mother of a Uyghur friend and participated in the social activities of a group of men who 
were childhood friends of this friend. Dautcher felt he had “considerable freedom” from 
his work unit, the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, and was “careful not to violate 
the implicit conditions of their trust” (1999, p. xi). 
Dautcher described two challenges he had to contend with. The first related to 
field research. Dautcher stated, “in the beginning of [his] field research, [he] struggled to 
participate in a social world enacted in a language in which [he] was not yet fully 
conversant” (1999, pp. xi-xii). The second had to do with the narrative form of the 
ethnographic dissertation, whose linearity and logical argumentation obfuscated the 
“distinctly non-linear, disjointed, and often quite disheartening process” of data 
accumulation (Dautcher, 1999, p. xiii). My study differed from Dautcher’s because my 
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consultants were proficient (if not fully fluent) in Uyghur, Mandarin and English. I had 
the good fortune and honor of meeting Uyghur consultants who embraced multiple roles, 
assisting me as language teachers, and cultural and linguistic brokers (Tse, 1996). But 
like Dautcher, I also recognize how data accumulation may be at dissonance with (and 
concealed by) an organized scholarly text. 
The most recent dissertation in this particular line of research is Roberts’ Uyghur 
Neighborhoods and Nationalisms in the Former Sino-Soviet Borderland: An Historical 
Ethnography of a stateless nation on the Margins of Modernity (2003). Roberts’ study is 
a historical ethnography on the Uyghurs of the Ili valley, “a stateless Muslim nation 
lodged between Russian and Chinese sphere’s of influence in Central Asia (2003, p. 
xiii).” In 1994, Roberts conducted one year of fieldwork in Almaty, Kazakhstan to collect 
data for his maters thesis. He returned to Almaty in 1997 and took up residence in a 
Uyghur neighborhood to perform fieldwork in support of his dissertation. Roberts lived 
with a family for the first six months and by himself for the second six months, 
participating and observing “the dynamics of this cross-border community” (2003, p. 10). 
Roberts interviewed numerous Uyghurs in Almaty, including Uyghurs born in 
Kazakhstan, migrants and sojourners, and of various age, gender, and social class, 
collecting 38 life histories and information about “these individuals’ understanding of the 
Uyghur nation and the Ili valley borderland today” (2003, p. 11). Roberts also conducted 
historical research in public and private libraries and archives of Almaty. After this year 
of intensive data collection, he continued to collect supplementary data for two and a half 
years while working for the United States Agency for International Development. During 
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this period of time, Roberts made four brief excursions to the Chinese side of the Ili 
valley. He mentions in a footnote that he was harassed on several occasions by Chinese 
security officers for his knowledge of the Uyghur language (2003, p. 11). While I did not 
encounter hostility for my knowledge of the Uyghur language, many Han Chinese were 
perplexed by my Uyghur language studies. Many Han Chinese questioned my motive for 
learning Uyghur. I responded to this question in a variety of ways, sometimes answering, 
“Because this is Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.” 
All of the Xinjiang and Uyghur-focused scholarship cited above conform to 
Spindler and Spindler’s “criteria for a good ethnography” (1987, pp. 18-20), although it 
might be argued that Dautcher’s (1999) text is the most reflexive, realist narrative (Foley, 
2002; Luttrell, 2000). All of the mentioned Xinjiang/Uyghur scholars were situated at site 
for at least one year, and utilized participant observation and interview methods in data 
collection activities. These scholars also possessed a degree of fluency in Uyghur needed 
to conduct interviews and daily interactions in this language. The three who conducted 
fieldwork in Xinjiang (W. C. Clark, 1999b; Dautcher, 1999; Rudelson, 1992) all 
exercised some caution or reticence at site in observance of the atmosphere of intolerance 
toward the discussion of sensitive issues regarding politics and ethnicity. I also had to 
exercise caution while conducting fieldwork, a cognitive and behavioral orientation that 
became acute during several volatile periods of time. Below, I describe significant events 
that occurred while I was at site, and their ramifications on methodology. 
The studies reviewed here are the result of extensive fieldwork; these authors 
utilized social knowledge as a key to understand phenomena and situations on which 
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facts were undocumented and sparse. In terms of ethnography, the political sensitivities 
of Xinjiang necessitate an approach whereby discretion and confidentiality are upheld to 
an extreme (Wayne, 2007). The crux is that, as Dorian stated, “one’s fieldwork, however 
antiseptic it may try to be, inevitably has political overtones. If there is little overt 
politicization in the region, the fieldworker may be able to ignore those overtones. If 
there is considerable politicization, s/he cannot usually contrive to do so” (1993, p. 576). 
The Uyghur language is considered a sensitive topic in Xinjiang, including script reform 
(Blachford, 2004), along with Uyghur-Han Chinese ethnic relations and Islam (Y. Chen 
& Postiglione, 2009; Fuller & Lipman, 2004; Yee, 2003). In my approach to fieldwork 
and writing, I did not attempt to ignore political overtones and biases, but to recognize 
and articulate these positions with the objective of understanding practices and 
perspectives within a historical, cultural and social framework. 
3.3.1 Significant events at site 
In section 2.2.1, I described some of the social unrest that occurred while I was 
conducting fieldwork. In this section, I describe my personal experience as a researcher 
in Urumchi and what it was like to live through these events. In the following subsection, 
I make connections between these circumstances and their impacts on methodology and 
doing fieldwork in Urumchi. 
In the summer of 2008, I obtained permission from a dean at a public university in 
Urumchi to collect data on language practices from Uyghur college students at his 
university. I was explicit about my intention to conduct interviews on language practices, 
 
 81 
and had submitted an interview protocol at his request. The dean reviewed this document 
and offered his approval and support. But after arriving, he told me that this permission 
had been revoked. His superiors had determined that issues related to the Uyghur 
language were “too sensitive” to investigate. I captured my reaction in a field note: 
I feel like the victim of a bait-and-switch (i.e. tell the foreigner what he wants to 
hear so that he will sign a teaching contract, then pull back the incentive that had 
been agreed upon). Everything was copasetic while negotiating in the U.S., but 
now that I am here, research activities are a no go…I was disappointed, but I hid 
my reaction from the dean. (Field note: October 1, 2008) 
 
In order to conduct observations on language practices for an extended period of 
time, it was requisite that I maintain residency in Urumchi. I worked in Urumchi to 
obtain the long-term visas necessary to maintain residency. In my early field notes 
describing Urumchi, I wrote about the density of people and traffic, the ethnically 
segregated nature of the city, and the stark contrast between poverty and wealth – beggars 
huddled outside of Louis Vuitton stores. I described conversations with Han Chinese 
(conducted in Mandarin), and conversations with Uyghurs (conducted in a combination 
of Uyghur, Mandarin and English). 
In June 2009, my contract with the university was not renewed. An administrator 
told me that, due to the upcoming 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC, no foreign 
teachers who had worked for a single year would be rehired.17 There was no way around 
this; foreign teachers from other colleges and universities in Urumchi were not permitted 
to transfer from one school to another. Fortuitously, I had not attempted to transfer to 
another school. I enrolled as a Uyghur language student for the Fall 2009 semester. I had 
                                                
17 Teachers who had worked two or more years were allowed to renew their contracts. 
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considered enrolling at another university, but was fortunate that I did not because almost 
all of the foreigners who did were denied without explanation. 
In Fall 2009, for financial reasons, I took a teaching position at a private English 
language school. At the end of January 2010, in the middle of winter, I had to vacate my 
apartment on one-day notice because of stipulations related to my new residency permit. 
Financially, this was a disaster because I had paid several months of rent in advance and 
my landlord kept most of this money. The private school provided a dilapidated 
apartment about an hour from the school. I broke my contract with the private school in 
April 2010 after I had completed data collection and returned to the U.S. 
During fieldwork, I returned to the U.S. twice for one-month intervals. These 
breaks were important because I was afforded opportunities for reflection. On one of 
these breaks, during the winter of 2008, I wrote the following note:  
The most salient difference between Urumchi and the U.S. is the capacity to 
engage in free speech. This freedom is like money – you only appreciate it in its 
absence, when you have none or when it is taken from you. I am happy to be back 
in the U.S. because I can say what I want and I have no fear of retaliation. To 
understand this freedom, or its absence, you must experience it. It is a total 
experience, like swimming. How difficult would it be to describe the feeling of 
being surrounded with water to someone who has never had the experience? I 
couldn’t write about the freedom of speech – indeed I never enjoyed the freedom 
of speech – before today. I can only appreciate it now because I’ve experienced 
its absence. (December 23, 2008) 
 
In the following paragraphs, I describe a few occasions where I felt in peril at site. 
On June 12, 2009, I was at a bar with Messi, Athena and a small group of other Uyghur 
and Western friends. We were drinking and talking when the music stopped and a group 
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police officers stormed in.18 The police demanded to see our passports, or for Uyghurs, 
their identification cards. Only three African men and I did not have our passports. One 
of the African men was not entirely cooperative and the lead officer threatened him and 
pushed him around. Then one officer informed us that all those without passports had to 
go to the police station. I had no fear up until that point, but I was afraid to get into the 
police car because I was not sure where I would be taken. With few options available, I 
complied. Messi had his identification card but came along as an interpreter. 
We were taken to a police station and led to a conference room. The African men 
were taken away for questioning, but I was left alone. Later, one of the African men 
became irate. He had been told that if he produced his passport, he could leave. However, 
when a friend of his did procure his passport, he was not released. He demanded to know 
why he was being detained. I knew that the Chinese police sometimes detained suspects 
without charging them of a crime and that it was futile to protest. After an hour or so, we 
learned that the lead officer who had ordered our detention had gone to dinner. I was left 
without supervision, so I passed the time by roaming around the squalid police station. 
The lead officer returned about two hours later. We were then taken to a small office 
where the lead officer collected our passport numbers and checked our personal 
information on an online database. Fortunately, I had memorized my passport number. 
The lead officer recorded our phone numbers and criticized us for not having our 
                                                
18 For another perspective on this event, see this blog entry, written by an American friend: 
http://blogs.princeton.edu/pia/personal/xinjiang/2009/06/uyghur_music_si.php. I am identified as “RWW.” 
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passports. Then he released us. We returned to the bar and reunited with our friends, 
relieved that the ordeal was over. 
A few weeks later, in the early evening of July 5, 2009, I was at a food court with 
Möshük; we had completed our final semi-structured interview and were having dinner 
on the top floor of a department store complex. Midway through our meal, Möshük 
received a phone call from her mother; we were told that there had been a bombing in the 
Nánmén area a few blocks away. Through glass windows, we watched police set up a 
barricade blocking the flow of traffic into downtown. We left the food court and took a 
taxi to the university. Once on campus, I advised Möshük to return to her dormitory 
because I predicted (accurately) that the faculty dormitory resident would take attendance 
of the university student residents. I spent the evening online, reading reports about the 
Uyghur protest and the violence that was occurring downtown. At 3:00 am on July 6, the 
Internet was disabled. 
Over the next week, following the advice of my friends and students, I remained 
inside my apartment for most of the time. Cell phone and text services were available 
intermittently. During the initial period of violence, I was not concerned for my safety; I 
was confident that Uyghurs would not target me. However, on July 7, I feared for my life 
when I heard that Han Chinese were marauding and attacking Uyghurs. The CCP had 
blamed Rebiya Kadeer and the World Uyghur Congress for initiating the July 5 uprising. 
Many Han Chinese know that Rebiya Kadeer, the leader of the World Uyghur Congress, 
lives in exile in Washington D.C. It is also known that the World Uyghur Congress 
receives funding from the U.S. Congress through the National Endowment for 
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Democracy, a non-profit organization (2009). I was concerned that my American 
nationality might make me a target, and that I might be attacked. Fortunately, I was not 
harmed. 
20,000 security troops inundated Urumchi after the Uyghur uprising of July 5. 
After the most intense periods of violence had passed, Urumchi continued to be under 
military occupation. A curfew was enforced, lifted, and then reinstated during the syringe 
attack protests of early September 2009. On those two occasions, security forces 
barricaded most of the streets and intersections downtown. In additional to regular police, 
riot police and army troops were stationed throughout the city. Many of these security 
personnel carried rifles, some with large bayonets affixed to their muzzles. On the streets, 
civilians often carried sticks and poles. Sirens of all sorts blared day and night; 
helicopters continuously circled the city skies making it difficult to sleep. The tension 
was palatable, as if more violence could break out at any time. 
Guards stationed at the university campus gates prohibited people from free 
passage, although I pushed my way through on a few occasions. I was with Messi two of 
these times. He managed to slip out with me by claiming that he was a foreigner. On July 
17, 2009, Messi and I were walking down Yǒuhăo west road when we came upon a 
Uyghur restaurant that had been destroyed during the Han Chinese retaliatory violence of 
July 7. This restaurant was on the route taken by the crowds that day. At this particular 
restaurant, the kebab grill had been smashed and many windows had been shattered. A 
group of men were standing in front of the restaurant, watching another group of men 
who were cleaning broken glass. I took a few photographs, but stopped when one of the 
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men noticed me. Messi and I walked away briskly, but a couple Han Chinese men chased 
us down the block. Messi warned me, “Don’t speak Chinese.” We waited for our 
wheezing pursuer to make the first move. He pulled out an identification card and in 
English said, “camera.” Messi started speaking to me in English, and I caught on that he 
was pretending to be a foreigner. I knew our pursuer was after the photographs I had 
taken, so I erased them without hesitation. Other men had surrounded us at that point and 
were talking about what to do with us, but they decided to let us go.19 
On another weekend afternoon in September 2009, Messi and I took a walk 
through Urumchi and witnessed thousands of troops and military vehicles in the streets. 
On the Chinese national news that evening, a taxi driver from Urumchi was interviewed. 
He said that life and traffic in the city was normal. This is one example of how the media 
was used to spread a CCP-sanctioned version of reality. A calamitous event had occurred, 
but instead of using it as a teachable moment – an opportunity to address the core issues 
that had fueled the July 5 violence – the CCP blamed the event on foreign provocateurs. 
Police cars outfitted with loudspeakers blared messages such as, “we are all one people, 
people mustn’t be scared.” In one news story, a reporter “spontaneously” discovered a 
group of people of various ethnicities chatting on the street. Some of those interviewed 
said that all ethnic communities lived in harmony in Urumchi. Other cycled broadcasts 
featured Uyghurs giving police officers watermelon, kebab and water. People of different 
ethnic backgrounds were filmed donating blood or money, always in long lines to do so. 
                                                
19 When I left Urumchi in April 2010, this Uyghur restaurant had been transformed into a Chinese 
restaurant. It is interesting to note that a Hui Chinese restaurant on the opposite corner was not damaged 
during the Han Chinese retaliatory violence of July 7, 2009. 
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It was difficult to endure this campaign supporting a narrative of ethnic harmony and 
social stability. Curious as to how others reconciled the competing realities, my friends 
told me that they avoided or ignored the CCP propaganda. 
During the last weekend of July 2009, Messi and I went to Èrdàoqiào to buy 
some doppas (Uyghur hats). A Chinese reporter requested to interview me and I agreed. I 
easily talked about my purchases, but when asked if I thought Urumchi was a safe place, 
I felt compelled to say yes. However, when the interview was broadcast, my voice was 
dubbed over in Mandarin with a statement about how Uyghur and Han Chinese are 
brothers and sisters. I did not see this interview myself, but was told about it by a Han 
Chinese student. He called me after seeing this news story because he found it incredible 
that I had said such a thing. I confirmed his suspicion that I had been “misquoted.” I was 
also interviewed for a nationally broadcast program called Rediscovering China.20 After 
this second interview, I decided to decline future interview requests; I did not want to 
contribute to a manufactured perception of “ethnic harmony.” Nor did I want to 
compromise the trust that my consultants placed in me. 
Communications were disrupted after July 5, 2009. In “the largest and longest 
such blackout in the world,” the Internet was blocked, except for a few CCP websites, for 
a ten month period, between July 6, 2009 and May 14, 2010 (Anna, 2010). I was an 
“Internet refugee,” making trips outside of Xinjiang, twice to Hong Kong and once to 
Lanzhou, to get online. I recognize my privilege in being able to do this and that my 
                                                
20My interview can be viewed here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=61QybC4RkSM. This is a link to 
the entire show: http://english.cctv.com/program/rediscoveringchina/20100308/103274.shtml. 
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relative freedom to travel might have inspired some envy from acquaintances and 
consultants. Although I did not have enough money to fund the travel of others, I always 
collected a list of items to download for my friends who were unable to leave. 
Overseas telephone calls were not possible from home or mobile phones from the 
date of the uprising until January 20, 2010. The only option was to use public phones at 
calling centers. In most of these places there was a single phone and often a long line. 
The only way to avoid the line was to go downtown at dawn in the often-frigid weather. 
A passport and $12 deposit was required to use the telephone.  Phone calls were 
monitored live. If one used a language other than Mandarin, Uyghur, English or Russian, 
languages for which translators were available, the call would disconnect. 
Urumchi was a challenging environment to conduct research because Xinjiang is 
undergoing dramatic transformation. Han Chinese colonization, coupled with increasing 
competition for scare resources (Gladney, 2004), imbues Urumchi with palatable tension. 
This was a volatile place, and violence, such that occurred on July 5, 2009, seemed 
inevitable. I had a bag packed with my most important items and was always prepared to 
leave on a moment’s notice. 
3.3.1.1 Methodological implications 
Many scholars have documented their experiences conducting ethnographic 
fieldwork in dangerous and difficult circumstances – in environments beset by conflict, 
instability and terror (Delaney, 2009; Lee, 1995; Nilan, 2002; Omidian, 2009; Sluka, 
2000; Van Maanen, 1988). There exists a body of literature on the practical hazards of 
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ethnographic fieldwork with suggestions on how to negotiate challenging circumstances 
(Howell, 1990; Kovats-Bernat, 2002; Sluka, 1995). Going into Urumchi, I was aware of 
the potential for surveillance (Dautcher, 1999) and that social unrest could occur, even 
forcing an end to fieldwork (Rudelson, 1992). In this section, I describe the 
methodological implications of conducting research in Urumchi, an unstable 
environment, with a focus on the ways I managed danger (Sluka, 1995). 
Sluka, in Reflections on Managing Danger in Fieldwork: Dangerous 
Anthropology in Belfast (1995), draws upon personal experience and that of other 
anthropologists conducting fieldwork in dangerous and violent social contexts to provide 
recommendations concerning ethnographic research. By the term “managing danger,” 
Sluka means to mitigate danger through “foresight, planning and skillful maneuver” 
(1995, p. 284). He states that the challenge of doing fieldwork in dangerous contexts can 
be met “rationally by considering the dangers as methodological issues in their own 
right” (Sluka, 1995, p. 293). For my own study, this meant maintaining consciousness of 
potential volatility and avoiding a false sense of security. It should be stated at the outset 
that the type of danger encountered in Urumchi is best understood as periodic 
unorganized insurrection, that is, Uyghurs intermittently engage in violent localized 
resistance (Wayne, 2007). Uyghurs lack the means to engage in dialogue with the CCP 
political authority, but some do engage in protest when provoked and civilians are often 
targeted. The style of protest is sometimes violent because Uyghurs do not enjoy the right 
to non-violent means of resistance or the right to publicize their grievances. This 
environment is dangerous because Uyghurs intent on expressing resistance or anger 
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towards the CCP do not advertise where they might demonstrate violent activism. Thus 
violent attacks are sporadic and seemingly random. 
One danger management strategy advocated by Sluka is to “evaluate as 
realistically as possible the degree of danger, and try to identify possible sources of 
danger” (1995, p. 287). Like Sluka (1995) and Polsky (1967), I found that most of the 
risk in my fieldwork came from the authorities rather than from my research participants. 
This is why, following Dautcher (1999), I maintained a low-profile in my data collection 
activities. My one encounter with the police was the result of a dragnet targeting 
foreigners without identification, not because of my research activities. One positive 
outcome of this event was that it helped me establish rapport among Uyghurs. This is 
because many Uyghurs (particularly young men) have been subject to arbitrary detention 
(Amnesty International, 2010b). 
A second danger management strategy I employed was to maintain neutrality with 
members of different ethnic communities in Urumchi. I expressed “sympathy or 
agreement with persons on both sides” (Henry, 1966, p. 553), an approach that 
contributed to my overall safety, especially during the period of intense violence on and 
after July 5, 2009. I make this assertion because the media could not be trusted, and it 
was only through personal correspondence that I learned what was happening in the city 
– places to avoid and safe times to be outside. I recall one of my neighbors, a Han 
Chinese professor, checking up on me one evening following the July 5 riots. He 
grumbled that “two minorities – Tibetans and Uyghurs – were always making trouble,” 
and then provided advice on how to maintain safety during this period. 
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As a third danger management strategy, I took precautionary measures to secure 
my field notes, recordings and the identity of my research participants (Sluka, 1995, p. 
289). I scanned my notes and stored these, along with interviews, on Sugarsync 
(www.sugarsync.com), an online file storage site. On the occasions I traveled outside of 
Xinjiang to get online, I was very anxious because I had months of data on my person. 
Following the advice of Jenkins (1984), I made a methodological choice not to record 
interviews entirely. When discussing sensitive political issues, I turned the recorder off. 
This was to protect my informants as well as myself. The CCP has a record of punishing 
Uyghurs for leaking “state secrets” to foreigners (Congressional-Executive Commission 
on China, 2011c; Kadeer, 2009).21 Some contest that the CCP utilizes the “state secret” 
law as a tool to imprison and torture activists, dissidents, journalists, and religious leaders 
(Amnesty International, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2012; Unrepresented Nations and 
Peoples Organization, 2009). To my knowledge, none of my consultants were privy to 
state secrets, but as the definition is nebulous, I decided not to record data consisting of 
discussions on sensitive political issues. 
 While at site, I was always aware that a dangerous event might occur, something 
beyond management. In anticipation of such an eventuality, I kept a bag packed with my 
most important items and was always prepared to leave on a moment’s notice. I feel 
fortunate that violent circumstances did not force an early termination of fieldwork 
(Sluka, 1995), as was the fate of Rudelson (1992). 
                                                
21 The CCP defines “state secrets” as “information concerning state security and interests and, if leaked, 
would damage state security and interests in the areas of politics, economy and national defense, among 
others” (Huizi & Zhuo, 2010). 
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3.4 PARTICIPANT SELECTION CRITERIA 
In order to select participants for this study, I used three different strategies: 
typical case sampling, involving selection based on average characteristics of a 
population (LeCompte & Schensul, 2010); snowball sampling, involving the recruitment 
of participants from other participants’ existing social networks (Patton, 2002); and 
criterion-based selection, involving selection based on a pre-determined criterion of 
importance (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2010). At the beginning of fieldwork, I used typical case 
sampling (LeCompte & Schensul, 2010) because I wanted to select cases that were not 
significantly “atypical, extreme, deviant, or intensely unusual” (Patton, 2002). To 
participate in the first series of interviews, participants had only to identify as Uyghur, 
have received a formal education in Xinjiang and be in the early years of adulthood (i.e. 
18-25 years of age). At this stage, I was interested in obtaining a general idea about the 
language practices of Uyghur young adults who had attended Mandarin language schools 
(mínkăohàn), Uyghur language schools (mínkăomín) or bilingual Mandarin-Uyghur 
schools (shuāngyǔ). Early into my fieldwork, I told one of my Uyghur language teachers 
about my research interests on Uyghur language practices. This teacher was an adjunct 
instructor at several universities in Urumchi and offered to arrange meetings with groups 
of Uyghur college students. In my application of typical case sampling, I asked my 
teacher to select equal proportions of Uyghur students who had attended the schools 
identified above. On two occasions, I utilized snowball sampling, selecting interviewees 
on the advice of existing participants (Patton, 2002, p. 236). The chart below contains the 
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date, number of participants, sex, location and duration of the Fall 2008 semi-structured 
interviews.22 
Date Participants 
(not incl. PI) 
Sex Location Duration 
10/5/2008 1 1 male Restaurant/Bar 170 min. 
10/5/2008 1 1 male Bar 25 min. 
10/9/2008 4 2 females/2 males School office 70 min. 
10/15/2008 1 1 male Restaurant/Home 175 min. 
10/16/2008 4 3 females/1 male Classroom 40 min. 
10/18/2008 1 1 female Home 25 min. 
10/22/2008 5 1 female/4 male School office 45 min. 
11/2/2008 2 2 males Restaurant 65 min. 
11/2/2008 1 1 female Restaurant 25 min. 
11/2/2008 1 1 female Restaurant 40 min. 
12/4/2008 1 1 female Home 30 min. 
12/4/2008 1 1 male Home 60 min. 
12/5/2008 1 1 male Home 50 min. 
12/8/2008 2 1 female/1 male Home 100 min. 
Table 1: Fall 2008 interviews 
I employed a purposive sampling strategy when selecting case study 
consultants.23 I used criterion-based selection (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2010) to select case 
study consultants. Two of these individuals were from the group of 26; I met the two 
others through chance encounters on college campuses in Xinjiang. In order to “obtain 
the broadest range of information and perspectives on the subject of study” (LeCompte & 
                                                
22 See Appendix for Interview Protocol I. 
23 Following Urrieta (2007), I refer to the case study participants as “consultants” as opposed to 
“informants” or “subjects” in order to recognize their expertise in community knowledge and active 
involvement in the research process. Also see Rice, for a discussion on “ethics and balancing power and 
priorities in linguistic fieldwork” (2006, p. 123). 
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Preissle, 1993), I selected participants who I felt typified certain common language 
education backgrounds and would “yield the most relevant and plentiful data” (Kuzel, 
1992, p. 37). I selected four Uyghur young adults, one female who had been educated in 
Mandarin schools (mínkăohàn), one male who had been educated in Mandarin schools 
(mínkăohàn), one female who had attended Uyghur primary and Mandarin-Uyghur 
secondary schools (mínkăomín/shuāngyǔ), and one male who had attended Uyghur 
primary and Mandarin-Uyghur secondary schools (mínkăomín/shuāngyǔ). 
These four individuals were selected because they represented two sexes and two 
educational trajectories. I felt that this combination of characteristics    would yield 
insight on how the scholastic domain and language of instruction influenced Uyghur 
language practices. I was also interested in exploring patterns and themes of language 
practices as situated in a specific language ecology and of consequence to identity 
formation. This study sought to address questions related to the relationship between 
language learning contexts (i.e. second and foreign language), and investments in 
language learning (J. K. Hall & Verplaetse, 2000; Peirce, 1995); expected returns on 
investments in Mandarin (i.e. anticipated conversions of capital) (Bourdieu, 1986; Peirce, 
1995); language choices in multilingual contexts (Fishman, 1972; F. Grosjean, 1994); 
Uyghur language shift toward Mandarin and implications for the performance and 
demarcation of Uyghur identity (Bourdieu, 1991; Duranti, 1997; Gee, 1996); and Uyghur 
language vitality (UNESCO Ad Hoc Expert Group on Endangered Languages, 2003). 
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3.5 METHODS 
This study utilized methods of data collection that are associated with 
ethnographic and case study methodologies: participant observation, various types of 
interviews and documents. These methods were adapted to the ethnographic setting of 
Urumchi (Sobo & Munck, 1998), a process that entailed the identification of situations 
and locations for participation observation activities (e.g. contexts with compositions of 
Uyghur young adults from various language education backgrounds and diverse sets of 
interlocutors) (Murchison, 2010); and an approach to interviewing that provoked “social 
critique as a means of exposing the unequal distribution and use of power within human 
interactions” in Urumchi (Frey, 2001, p. 61), yet mindful of ideological, political, value 
based, and overly biased affinities (Lapan, Quartaroli, & Riemer, 2011). The collection of 
documents in the ethnographic setting of Urumchi did not require adaptation, however 
access to this data was interrupted when the Internet was disabled following the July 5, 
2009 unrest. 
Sources of evidence associated with ethnographic and case study methodologies 
were appropriate because, consistent with a Bourdieusian approach (also called Practice 
Theory), I was interested in contextualizing the language practices of my case study 
participants – thick descriptions of domains and social networks mediated by linguistic 
interactions (Geertz, 1973; May, 2011). I used an expressive vocabulary assessment to 
collect data on the Uyghur lexical knowledge of my case study participants. This 
quantitative method was designed to obtain empirical evidence in support of the claim 
that Mandarin-educated Uyghurs possess deficient command of the Uyghur lexicon. In 
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the following sub-sections, I describe the methods used in this study and how they were 
used to collect data. 
3.5.1 Ethnographic case study methodology 
LeCompte and Schensul stated that “Ethnographies are case studies because of 
their focus on a single entity, but they differ from case studies in general in that…they 
always include in their focus the culture of the group or entity under study…Case studies 
are usually framed within a specific explanatory social or natural science” (2010, p. 116), 
but what makes the present study an ethnographic case study is its emphasis on cultural, 
political and historical conditions, and how these conditions influence language practices. 
These conditions have implications for language practices because they account for 
human agency, political intervention, power and authority in the formation of particular 
language ideologies (Blommaert, 1999; May, 2005). This approach focuses on the 
“[historically] contingent, socially embedded, and often highly unequal practices, that 
have so disadvantaged minority languages, and their speakers in the first place” 
(Blommaert, 1999, p. 7), in order to advocate for minority language rights (May, 2005; 
Rubio-Marín, 2003; Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson, 2001). This case study is 
ethnographic because of the “focus on the culture of the community in which the stud[y] 
w[as] situated” (LeCompte & Schensul, 2010, p. 117). 
 “An ethnographic case study is defined as prolonged observations over time in a 
bounded system” (Angers & Machtmes, 2005). I employed ethnographic case study 
methods to investigate, describe in detail and analyze a single phenomenon – that is, the 
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language practices of Uyghur young adults and to theorize about the influence of 
domestic and academic fields on language practices. The case study approach allowed for 
a closeness and richness of detail, obtained from extended participation and extensive 
interviews with four case study participants. These data collection activities took place on 
university campuses, consultants’ homes, my apartments, and public areas in Urumchi 
(e.g. city streets, parks, restaurants, shopping districts). I observed the language practices 
of Uyghur consultants when communicating in multilingual contexts with interlocutors 
from various ethnic backgrounds (e.g. Uyghur, Han Chinese). When with Uyghurs only, I 
paid attention to Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching and Mandarin borrowings. 
Ethnographic methods are useful for discovering how particular speech acts and 
speech events function in particular social contexts (Gumperz & Hymes, 1972), yet these 
methods had to be adapted to be effective for understanding “situated language practices 
as opposed to whole cultures as systems of meaning embodied in symbols” (Geertz, 
1973; Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2004, p. 66). I chose focal speech events strategically, 
by purposeful participation observation activities with Uyghur consultants in a variety of 
domains, including family (or home), education, and friendship (Fishman, 1972) and 
spent an extended period of time in the field “in order to document and understand how 
specific social and cultural factors influence speakers’ ‘natural’ performances” 
(Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2004, p. 66). I chose Practice Theory as the analytic lens 
because it held the promise of uniting the role of language practices, domains, and social 
dynamics with an ethnographic perspective (Bourdieu, 1977b, 1991; Grenfell, 2011d). 
This is because, as Blackledge stated, “What Bourdieu offers ethnographic research with 
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a language focus, and language research with an ethnographic focus, is a way of 
representing social and linguistic phenomena which specifically engages with dimensions 
of history, power and social structure. His metaphors enable us to situate interactions 
between people in the context of the relations of power that are obtained in the linguistic 
market” (2011, p. 144). Ethnographic methodology is suitable for the investigation of the 
interrelationship of contextual factors and language practices, understood as an evolving 
language ecology (Haugen, 1972; Mühlhäusler, 1996), enabling researchers to say 
something about what particular people do with language in particular historically 
constituted, politically conditioned and socially structured circumstances (Blommaert, 
1999; Bourdieu, 1991; May, 2005; Wolcott, 1999). 
As stated by Riain, “Ethnographic research has long been synonymous with case 
studies, typically conceived of as grounded in the local and situated in specific well-
defined and self contained social contexts. Furthermore, these contexts were to be seen as 
cases of some larger phenomenon” (2009, pp. 290-291). The larger phenomena addressed 
by this study are language maintenance and language shift, “the relationship between 
change (or stability) in language usage patterns, on the one hand, and ongoing 
psychological, social or cultural processes, on the other hand, in populations that utilize 
more than one speech variety for intra-group or for inter-group purposes” (Fishman, 
1972, p. 76). This ethnographic case study investigates language maintenance and 
language shift phenomena related to a specific colonized ethnolinguistic community, but 
its implications are of relevancy to other unrepresented peoples and nations interested in 
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the intergenerational transmission of language and culture in many other parts of the 
world. 
3.5.2 Participant observation 
Dewalt, Dewalt and Wayland define participant observation, the primary research 
technique of ethnography, as “a way to collect data in a relatively unstructured manner in 
naturalistic setting by ethnographers who observe and/or take part in the common and 
uncommon activities of the people being studied” (1998, p. 260). Participant observation 
differs from “casual looking around” due to “the nature of the researcher’s participation 
in the group being studied and the care and systematicity with which records are made 
and analysis undertaken” (Johnstone, 2000, pp. 81-82). This method required practice 
and involved developing a particular research stance whereby I could benefit from 
participation and observation as activities in juxtaposition. I maintained systematicity in 
participant observation activities by recording information on sociolinguistic domains, 
including the location, the participants and the topic (Fishman, Cooper, & Ma, 1971). I 
paid attention to the language practices of my Uyghur consultants in different domains, 
including family (or home), education, and friendship (Fishman, 1972) and with various 
configurations of interlocutors, such as Uyghurs (of different language education 
backgrounds), Han Chinese, Westerners, and combinations thereof. 
I discovered that “rich points” (Agar, 1996a, p. 106) for observations of language 
practices included moments when interviews or conversations with Uyghur consultants at 
my apartment were interrupted by the arrival of other unannounced consultants; 
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interruptions of interviews and conversations by phone calls; and chance encounters with 
the classmates and friends of consultants when on university campuses and other public 
spaces. These interruptions and chance encounters provided insight into the local context 
and the meaning of language practices, supplying data to advance my investigation of 
why things are this way and address questions related to the power and interests that 
“wrap this local world so tight that it feels like the natural order of things to its 
inhabitants” (Agar, 1996b, p. 26). In this section I focus on insider/outsider perspectives 
of participant observation, and how my role as a researcher might have impacted 
relationships and data collection. 
At the beginning of my fieldwork, I was convinced that good ethnography should 
be written in blood. But what I now realize is that I don’t need to throw myself 
into a lion’s den and be mauled in order to appreciate the sharpness of a lion’s 
tooth. I don’t need to sacrifice myself and submit to every opportunity for 
experience. I don’t need to accept every invitation to do everything in order to 
achieve some type of totality of experience. (Field note: October 2, 2008) 
 
I recorded the above note after one month at site. At that time, I was struggling to 
figure out the “degree of participation” in which to engage and interact with Uyghur 
contacts at site (Spradley, 1980, pp. 58-62). It took time to establish the distance needed 
to achieve a degree of objectivity while also participating in the lives of my Uyghur 
consultants (Duranti, 1997; Johnstone, 2000). When participating in activities with 
Uyghur consultants (e.g. visiting the homes of consultants’ immediate and extended 
families; watching television at my apartment; eating/drinking at restaurants/bars; 
shopping; walking through parks, university campuses, and the streets of Urumchi), I 
participated at different degrees and observed from diverse stances, including complete 
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participant; participant as observer; observer as participant; and complete observer (Gold, 
1958). These stances allowed me to exploit the “creative tension between the goal of 
documented observation and the critical goal of understanding the situated observer” 
(Dewalt, et al., 1998, p. 263). 
Adler and Adler argue in Membership Roles in Field Research (1987) that 
researchers undertaking naturalistic studies take on a variety of membership roles, and 
that the choice of role played by the ethnographer will affect the type of information 
made available and, ultimately, the kind of ethnography written. During my fieldwork, I 
had multiple simultaneous membership roles, including researcher and Uyghur language 
learner. The former role did undergo modification. When I first entered the field, I 
revealed my research activities to casual Uyghur acquaintances, but stopped doing this 
after a Uyghur consultant advised me to do so, stating that scholarship on Uyghur 
language issues might invite suspicion from authorities. As a Uyghur language learner, I 
sometimes advised Uyghur consultants not to accommodate their language practices 
(Giles, 1973) for my benefit (i.e. use English). 
Other simultaneous ethnographic identities included status as a male, young, 
outsider. Being male impacted this study because this identity afforded greater access to 
the lives and language practices of Uyghur men. I was 30 years of age when I began this 
study and 32 at the completion of data collection. I feel that my age facilitated participant 
observation activities because it was within the range of the peer-group networks of 
young Uyghur adults. Of these ethnographic identities, my outsider status was most 
consequential. As an American foreigner of European ancestry, Uyghur consultants felt 
 
 102 
secure that I was not a Chinese spy or, in the words of my Uyghur consultant Möshük, a 
“Uyghur dog” who would turn information (e.g. critical perspectives) over to the CCP. 
My outsider status also allowed me to ask questions about linguistic phenomena that may 
have been generally invisible to insiders. Many of my consultants were personal friends, 
and aware that I was sympathetic to a strongly pro-Uyghur language position. These 
factors may have influenced the kind of responses I received when exploring perspectives 
on CCP language policy in the Xinjiang education system. Some consultants may have 
over-emphasized their Uyghur language practices and/or offered critical perspectives that 
supported my own ideology in advocacy for Uyghur language autonomy. My research 
activities may have provoked contemplations such as: If this foreigner cares so much 
about my language, shouldn’t I care too. 
To consultants, I did reveal my research interests in language practices and my 
advocacy for linguistic human rights (Nettle & Romaine, 2000; Rubio-Marín, 2003). 
When I disclosed my role as a researcher, many of my consultants commended me for 
engaging in research that would publicize the Uyghurs (W. C. Clark, 1999b). My status 
as a Uyghur language learner may have influenced the language practices of my 
consultants because of an altruistic motivation to help me learn Uyghur through exposure 
and direct teaching. However, I believe that the extended nature of my study mitigated 
this possibility because I observed my consultants in a variety of domains, including 
family (or home), education, and friendship (Fishman, 1972), and with different 
combinations of interlocutors, such as Uyghurs (of different language education 
backgrounds), Han Chinese, Westerners, and combinations thereof. 
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The insider/outsider distinction does capture something important about the roles 
I played in the field, the perspectives associated with them and their impact on 
relationships and data collection. I entered the field with an intellectual grasp of the 
history, power struggles, internal tensions and social structure of Xinjiang, but with no 
conception of how these dimensions appeared to those on the “inside” (Wolcott, 1999, p. 
144). I exploited this tension by citing academic perspectives on Uyghur identity, 
language policy, and political discourse in Xinjiang (Dwyer, 2005; Goodman, 2004; 
Zhou & Hongkai, 2004) to my Uyghur consultants in order to initiate discussion. As 
Wolcott writes, “Outsider status refers to an orientation, not to a membership” (1999, p. 
144). My objective was to obtain a nuanced understanding of the phenomena under 
investigation, not to become Uyghur, although I must admit to a deep positive feeling at 
moments where Uyghur consultants stated that I had obtained a deep understanding of 
the Uyghur context (and plight). My research study was a continuous exercise, consisting 
of data collection in order to “throw light on the issues that [were] the emerging focus of 
inquiry” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 3). In my participant observation activities 
on the language practices of Uyghur young adults, I documented the impact of my roles 
(e.g. researcher, Uyghur language learner, linguistic human rights advocate) on 
performances of “natural” linguistic phenomena under investigation (Kamberelis & 
Dimitriadis, 2004, p. 66). 
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3.5.2.1 Notes 
Social scientists define field notes in various ways according to their intent, 
function and purpose (Jackson, 1990). Still, there is some consensus that field notes 
consist of a running log inscribed in the field. I recorded field notes through the duration 
of my fieldwork. Cognizant of the assertion of Dewalt, Dewalt and Wayland (1998) that 
“observations are not data unless they are recorded in some fashion for further analysis” 
(Dewalt, et al., 1998, p. 271), I took care to record all thoughts and observations that were 
relevant to my study. I was intent to produce a set of data that could be drawn upon to 
reconstruct a “development of understanding, and to be able to review the growing 
relationship between [myself] and study participants in a manner that allows for 
reflexivity at the end of the process” (Dewalt, et al., 1998, p. 271). In the following 
paragraphs, I discuss three types of field notes – descriptive, analytic and reflexive – and 
describe my note-taking practices. 
Emerson, Fretz and Shaw (2011) define descriptive field notes as a written record 
about one’s experiences and observations derived from intense and involved participation 
in the lives and activities of others. My descriptive notes consisted of observations of the 
language practices of my consultants – descriptions about language(s) used in settings 
consisting of interlocutors from different ethnicities and language education backgrounds. 
I noted the setting and type of communication (face-to-face or telephone), number of 
interlocutors, ethnicity of interlocutors, and language backgrounds of interlocutors.24 I 
                                                
24 If I did not know the language education background of the interlocutor(s), I would ask my consultant or 
acquaintance for this information after the conversation.  
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recorded information on formulatic expressions, including greetings and leave-takings 
(Duranti, 2009), lexical borrowing (Muysken, 1995) and code-switching (Auer, 1998). 
These descriptive field notes were accompanied with analysis, including asides, 
commentaries and interpretations (Emerson, et al., 2011). These were questions, ideas 
and reactions I had to the language practices I had observed. I wrote these personal and 
theoretical reactions in italics to distinguish them from the descriptive text. These 
analytical field notes were coded for thematic analysis, a continuous process maintained 
through the duration of the study. Thematic analysis consisted of recording brief 
descriptions as related to small chunks of data on language practices. The detail of this 
process varied according to the saliency of the themes and expectations about the 
direction of the analysis. I altered and modified the analysis in the light of experience and 
the development of ideas. This sometimes required adjustments of earlier codings, as I 
developed a deeper understanding of language practices as shaped by and shaping the 
language ecology of Xinjiang. On the basis of these codings, I identified themes (i.e. 
context and language investments; expected returns; language choice; and linguistic 
anxiety) that integrated substantial sets of these codings, again making changes and 
adjustments. 
I also recorded reflexive field notes – examinations of personal assumptions, 
preconceptions, experiences, and feelings that impacted my perceptions as a researcher 
(Davies, 1999; Salamone, 2006). These notes were important to my study, especially the 
recognition of themes; I would often “member check” my analysis (Bloor, 1983), 
providing my consultants opportunities to evaluate my findings and interpretations, 
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inviting commentary with the objective of refinement. This activity often led to energetic 
discussions on issues related to Uyghur identity, language policy, and political discourse 
in Xinjiang (Dwyer, 2005; Goodman, 2004; Zhou & Hongkai, 2004). 
In reference to the language practices described above, I recorded reflexive field 
notes on the impact of my presence on the language practices of consultants. I was 
concerned with the Hawthorne effect, the alteration of language behavior by the 
consultants due to an awareness of being observed (Landsberger, 1958). Through I 
advised my consultants to use whatever language they typically used, it is possible that 
some chose to use English in order to ensure my full participation and/or comprehension 
in certain conversations. This possibility prompted intense focus on “rich points” (Agar, 
1996a, p. 106), including language practices prompted from interruptions by 
unannounced consultants; interruptions of interviews and conversations by phone calls; 
and chance encounters with consultants’ classmates and friends. 
Other reflexive field notes captured my struggles in subjective/objective 
positionality, power and privilege, as I struggled to answer the questions: How do my 
language practices influence the language practices of my consultants in multilingual 
contexts? How does my advocacy for linguistic human rights and language maintenance 
influence my relationships at site? And what impact does my status as a Western 
foreigner and temporary resident of Urumchi have on my relationships at site? 
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3.5.3 Interviews 
I conducted two types of interviews in this study: semi-structured and 
ethnographic interviews (Davies, 1999; LeCompte & Schensul, 2010; Lindlof & Taylor, 
2010). Semi-structured interviews were conducted during planned meetings where I had a 
set of written questions. I did not read questions verbatim but used them as reference 
points to elicit open-ended responses. I addressed topics as dictated by the flow of the 
conversation (Davies, 1999, pp. 94-95). I conducted two sets of semi-structured 
interviews, the first with 26 Uyghur young adults in dyads and groups, and the second 
with four case study participants.25 
The first series of semi-structured interviews were approximately one hour long. 
The second series spanned several meetings for at least five hours. I conducted interviews 
on university campuses, restaurants and my apartment. In my field journal I described the 
interview participants and recorded information on the contexts. For semi-structured 
interviews, I used an interview protocol (Yin, 2003). Some of the questions were focused 
(i.e. devised to elicit specific information) while others were open-ended (i.e. devised to 
solicit descriptions, interpretations, opinions and perspectives). Interview Protocol #1 
featured 10 questions. The purpose of this first interview protocol was to obtain self-
report data on consultants’ language practices in different domains, including family (or 
home), education, and friendship (Fishman, 1972); explore expected returns on Mandarin 
language skills; and explore the complex identity of Uyghurs educated in Mandarin 
                                                
25 The group interviews were not designed as “focus group interviews” because I was not interested in 
obtaining complimentary or argumentative interactions (Lindlof & Taylor, 2010, pp. 183-184). 
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(mínkăohàn). Interview Protocol #2 was composed of 20 categories and 100 questions.26 
The purpose of this second interview protocol was to obtain data on case study 
consultants’ language practices in various domains, including family (or home), 
education, and friendship (Fishman, 1972). 
I continuously refined the second interview protocol. I amended it several times 
because my case study participants sometimes provided information that I had not 
directly solicited, prompting me to reverse engineer questions (Cameron, Frazer, Harvey, 
Rampton, & Richardson, 1992). For example, during one interview, Athena revealed that 
she had a nickname for her mother. I later asked Möshük if she had nicknames for family 
members, which she affirmed. Athena, educated in Uyghur primary and Mandarin-
Uyghur secondary schools, had Uyghur language nicknames for family members. 
Möshük, educated in Han Chinese schools, had Mandarin nicknames for family 
members. This data suggested that the language of the academic field might influence 
language practices in the domestic field. In order to explore this possibility, I formed a 
question on nickname language practices. 
I conducted ethnographic interviews throughout the study in my apartment and 
public places, including city streets, parks, restaurants, shopping districts. These 
interviews were unstructured, in-depth and open-ended, with the purpose of exploring 
issues related to the socio-cultural, socio-political and socio-historical dynamics that 
influence language practices (Schensul, Schensul, & LeCompte, 1999). These 
                                                
26 See Appendixes A and B for the Interview Protocols. 
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conversations were of an open-ended, exploratory nature and conducted with one 
consultant at a time (Davies, 1999). 
3.5.4 Documents 
 Social scientists often use documentary research methods to supplement 
participant observation and interviews (Mogalakwe, 2006). Scott (1990) defined a 
“document” as an artifact that has as its central feature an inscribed text. Documentation 
can take many forms (Yin, 2003); the type of documents used in this study were 
classroom-based bulletin boards; and online articles consisting of news media data. 
Classroom-based bulletin boards were of interest because they contained ideological 
messages linking Mandarin proficiency with national unity and economic prosperity. 
Online articles contained information about the phenomenon under investigation (Bailey, 
1994). Some articles on CCP Language Policy in Xinjiang – government initiatives that 
have implications for language practices – periodically appeared on CCP-authored 
websites; these documents were of interest because they illustrated the ideological stance 
of the state, that the expansion of Mandarin as a language of instruction in the Xinjiang 
school system would increase employment opportunities for Uyghur graduates and 
contribute to ethno-national cohesion (Jia, 2009a, 2009b). 
Scott (1990) formulated four criteria for handling documentary sources: 
authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning. In the following paragraphs, I 
discuss how I collected news media data during fieldwork, how I used them, and how 
these documents measured against Scott’s credibility measures (1990). 
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In order to collect news media data, I set up applications to filter online news sites 
and deliver articles via e-mail. In my New York Times online account, I subscribed to e-
mail newsletters for articles on “Uighurs (Chinese ethnic group)” and “Xinjiang (China).” 
I also set up “keyword news alerts” on Yahoo! for articles that mentioned “Uyghur,” 
“Uighur,” and “Xinjiang.” The New York Times delivered all published articles while the 
Yahoo! keyword alerts gathered links to ten articles per day. I subscribed to the Uyghur 
Human Rights Project mailing list, and RSS feeds from Radio Free Asia Uyghur Service, 
and the blogs The New Dominion and Xinjiang: Far West China. 
This method worked well until July 6, 2009, when in the midst of the violence 
that had gripped Urumchi, the CCP disabled the Internet. The disruption of Internet-based 
communications did not interfere with the collection of documents, but retrieval was 
interrupted. Like many others, I became an “Internet refugee” and made several trips 
outside of the Uyghur region to access the Internet and obtain news media data (Dewalt, 
et al., 1998, p. 271). 
I organized articles into themes related to: Mandarin language education policy in 
Xinjiang, and cultural practices (language and religion). I arrived at the first theme 
because of its direct relevance to the study, that is, the expansion of Mandarin as a 
language of instruction in the Xinjiang education system and the corresponding 
marginalization of Uyghur and other ethnic minority languages. I arrived at the second 
theme because of its reoccurrence and because language and religion were often 
mentioned together as restricted practices. I incorporated these articles into my field notes 
when their content seemed to support, refute or complicate data obtained through 
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participant observation and interview sessions. Many of these articles served as links in 
the chain of evidence between my research objectives and conclusions. I used these 
documents as supplementary data to corroborate information from my case studies (Yin, 
2003). I created electronic folders to store a copy of each article, a means to compensate 
for low retrievablility – one weakness of documentary evidence (Yin, 2003). This was 
partly because the Xinhua News Agency (the official press agency of the People’s 
Republic of China) has a record of modifying and/or removing articles within hours of 
publication.27 
In terms of Scott’s credibility measurements (1990), I assess the news media data 
as authentic and representative, but of debatable credibility and complex meaning. I use 
Cui Jia’s article “Mandarin Lessons in Xinjiang ‘help fight terrorism’” (2009b) as a 
representative example. In addition to the claim made in the title, this article asserts that 
Uyghurs who cannot speak Mandarin are susceptible to being “tricked into terrorist 
activities” by terrorists from neighboring countries; that there is a demand for Mandarin 
language education from ethnic minority students; that the desire among ethnic minority 
students to learn Mandarin is generated from citizens and not imposed by the state; that 
Mandarin language proficiency is positively correlated with employment prospects; and 
that Mandarin language proficiency is facilitative of the promotion of minority ethnic 
                                                
27 A New York Times article “New Protests Reported in Restive Chinese Region” (2007) provided 
evidence of this practice. The journalists wrote that “the Web site of China Daily published an article from 
Xinhua, the state news agency, that said police officers had detained 15 people in Xinjiang for needle 
attacks…After the large protests, government censors rushed to delete the news accounts on the Internet. 
By late afternoon, the Xinhua article published by China Daily was still on the newspaper’s Web site, but a 
news release on the same subject, posted on the Web site of the information office of the State Council, 
China’s cabinet, had been deleted.” 
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culture. This article also implies that ethnic minority students who do not learn Mandarin 
will come to regret this decision. 
Authenticity refers to the genuineness of the document and whether it is of 
reliable and dependable origin. This article may be considered an authentic (government) 
document because the CCP exercises tight control of news media (Esarey, 2007); there is 
no reason to believe that this document was falsified, corrupted or damaged in any way. 
Representativeness refers to the typicality of the document. This article represents and 
reflects CCP ideology on terrorism (as proliferated by external separatists) and the 
expansion of Mandarin language education as related to an increase in Uyghur 
employment opportunities (Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2007; Wayne, 2007). 
Credibility refers to document error and distortion. In the article under examination, 
several pieces of information may be misleading, such as a statement attributed to the 
CCP Chairman of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. “[Nur] Bekri said there had 
been demand for Mandarin language lessons from ethnic minority students who wanted 
to be able to communicate with other Chinese.” (Jia, 2009b). It is difficult to believe that 
the expansion of Mandarin language education was the result of a bottom-up movement28 
(Spolsky, 2004). Meaning refers to comprehensibility, and while this article is 
comprehensible, the reader must determine “which inference to make from a document 
about matters other than the truth of its factual assertions” (Platt, 1981). 
                                                
28 Ron Utz made a similar argument for the promotion of English language education (and the 
corresponding elimination of Spanish-English bilingual education) in 1996 in California. A small group of 
Spanish-speaking parents had claimed that, “the Los Angeles school district was refusing to teach their 
children English,” and pulled their children out of school for two weeks (Crawford, 2007, p. 153). Utz 
seized upon the publicity generated by this protest to launch Proposition 227 – the “English for the 
Children” initiative (Colin Baker, 2011, p. 190). 
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3.5.5 Expressive vocabulary assessment 
One objective of this study was to assess the degree of threat faced by the Uyghur 
language (Dillon, 2002; Dwyer, 2005). Based on scholarship exploring the role of lexical 
borrowing as related to language contact and change (O'Shannessy, 2011; Weinreich, 
1953; Winford, 2003), and research on loanword typology (Haspelmath & Tadmor), I 
created an expressive vocabulary assessment in order to obtain one measurement of my 
case study participants’ knowledge of the Uyghur lexicon.29  I focused on lexical 
borrowing because “the most common outcome in language contact is lexical borrowing 
from the more sociolinguistically dominant language by the less dominant one” (Carol 
Myers-Scotton, 1998).  
I devised this instrument because in conversations on the viability of Uyghur, 
several Uyghur acquaintances and consultants expressed a concern that the Uyghur 
language was “disappearing” through the process of first language attrition (Köpke, 
Schmid, Keijzer, & Dostert, 2007; Lambert & Freed, 1982) and/or native language 
lexical deficiency (Sounkalo, 1995). However, there was an absence of empirical data to 
support this claim. A conversation with Messi’s grandfather also compelled me to create 
this instrument. One afternoon in February 2009, in his living room, he pointed out a few 
objects – a table and dresser among them – and lamented how younger generations of 
Uyghurs were now using Mandarin terms to identify these objects. He expressed a fear 
that common Uyghur words were being lost. 
                                                
29 See Appendixes C and D for the expressive vocabulary assessment and key. 
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This instrument was inspired by Dunn and Dunn’s Peabody Picture Vocabulary 
Test (1965, 1997). The purpose of this test is to provide a quick, easy and reliable 
assessment of vocabulary. To administer the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, the 
examiner orally presents a stimulus word with a set of pictures; the test taker is asked to 
select the picture that most accurately represents the word’s meaning. Dunn and Dunn 
created their instrument in order to measure receptive vocabulary, the body of words that 
a person recognizes and understands well enough to comprehend when read or heard. 
However, I modified this instrument in order to measure expressive vocabulary, the body 
of words that a person recognizes and understands well enough to comprehend while 
writing or speaking. I was interested in measuring expressive vocabulary because these 
words indicate a person’s productive, as opposed to receptive, lexicon (Cohen, 1989). 
Test takers were presented with pictures and asked to inscribe their signifier. 
I focused on vocabulary as an aspect of language to assess because first language 
attrition is typically manifested first in the lexicon (Schmid & Köpke, 2008). To create an 
expressive vocabulary assessment instrument, I first devised nine categories: animals; 
body and face; family; nature; food; jobs; furniture and appliances; transportation; 
numbers; and colors. These categories were selected because they were commonplace 
and compatible with visual representation. I located 156 pictures to populate the 
categories. I obtained the pictures on websites that offered free images for educational 
purposes (e.g. http://www.coloring.ws; http://www.edupics.com). I administered this 
instrument to each case study participant in order to assess expressive Uyghur 
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vocabulary. The mínkăomín case study participants wrote their answers in Uyghur and 
the mínkăohàn case study participants wrote in Latin letters. 
In administering this instrument, I reinforced the visual cues with spoken English. 
This is because, when Möshük returned the expressive vocabulary assessment, she had 
left many entries blank. Curious about this, I asked her if she knew the Uyghur word for 
“elbow.” She then orally produced the correct Uyghur term. She told me that, for her – a 
self-identified “illiterate” in Uyghur – Uyghur is an oral language. It is difficult for her to 
produce the written form. I reviewed the expressive vocabulary assessment with Möshük, 
verbally soliciting vocabulary items she had left blank (or were misidentified) and 
recorded the results. In order to maintain consistency, I repeated this procedure with each 
case study participant. This verbal solicitation was a crucial step to clarify 
misidentifications and to determine which lexical items were genuinely unknown. I 
created a table for each case study participant with the number of known lexical items 
divided by the total number. This equation yielded a percentage of total known items 
featured on the assessment. 
3.6 DATA ANALYSIS 
This research study yielded a substantial amount of data. In the following sub-
sections, I describe my approach to the recognition of emergent themes and the formation 
of case study narratives. In the final sub-section on thematic data analysis procedures, I 
provide an overview of my techniques for coding and categorizing data and how I went 
about generating themes. 
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Ethnographies are social constructions, not unambiguous representations of the 
“truth” (Alsop, 2006). These works are not to be read and received as “a straight-ahead 
cultural description based on first hand experience an author had with a strange (to both 
author and reader) group of people” (Maanen, 1995, p. 1). Rather, ethnographic works 
are to be recognized as “inventions” of culture and fictions “in the sense of something 
made or fashioned” (1986, p. 6). Ethnographic forms of writing that are authoritative and 
univocal are deceptive because the quality of “fiction” is concealed by a mode of 
representation about “something that actually happened to characters who actually 
existed” (C. Ellis, 2003). “Textaulists urge ethnographers to experiment with new forms 
of writing that are dialectical, dialogic, or polyphonic” instead of modes of representation 
that promote a perception of researcher omniscience (Brettell, 1993, p. 2). 
I acknowledge that “the information provided [was] affected by the positions of 
both ethnographer and informant within [our] own social worlds, as well as by [our] 
evolving personal relationships and understanding of one another’s social worlds 
(Davies, 1999, p. 79). By developing a reflexive understanding of my relationships with 
my informants, I analyzed how my experience in the field influenced data collection, 
blurring “subjective” and “objective” commentaries (Alsop, 2006). Instead of striving to 
maintain particular positions along the “degree of participation” (Spradley, 1980) 
continuum, I continuously exercised reflexivity and awareness of my impact on the 
research process (Alsop, 2006).  
I do not claim that the data produced by this study, along with my interpretations 
and conclusions, are complete or that I have told the whole story. In the words of Bakker, 
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“the problem of anthropological knowledge” is that “sociocultural reality presents itself 
to the anthropologist in fragmented bits and pieces” (1992, p. 40). He later asserts that, 
“the knowledge produced in the field is necessarily incomplete, distorted, tentative, 
speculative, and thus essentially contestable” (Bakker, 1992, p. 40). Many scholars have 
suggested that this crisis in confidence in “ethnographic authority” can be solved through 
the method of reflexive analysis (Aunger, 2003; Davies, 1999; Foley, 2002; Sanjek, 
1990). I exercise reflexivity in my data analysis by identifying and making explicit 
ideological, political, value based, and overly biased affinities (Lapan, et al., 2011). 
However, I do assert that this study makes a contribution to our understanding of 
the social-life of language as practiced by Uyghur young adults, and more generally, 
colonized ethnolinguistic communities. My informants and I collaborated in a mutual 
search to examine the factors influencing Uyghur language practices in multilingual 
contexts. This experience did “mediate” our social worlds because conversations were 
motivated by a desire to understand the socio-cultural, socio-political and socio-historical 
dynamics that influence language practices. When discussing CCP language policy, I 
made efforts to articulate the government ideology related to the expansion of Mandarin 
language education and increased employment opportunities for Mandarin speakers.  I 
made an effort to include the voice of the CCP in our dialogue because I aspired to refine 
arguments, problematize assumptions, and counter my bias toward linguistic human 
rights (Skutnabb-Kangas & Dunbar, 2010). 
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3.6.1 Thematic analysis procedure 
This study employed thematic analysis, “a systematic approach to the analysis of 
qualitative data that involves identifying themes or patterns of cultural meaning; coding 
and classifying data, usually textual, according to themes; and interpreting the resulting 
thematic structures by seeking commonalities, relationships, overarching patterns, 
theoretical constructs, or explanatory principles” (Lapadat, 2009, pp. 925-926). Thematic 
analysis was a sensible approach for this study because I needed to manage a large 
volume of data without losing the context, and organize this data according to unifying 
themes and concepts (Lapadat, 2009).  
Coding is the basic analytic strategy used in thematic analysis, “a process of 
closely inspecting text to look for recurrent themes, topics, or relationships, and marking 
similar passages with a code or label to categorize them for later retrieval and theory-
building” (Lapadat, 2009, p. 926). The types of data used in my thematic analysis 
included field notes, interview transcripts and news media data. I utilized NVivo 
qualitative data analysis software to facilitate thematic analysis, including coding and 
searching. I coded language practices according to sociolinguistic domains, including the 
location, the participants and the topic. I then imported these texts into NVivo, and after 
reading them carefully, coded segments according to the relevant “node” – the NVivo 
term for “theme.” Two types of nodes were used: “Free nodes” have no clear logical 
connection with other nodes (e.g. toponyms); “tree nodes” are organized in a hierarchical 
structure, from a general category at the top, the parent node (e.g. language contact) to 
more specific categories, child nodes (e.g. lexical borrowing; language shift; linguistic 
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hegemony). NVivo supported lexical searching, involving searching for text; and 
Boolean and proximity node searching, enabling analytic comparisons. 
This study used systematic thematic analysis with a hybrid of inductive and 
deductive coding. Inductive themes emerged from a close examination of the empirical 
data for patterns (Roulston, 2010) and constant comparison, a process in which newly 
collected data is compared with previous data (B. G. Glaser & Strauss, 1967). I utilized 
free nodes when coding inductively, until categories became apparent and then organized 
them into trees. Deductive themes were based on Practice Theory constructs that I wished 
to investigate, such as habitus; fields; forms of capital (i.e. symbolic, economic, cultural, 
and social) and conversions of capital (Bourdieu, 1977b, 1986, 1991; Grenfell, 2011d). I 
used research questions and categories derived from theory (e.g. investments in the 
acquisition of linguistic capital; successful conversions of linguistic capital) to deduce a 
number of themes (i.e. context and language investments; expected returns; language 
choice; and linguistic anxiety). All codes were “grounded both empirically (in the data) 
and conceptually (linked to the wider analytic context)” (Davies, 1999, p. 79). 
3.6.2 Multiple case narratives 
This study includes a collection of storied vignettes on case study consultant life 
histories as related to language practices. A set of case studies related to the same topic 
are presented in narrative format (Polkinghorne, 1995). The purpose of creating a set of 
vignettes is to “provide [a] greater insight and understanding on the topic than any single 
vignette” (Seidman, 1985). I constructed case study narratives from semi-structured 
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interviews conducted with case-study consultants. I audio-recorded interviews and then 
transcribed them; Messi and Möshük assisted in the translation of Uyghur. When writing 
the narratives, I retained full statements and sections of dialogue when possible and/or 
appropriate (Davies, 1999). I quoted my consultants when they expressed sentiments that 
would have lost potency from summarization. These vignettes were crafted with the 
objective of understanding the “situated language practices” of Uyghur young adults 
(Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2004, p. 66). I described speech events in a variety of 
domains, including family (or home), education, and friendship (Fishman, 1972) in order 
to explore how specific social and cultural factors influenced consultants’ “natural” 
performances (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2004, p. 66). 
The narratives are structured in roughly similar chronological order, a sequence 
maintained because biographical information is appropriately expressed in linear format 
(Yin, 2003). The first sections illustrate the participants’ family and background, with a 
focus on language practices in the domestic field. The middle section describes the 
participant’s education and language practices in academic fields from kindergarten 
through university. The final section presents contemporary language practices along 
with perspectives on CCP language policy. The case study narratives are written in the 
third person. This was a stylistic choice to remind the reader that a story was being told 
through an intermediary. 
After constructing these narratives, I read them to my consultants. Through the 
process of “member checking” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), I gave my consultants the 
opportunity to consider their respective vignettes and react to the interpretations. I invited 
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the participants to ascertain the veracity of the narratives in order to ensure the 
trustworthiness of the data. These narratives are co-creations, formed from the 
juxtaposition and interplay of researcher and case study participant. These texts are 
written from a critical realist perspective with the objective of describing the social 
realities – mediations formed from interactions within a social field consisting of 
researcher and case study consultants (Brettell, 1993; Davies, 1999; Foley, 2002). 
3.7 TRIANGULATION 
Participant observation, interview and documentary data was triangulated 
(Denzin, 1978) in an effort to obtain a deep understanding of the interrelationship of 
contextual factors persisting in Urumchi, Xinjiang and the language practices of Uyghur 
young adults, and to say something meaningful about what particular people do with 
language in particular historically constituted, politically conditioned and socially 
structured circumstances (Blommaert, 1999; Bourdieu, 1991; May, 2005; Wolcott, 1999). 
The purpose of triangulation was to improve the quality of the data and the 
accuracy of ethnographic findings (David M. Fetterman, 2009). Field note data captured 
descriptions of consultants’ language practices in a variety of domains, including family 
(or home), education, and friendship (Fishman, 1972); interviews yielded insights from 
consultants on patterns and the meanings of language practices; documents functioned to 
reveal official CCP positions on language policy and ideology in Xinjiang. The 
expressive vocabulary assessment generated a quantified measure of consultants’ 
knowledge of the Uyghur lexicon. I practiced triangulation, the gathering of data with a 
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combination of research methods, to generate a robust set of findings on the language 
ecology of Urumchi, Xinjiang and the language practices of Uyghur young adults. 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
In March 2010, near the end of my fieldwork in Urumchi, my consultant Mike 
and I were sitting on a couch in my apartment, discussing his frustrations associated with 
interactions with Han Chinese authority figures, including his conscious refusal to meet 
with Han Chinese “politeness expectations” in sociolinguistic interactions (Lakoff, 2005, 
p. 23). We had discussed politics and ethnic discrimination extensively that day; the 
numerous segments of audio recordings indicated the many times I turned the recorder 
off in order to avoid collecting data on sensitive issues (Jenkins, 1984). 
At the close of this long conversation, Mike said to me, “I feel like I have a tear in 
my eye but I cannot cry.” That sentiment hit me like a great weight. It captured a sense of 
exasperation. It was a visceral expression of what it felt like to be deprived the freedom 
to express intense feelings of frustration and sorrow. This statement prompted me to 
consider the feelings of Uyghurs and other ethnic minority communities whose languages 
are marginalized in the Xinjiang education system, that is, irritation associated with 
having words in their mouths that they cannot speak. 
Several scholars, such as Concepcion (2000), Fuller and Starr (2004), and Li 
(2010), have suggested that far-reaching controls on freedoms of expression in Urumchi, 
Xinjiang contribute to the volatility of this setting (Sobo & Munck, 1998). Ironically, the 
CCP has responded to contemporary socio-political volatility in Xinjiang by increasing 
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restrictions on freedoms of expression (Freedom House, 2011; S. Wei & Cuifen, 2010). 
The completion of this study required methodological adaptations, including the 
consideration of danger as a methodological issue, and the development of ways to 
minimize risk in the field (Sluka, 1995).
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Chapter 4: The language ecology of Xinjiang, Uyghur language 
practices and identity formation 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I present four themes that emerged from participation-observation 
activities and the transcripts of semi-structured interviews conducted with 26 Uyghur 
young adults [N=26] who had been educated in Mandarin (mínkăohàn), Uyghur 
(mínkăomín), bilingual Mandarin-Uyghur (shuāngyǔ) or a combination of these 
programs. The themes are: context and language investments, expected returns, language 
choice, and linguistic anxiety. In the following section, I review literature on the ecology 
of language and justify how this theoretical framework and research orientation resonates 
with Bourdieu’s ideas on language, power and politics (1977b, 1991; Grenfell, 2011d; 
Haugen, 1972). Data on practices and perspectives, obtained and exhibited during 
participation-observation activities and semi-structured interviews, form the evidence in 
support of the themes (D. M. Fetterman, 1989). I conclude this chapter by linking 
language ecology with the language practices of Uyghur young adults along with 
implications for identity formation (Bazeley, 2009). 
4.1.1 The ecology of language 
Haeckel coined the term ecology to denote “the study of all those complex 
interrelations referred to by Darwin as the conditions of the struggle for existence” 
(Brewer, 1988, p. 1). Haugen applied this term metaphorically to the field of linguistics, 
defining language ecology as “the study of interactions between any given language and 
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the environment… [And that] “the ecology of a language is determined primarily by the 
people who learn it, use it, and transmit it to others” (1972, p. 325). Haugen recognized 
some limitations to the principles of ecology when transferred from the natural sciences 
to the social sciences, limitations inherent to the analysis of complex environmental 
factors on language contact situations (Haarmann, 1986; Winford, 2003). Haugen 
pioneered the application of ecological principles to languages and speakers in society, 
initiating a systematic exploration of interrelationships between languages and their 
social environments (Enninger, 1984).  
Since Haugen, linguistic anthropologists and sociolinguists have developed the 
theoretical framework and research orientation of language ecology. MacKinnon (1977) 
and Dorian (1973) considered ecological factors when investigating language death, as 
did Gal (1979) and Mackey (1980) when discussing the social determinants of language 
shift. These scholars approached the analysis of linguistic phenomena as an ongoing 
social activity, stressing the interrelationships of environmental and social factors (e.g. 
population factors, socio-economic mobility, interactional patterns and networks) on 
language practices (e.g. diglossia, code-switching, bilingualism) (Enninger, 1984; 
Haugen, 1972). Linguists concerned with language endangerment have also adopted the 
theoretical framework of language ecology because of its ideological emphasis on 
interrelationships and diversity (Finke, 1996; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2002); this perspective is 
also attractive because it can be used to link disciplines (Weinrich, 1990). 
Mühlhäusler (1996, 2000) advanced a comprehensive approach to language 
ecology by connecting the maintenance of linguistic diversity to a concern for biological 
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diversity. Mühlhäusler (2001) suggested that the exploration of linguistic diversity be 
extended beyond the communicative functions of language (including static taxonomies) 
to include metacommunicative functions. He suggested that language ecology be used to 
investigate group identity, the role of social networks in language use and maintenance, 
and how speech communities adapt to specific environmental conditions. Mühlhäusler’s 
“ecological approach incorporates the aspects of language planning traditionally 
considered, such as languages and speakers, with system-wide factors and system-
external factors, and then shifts the frame of reference to emphasize relationships 
between the factors rather than on the factors themselves” (Cassell, 2007, p. 65). 
The scholarship associated with language ecology resonates with Bourdieu’s 
ideas on language, power and politics because of the shared orientation toward material 
conditions and the dynamics of power relations in social spaces (1991; Haugen, 1972; 
Mühlhäusler, 1996). “According to Bourdieu, the constitution of a language is a historical 
process in which socio-political and economic forces compete to empower the modes of 
expression of certain classes or social groups and to disempower those of others… 
Bourdieu argues that the political struggles that took place in the development of modern 
nation-states had a crucial linguistic dimension; they included struggles for the monopoly 
of language” (Medina, 2005, p. 114). In society, there is an exchange rate for linguistic 
signs. This linguistic system does not operate in isolation from social factors, but is in 
competition with the social values of other symbolic systems (Bourdieu, 1977a). As 
Weinrich suggested, “If one wants to analyze the linguistic system adequately one has to 
analyze simultaneously the entire social environment of this system” (1990, p. 95). The 
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following themes explore the language practices of young adult Uyghurs as related to 
historical, political, economic and cultural factors particular to the social space of 
Xinjiang. 
4.2 THEME ONE: CONTEXT AND LANGUAGE INVESTMENTS 
Peirce (1995) used the term language investment to describe a learner’s desire to 
invest time and effort in learning a language to gain symbolic or material resources. She 
argued that investment was more accurate than motivation because the conceptions of 
motivation dominant in the field of Second Language Acquisition “do not capture the 
complex relationship between relations of power, identity, and language learning” (1995, 
p. 17). Peirce claimed that her idea of investment was best understood in reference to the 
economic metaphors utilized by Bourdieu, particularly his notion of cultural capital 
(Bourdieu, 1977a; 1995). Peirce “take[s] the position that if learners invest in a second 
language, they do so with the understanding that they will acquire a wider range of 
symbolic and material resources, which will in turn increase the value of their cultural 
capital. Learners will expect or hope to have a good return on that investment – a return 
that will give them access to hitherto unattainable resources” (1995, p. 17). 
Language investment emerged as a theme from the interviews conducted with 26 
Uyghur young adults who had been educated in Mandarin (mínkăohàn), Uyghur 
(mínkăomín) and bilingual Mandarin-Uyghur (shuāngyǔ) or a combination of these 
programs. The following paragraphs illustrate the nature of language investments made 
by Uyghur young adults and how these investments in Mandarin impacted their own 
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social identity, “an identity which [was] constantly changing across time and space” 
(Peirce, 1995, p. 18). 
All of the consultants had invested in learning Mandarin, although the nature of 
language investment was not uniform. Although all of the consultants were living in 
Urumchi, and several had been raised in this city, some were from other urban centers, 
and other consultants were from towns and rural areas in Xinjiang. The following three 
profiles of Uyghur young adults are presented in order to illustrate the various types of 
Mandarin foreign and second language learners in Xinjiang. This is not intended to be an 
exhaustive typology of Mandarin language learners in Xinjiang. Rather, these profiles are 
presented in order to bring attention to the variety of environments in which Uyghurs 
learn Mandarin, with an emphasis on population factors. All of the consultants identified 
as Mandarin language learners, but this category must be analyzed because its generality 
and inclusiveness obfuscates important differences related to the environment and context 
of Mandarin language learning.  
Most Uyghurs from Urumchi and educated in majority Han Chinese classes with 
Mandarin as the language of instruction may be classified as Mandarin second language 
learners. Most of these individuals learned Mandarin following the acquisition of their 
first language (i.e. Uyghur). Möshük, for example, was born and raised in Urumchi. In 
the domestic field of Möshük’s childhood, monolingual Uyghur was the language of 
communication, her “primary language” and “mother tongue.” She recalled earning low 
scores in Mandarin in first grade because she did not comprehend this second language. 
For the duration of her academic career, she was educated in Mandarin (mínkăohàn) in a 
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predominantly Han Chinese class. Möshük, currently in college, reported that Mandarin 
was now her “strongest language.” The Uyghur language is a major part of Möshük’s 
personal, social and cultural identity (Edwards, 2009), yet she claimed a higher degree of 
fluency in Mandarin. Möshük’s investments in learning Mandarin were facilitated by 
Mandarin immersion beginning in pre-school, and frequent contact with Han Chinese in 
her class and neighborhood. 
Most Uyghur young adults from urban centers outside of Urumchi, along with 
towns and rural areas in Xinjiang, may be more accurately classified as Mandarin foreign 
language learners, because Uyghur and Han Chinese (i.e. Mandarin-speaking) 
communities often occupy distinct spaces (Dillon, 2009b; Rudelson, 1997).30 Mike, for 
example, was from Ghulja, a city in northwest Xinjiang with a population of some 
515,000 people, about 46 percent of whom are Uyghur (National Bureau of Statistics, 
2011). Mike stated that the physical spaces of Ghulja were segregated along ethnic lines. 
Although Mike was educated in Mandarin (mínkăohàn), and the majority of his 
classmates were Han Chinese, there were several Uyghurs and a smaller number of 
Kazakhs. Mike’s Mandarin immersion began when he entered primary school, but his 
contact with Han Chinese was limited to interactions in the scholastic field. Mike was 
fluent in both Uyghur and Mandarin but he engaged in resistance by refusing to adhere to 
conventions of Han Chinese politeness when communicating with Han Chinese authority 
                                                
30 The distinction between second language and foreign language learners is important to this study 
because contextual differences impact the process of language acquisition (Gee, 1996). As Krashen 
(Wilton, 2009) suggests, second language contexts support natural (unconscious) acquisition while foreign 
language contexts involve formal (conscious) learning of the target language. However, see Gregg (1981) 
for a critical review of Krashen’s theory. 
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figures (Lakoff, 2005). For example, Mike favoured directness and did not display 
deference in discourse (Bilbow, 1997). His Han Chinese interlocutors frequently became 
frustrated with him because while he demonstrated a high degree of Mandarin linguistic 
competence (Chomsky, 1965), he did not demonstrate a corresponding degree of 
communicative competence, or adherence to Han Chinese expectations of socially 
situated performance (Canale & Swain, 1980; Hymes, (2000 [1965])). Mike’s 
investments in learning Mandarin were facilitated by Mandarin immersion beginning in 
primary school, yet this input was restricted to formal education contexts as Mandarin 
was not the medium of communication in his neighborhood. 
Anar, from a rural area outside the city of Aksu, typifies a third variety of 
Mandarin language learner. Aksu has a population of around 245,000 (National Bureau 
of Statistics, 2000); with an increasing number of Han Chinese (Toops, 2010). Anar grew 
up in a rural, agrarian, Uyghur community outside of Aksu. She attended a village 
primary school that was entirely populated by Uyghurs and was educated in Uyghur 
(mínkăomín), environmental conditions that suggest a Mandarin as a foreign language 
context. She performed well on standardized exams and earned entrance to a boarding 
school in Aksu for her secondary studies. Anar’s Mandarin immersion began when she 
entered secondary school, where she was educated in a bilingual Mandarin-Uyghur 
(shuāngyǔ) class with Uyghur classmates. Anar enrolled at a university in Urumchi after 
graduating from secondary school. Prior to starting college, Anar studied Mandarin 
(yǔkè) for one year, a requirement for ethnic minority students taking the mínkăomín 
version of the National Higher Education Entrance Examination (gāokǎo). 
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I claim that Anar initially learned Mandarin as a foreign language because she 
studied this language in a context where it was not the primary vehicle for daily 
interaction and where input in that language was restricted (Allwright, 1991; Oxford, 
2003). It is useful to draw a distinction between second language and foreign language 
contexts because population factors have implications for social interactions with the 
target language and culture, impacting “(a) the amount of exposure to input and 
opportunities for output, and (b) the learner’s probable motivation to engage in the 
additional language learning event” (J. K. Hall & Verplaetse, 2000, p. 9). 
If social interaction is the vehicle in order to start the process of second language 
acquisition, as is suggested by van Lier (1996), then Anar’s relatively deficient Mandarin 
exposure and corresponding opportunity for output would have influenced the 
development of her Mandarin language skills. Anar’s secondary boarding school and 
college were located in contexts with a significant number of Han Chinese, bringing her 
into frequent contact with the target language and culture. It is defensible to claim that 
Anar learned Mandarin as a foreign language in primary school, but later in Aksu and 
Urumchi, she learned Mandarin as a second language. Anar judged herself to be 
proficient in Mandarin, but less proficient than Uyghurs who had been educated in 
Mandarin (mínkăohàn) in urban areas. 
I was impressed by the variety of Mandarin learning experiences reported by 
Uyghur young adults. Each consultant seemed to have a unique educational trajectory, 
defying simple categorization. I encountered a small number of Uyghurs who had been 
educated in Mandarin (mínkăohàn); these individuals were invariably from urban areas. I 
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encountered no Uyghurs who had been educated in Uyghur (mínkăomín) for the entire 
duration of their primary and secondary education. The majority of the Uyghurs I 
consulted had been educated in Uyghur (mínkăomín) primary schools and bilingual 
Mandarin-Uyghur (shuāngyǔ) secondary schools. 
It was not surprising to find such as large number of Uyghurs educated in Uyghur 
(mínkăomín) primary schools and bilingual Mandarin-Uyghur (shuāngyǔ) secondary 
schools; since the late 1980s, Mandarin has been displacing Uyghur as a language of 
instruction in the Xinjiang education system through the expansion of a Mandarin 
dominant curriculum and the merger of minority language and Mandarin language 
schools (Dwyer, 2005). The Xinjiang Daily proclaimed in March 2004 that all ethnic 
minority schools be merged with Han Chinese schools, that ethnic minority and Han 
Chinese students be integrated in the classrooms of these merged schools, and that ethnic 
minority students in Xinjiang be taught in Mandarin as much as possible (Radio Free 
Asia, 2004). 
The Uyghur young adults consulted in this study were all college students; the 
youngest of the mínkăomín/shuāngyǔ interviewees (at 18 years of age) would have begun 
junior secondary school in 2002 and senior secondary school in 2005. These dates are 
consistent with the expansion of Mandarin as a language of instruction in the Xinjiang 
education system and the supplantation of Uyghur language instruction (mínkăomín) with 
bilingual Mandarin-Uyghur (shuāngyǔ) instruction. At present, monolingual Mandarin 
instruction (mínkăohàn) and Mandarin-Uyghur (shuāngyǔ) instruction is displacing 
Uyghur language instruction (mínkăomín) (Congressional-Executive Commission on 
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China, 2008a, 2010b; Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2007). Several 
mínkăomín/shuāngyǔ consultants remarked that they were the “last generation” of 
Uyghurs educated in Uyghur (mínkăomín) and that future generations of Uyghurs would 
be entirely Mandarin educated (mínkăohàn) and/or Mandarin-Uyghur educated 
(shuāngyǔ). Some of these individuals suggested that I conduct research on future cohorts 
in order to identify the implications of this shift on Uyghur language practices and 
identity formation.  
One complicating factor was that Uyghurs educated in Uyghur (mínkăomín) 
primary schools and bilingual Mandarin-Uyghur (shuāngyǔ) secondary schools 
sometimes identified as having been educated in Mandarin (mínkăohàn). This 
phenomenon indicates a tendency among some Uyghurs to deny an aspect of their 
background and promote an ethnolinguistic identity that has more value in Han Chinese-
dominated markets. This Möshük asserted that mínkăomín/shuāngyǔ sometimes claimed 
to be mínkăohàn because they were “jealous of mínkăohàn because mínkăohàn could get 
a better job and have a better life.” That is, she suggested that Uyghur 
mínkăomín/shuāngyǔ sometimes identified as mínkăohàn because they wanted to 
emphasize their membership in a sector possessing Mandarin linguistic capital, a form of 
embodied cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1977c). This may be considered a form of “passing” 
because there is no “real” identity behind this act of performance (Butler, 1990, p. viii). 
In Möshük’s estimation, Uyghur mínkăomín/shuāngyǔ aspired to benefit from the 
socioeconomic mobility thought to be available to mínkăohàn, and thus identified as 
such. This phenomenon may also be explained as a form of internalized oppression as it 
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suggests an oppressive view of Uyghur mínkăomín/shuāngyǔ toward their own group. 
Möshük stated that she was a “real” mínkăohàn, on the basis of having been educated in a 
Han Chinese majority class with Mandarin as the language of instruction with no Uyghur 
support for her entire education. It appeared that Möshük aspired to preserve the value of 
the symbolic capital accorded to mínkăohàn identity claims by maintaining a particular 
set of criteria (Bourdieu, 1986). An expanded definition of mínkăohàn might have been 
perceived as a threat to the integrity of this symbolic capital.  
Messi offered an alternate explanation, suggesting that mínkăomín/shuāngyǔ 
identified as mínkăohàn because they took the mínkăohàn version of gāokǎo. Uyghur 
students can select from two versions of the National Higher Education Entrance 
Examination (gāokǎo): mínkăomín and mínkăohàn. Uyghurs taking the mínkăohàn 
version of gāokǎo are given 50 additional points, but must compete directly with Han 
Chinese for college acceptance. Uyghur mínkăohàn examinees may begin their studies 
immediately if attending college in Xinjiang, though they must take one year of pre-
academic Mandarin (yǔkè) if attending college in mainland China. Uyghurs taking the 
mínkăomín version of gāokǎo are not given additional points, but they do not compete 
directly with Han Chinese. Uyghur mínkăomín entrance requirements are lower, but these 
students must take one year of pre-academic Mandarin (yǔkè) if attending college in 
Xinjiang. And they must take one or two years of pre-academic Mandarin (yǔkè) if 
attending college in mainland China. It is possible that some mínkăomín/shuāngyǔ 
identify as mínkăohàn because they wish to emphasize that they took the mínkăohàn 
version of gāokǎo, and competed directly with Han Chinese for college acceptance. 
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Aware of these factors, I investigated interviewees’ educational trajectories in order to 
obtain accurate information on the types of schools attended. 
Both Peirce (1995) and Bourdieu (1977a) utilized economic metaphors in the 
service of social theories. Peirce’s conception of investment refers specifically to “effort” 
(1995, p. 17); but it is no less important to recognize the financial investment made by 
Uyghur families. A Uyghur student who takes the mínkăomín version of gāokǎo and 
gains entrance to a top-tier university in mainland China must take at least one year of 
pre-academic Mandarin (yǔkè). 
Many Uyghur mínkăomín and mínkăohàn complete yǔkè at a technical school in 
Nanchang, Jiangxi Province named Jiāngxī gànjiàng zhíyè jìshù xuéyuàn. The tuition for 
yǔkè is roughly equivalent in Xinjiang and Nanchang, but there is an additional cost for 
yǔkè attendance in Nanchang because of travel expenses to and from this location. The 
distance between Urumchi and Nanchang is over 3,700 kilometers, while the distance 
from Kashgar to Nanchang is nearly 5,000 kilometers. The journey from Urumchi to 
Nanchang takes around 50 hours and costs between $50 and $100 depending on the type 
of seat (e.g. hard sleeper or hard seat), although the cost is significantly less if one 
purchases a “standing ticket” (zhànpiào). Most Uyghur students who study in Nanchang 
make this trip and incur the associated expenses four times a year; this is a significant 
financial investment considering per capita net income of the region. In 2010, farmers 
and herdsmen in Xinjiang earned 4,642.67 RMB ($703 USD) on average (Xinhua News 
Agency, 2011). 
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Uyghur families must make a substantial financial investment in Mandarin 
language education for their children as a pre-condition of college entrance, an expense 
that is prohibitive to some (Grose, 2008). According to Möshük, Uyghur parents make 
this investment because yǔkè is requisite for gaining entrance into a top-tier college in 
mainland China and earning a college diploma, an academic credential (Bourdieu, 1977c) 
that may be converted into a, “high salary, high reputation and high position.” Möshük 
was convinced of the certainty of this form of capital transfer in Xinjiang because Uyghur 
graduates of top-tier mainland Chinese universities are few in number, and thus attractive 
to potential employers. And if seeking employment in mainland China, Uyghur graduates 
of top-tier mainland Chinese universities can at least compete with Han Chinese for 
employment. However, Möshük added, “They are still in a Chinese world,” implying that 
one should not harbor illusions that competition for employment among members of 
different ethnic communities is fair.  
Peirce’s notion of investment “conceives of the language learner, not as 
ahistorical and unidimensional, but as having a complex social history and multiple 
desires” (1995, p. 9). It is important to describe contextual factors as related to Mandarin 
language investments in order to demonstrate that there is no typical Mandarin language 
learner in Xinjiang. The autonomous prefectures, cities and districts of Xinjiang are 
populated by diverse ethnic groups (Toops, 2004a); I have argued that population factors 
have influenced the amount of exposure to input and opportunities for output (J. K. Hall 
& Verplaetse, 2000), resulting in diverse language learning experiences. Some Uyghur 
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young adults learned Mandarin as a second language, while others learned it as a foreign 
language and, in some cases, later as a second language (Allwright, 1991; Oxford, 2003).  
Socio-cultural models of second language acquisition, such as that of Peirce 
(1995), “assume settings where the target language is used for everyday communication. 
In such situations social conditions determine the extent of learners’ contact with the L2 
and their commitment to learning it. However, socio-cultural models may be less relevant 
to foreign language settings where most learners’ principal contact with the L2 is in the 
classroom” (R. Ellis, 1997, p. 42). Most SLA models include “social factors” (Schumann, 
1978), noting the significance of the context on opportunities for input and L2 use, 
attitudes toward assimilation, and attitudes toward the second language group, but the 
core of SLA research focuses on “within-the-individual” variables (Lantolf, 2005, p. 
340), including cognitive, affective, and other individual factors. Contexts and social 
relationships have implications for investments because an “investment in the target 
language is also an investment in a learner’s own social identity, an identity which is 
constantly changing across time and space” (Peirce, 1995, p. 18). The range of 
investments in Mandarin available to learners in Xinjiang is limited by social constraints 
and the ways learners assert social identities to access “a variety of conversations in their 
community” (B. Norton & Toohey, 2001, p. 310). 
The contextual differences in Xinjiang are related to population factors, including 
size, distribution, and ethnicity. This diversity is a result of the influx and settlement of 
Han Chinese migrants to the region since 1949 (Peirce, 1995, p. 18). Some scholars, such 
as Gladney, refer to Xinjiang as an “internal colony,” arguing that, “through initial 
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occupation, gradual integration through immigration, and finally ‘minoritization’ as a 
result of nationality policy, the Uyghur (and perhaps many others like them) have been 
internally colonized by the Chinese state (1998, p. 20). Some contest this classification 
(Toops, 2004a), while others argue that China’s Xinjiang policy is worse than 
colonialism altogether (Gladney, 1998; Sautman, 2000). I support the classification of 
Xinjiang as an internal colony because, “the [CCP/Han Chinese] core is seen to dominate 
the periphery politically and to exploit it materially” (Hechter, 1975, p. 9). Although the 
type of colonialism (or nature of injustice) occurring in Xinjiang has been characterized 
in different ways, it is certain that the proportion of Han Chinese in Xinjiang rose 
dramatically from 6.7 percent (220,000) in 1949 to 40 percent (8.4 million) in 2008 (Hao, 
2009) and that Han Chinese have taken up permanent residence in the region (Benson, 
1990). The Congressional-Executive Commission on China, noted in a report that, 
“government-supported, large-scale Han migration into the area, has increased Uighur 
resentment and fears of coercive cultural assimilation” (2005). Language policy in 
Xinjiang is one such coercive tool, as the expansion of Mandarin as a language of 
instruction in the Xinjiang education system, is utlized to complement an evolving 
language ecology where “upward social, economic, and political mobility is increasingly 
dependent upon one’s ability to use Mandarin Chinese” (Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 2005). 
Large numbers of Han Chinese have settled in the “northern urban corridor of 
Urumqi, Shihezi, Karamay, Bortala, Changji with the outlier to the south of Bayangol 
(especially Korla)” (Schuerkens, 2006). Han Chinese migration is spurred by recruitment 
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(accompanied with aide) and word of mouth where “people move from a village to a new 
place, then tell their cousins and others in the old village to also move to the new place” 
(Toops, 2004a, p. 22). A socio-cultural model for second language acquisition in a 
colonial setting must account for a variety of language learning contexts and human 
migration among settings. Population factors pay an important role in second language 
acquisition in colonial settings and first language vitality because the proportion of 
speakers within a population have implications for second language input and 
opportunities for output (J. K. Hall & Verplaetse, 2000).  
Möshük, Mike and Anar were raised in environments that differed according to 
population factors and the constellation of languages in their immediate environments 
(Wilton, 2009). Möshük continuously invested in the target language in a context 
populated by members of the target language community. As a mínkăohàn in a 
predominantly Han Chinese class, she had daily opportunities to assert a Mandarin social 
identity through language-mediated social interactions with the target language 
community (Toohey, 2000). Mike was also a mínkăohàn in a predominantly Han Chinese 
class, yet the ethnolinguistic composition of his neighborhood did not provide 
opportunities to access conversations in the target language. In addition to residential 
community distance, Mike indicated some social distance (Schumann, 1976) between 
himself and the target language group, expressed as a generally negative attitude toward 
Han Chinese authority figures and resentment of the unequal power relationship between 
Uyghurs and Han Chinese (i.e. Han Chinese dominance). Anar first invested in the target 
language in a context separate from the target language community, yet dominated by the 
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target language community in absentia. For Anar, the school was the primary site for the 
production and distribution of the linguistic resource of Mandarin. She then moved into a 
context populated by members of the target language community, with expanded 
opportunities for investments in Mandarin, although still limited by powerful social 
constraints. In the following section, I focus upon anticipated returns on investments in 
Mandarin (an embodied form of cultural capital) and the Han Chinese educational 
credential system (an institutionalized form of cultural capital) (Bourdieu, 1977c). 
4.3 THEME TWO: EXPECTED RETURNS 
All of the Uyghur consultants had invested in Mandarin, although the investments 
were not uniform due to the contextual differences described earlier. A second theme that 
emerged from the data was expected returns on language investments, or the anticipation 
of access to previously unattainable resources (Peirce, 1995). Bourdieu defines these 
resources as any one or combination of capital in circulation: symbolic, economic, social, 
and cultural. 
Symbolic capital consists of the “prestige and renown attached to a family and a 
name” (Bourdieu, 1977b, p. 179), a concept drawn from Weber’s notion of status 
(Bendix, 1978). Language is also considered a form of symbolic capital which may be 
exchanged in the “marketplace” of social interaction (Bourdieu, 1977a, p. 652). 
Language may be seen as a symbolic resource, accorded value depending on the market. 
The possession of symbolic resources, “such as certain highly valued types of linguistic 
skills, cultural knowledge and specialized skills, helps to gain access to valuable social, 
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educational and material resources” (Mejia, 2002, p. 36). These resources, which 
constitute symbolic capital, in turn, “acquire a value of their own and become sources of 
power and prestige in their own right” (Heller, 1994, p. 7). 
Economic capital is “immediately and directly convertible into money and may be 
institutionalized in the forms of property rights” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 47). Economic 
capital is broadly connected to the societal distribution of economic and social resources. 
Bourdieu’s notion of economic capital has been criticized for lacking “depth, precision 
and rigour” (Fine, 2000, p. 59). Beasley-Murray (2000) observed that Bourdieu “tends to 
understand (economic) capital exclusively in terms of exchange value (monetary value) 
but the other forms of (non-economic) capital in terms of use (value)” (Fine, 2000, p. 59). 
Economic capital is critical in determining the kinds of access individuals have to other 
forms of capital. For example, some Uyghur parents pay a relatively high amount of 
tuition in order to send their children to Han Chinese schools. This necessitates a certain 
level of economic capital that is converted to embodied cultural capital, such as a high 
degree of Mandarin communicative competence, including linguistic competence 
(Chomsky, 1965) and social knowledge about how and when to use Mandarin utterances 
appropriately (Hymes, 1966). 
Social capital is “made up of social obligations (‘connections’), which is 
convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in 
the form of a title of nobility” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 47). Social capital consists of access to 
social institutions, relationships and resources as a result of group membership. In 
Bourdieu and Wacquant’s (1992) words, social capital is “the sum of the resources, 
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actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable 
network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintances and 
recognition” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Language, a social product is acquired 
through social interactions; Bourdieu referred to power-laden social interactions as social 
capital (Bourdieu, 1991). 
Cultural capital is “convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and 
may be institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 
47). This form of capital “describes the advantages that people acquire as a part of their 
life experiences, their peer group contacts, and their family backgrounds,” including 
“good taste, style, certain kinds of knowledge, abilities, varieties of language, and 
presentation of self” (Corson, 1998, p. 20). Linguistic capital, defined as the mastery of 
and relation to language (Bourdieu, 1991), can be understood as a form of embodied 
cultural capital. Linguistic capital, a part of one’s cultural heritage acquired from one’s 
surrounding culture, represents a means of communication and self-presentation. “For 
Bourdieu, linguistic capital was more than the competence to produce grammatical 
expressions and forms of language. It also included the ability to use appropriate norms 
for language use and to produce the right expressions at the right time for a particular 
linguistic market” (Corson, 1998, p. 20). 
As stated, language is a form of cultural capital, part of an “ensemble of cultivated 
dispositions that are internalized by the individual through socialization and that 
constitute schemes of appreciation and understanding” (Swartz, 1998, p. 76). A person’s 
initial accumulation of cultural (including linguistic) capital is “the best hidden form of 
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hereditary transmission of capital, and it therefore receives proportionately greater weight 
in the system of reproduction strategies, as the direct, visible forms of transmission tend 
to be more strongly censored and controlled” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 49).  Nieto adds that, 
“in the case of learning one’s native culture and language, cultural capital is acquired in 
the absence of any deliberate or explicit teaching; it is therefore unconsciously learned” 
(2001, p. 141). Some Uyghurs are born into contexts where Mandarin and Uyghur are 
used in daily interactions (Oxford, 2003), acquiring Uyghur first at home and then 
learning Mandarin sequentially at school. This type of context facilitates Mandarin 
second language acquisition because Mandarin is part of the particular language 
constellation in the immediate environment (Wilton, 2009). Yet many Uyghurs are born 
into contexts where Uyghur is the primary vehicle for daily interaction, and with 
negligible opportunities for contact with the target language outside of the classroom. 
Uyghur students in areas dominated by Han Chinese (e.g. Urumchi) have more 
opportunities to assert Mandarin social identities through conversation with members of 
the target language community. These students may be inclined to make investments of 
energy and desire due to the value of Mandarin within their social fields of activity. 
However, Mandarin linguistic capital is not evenly distributed in Xinjiang; in some areas, 
the school is the primary source for the production and distribution of Mandarin linguistic 
capital. For Uyghur students in contexts where the school is the only consistent site of 
exposure to Mandarin, and with no communicative need to use this language outside of 
the classroom, mastery of Mandarin will require a learner’s own personal investment of 
time, effort, and attention. 
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Beginning in the mid-1990s, Mandarin was mandated to be the language of 
instruction in schools throughout Xinjiang, regardless of contextual factors (Dwyer, 
2005; Radio Free Asia, 2004). Through a process of school consolidation and the 
expansion of Mandarin as a language of instruction, Uyghur students are compelled to 
invest in Mandarin or drop-out (Radio Free Asia, 2011a). This may be interpreted as a 
form of symbolic violence where the imposition of a cultural arbitrary (i.e. the expansion 
of Mandarin as a language of instruction in the Xinjiang education system) functions, for 
some Uyghur students, to disrupt educational aspirations and derail future possibilities 
(Bourdieu, 1977c; Yaʼir, 2009). In the following paragraphs, I present data collected 
during interviews on expected returns on investments in Mandarin, with the purpose of 
illustrating the variety of expectations. The perspectives on expected returns demonstrate 
a range of attitudes, including optimism, uncertainty and pessimism. I analyze these 
expected returns in reference to Bourdieu’s forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1986).   
Tileshüp was born and raised in Urumchi. Among all of the consultants, he was 
the only one that was educated in Mandarin (mínkăohàn) through junior secondary 
school, yet attended a Mandarin-Uyghur (shuāngyǔ) high school. This was exceptional 
because all of the other Uyghurs I interviewed who were educated in Mandarin 
(mínkăohàn) remained on this track for the entirety of their grade school education. 
Typically, Uyghurs educated in Uyghur (mínkăomín) during primary school streamed 
into Mandarin-Uyghur (shuāngyǔ) secondary schools. This trajectory represents a 
movement from primary language instruction to second language instruction with the 
primary language relegated to a marginal subject status. This type of bilingual education 
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program is comparable with early-exit or transitional programs where a native language 
is used as a foundation from which to transition him or her to a second language learning 
environment (Rhodes, Ochoa, & Ortiz, 2005). 
On the afternoon I interviewed Tileshüp, he was upset because he had recently 
broken up with his girlfriend of two and a half years. This was a serious relationship and 
they had been cohabiting. His sad feelings were compounded by his approaching 
birthday, an event that he used to celebrate with his girlfriend. Tileshüp’s girlfriend was 
Han Chinese; this was a rare example of a Uyghur-Han Chinese inter-ethnic relationship 
in an environment where many Uyghurs (and Han Chinese) disapprove Uyghur-Han 
Chinese romance (Kaltman, 2007). Tileshüp’s mother “didn’t say anything” about the 
ethnicity of his former girlfriend, but this relationship had caused his father some 
consternation. Tileshüp’s relationship with a Han Chinese woman indicates that general 
Uyghur and Han Chinese social disapproval of interethnic romance does not prevent this 
type of relationship. It also suggests that Tileshüp had participated in contexts that 
allowed him to develop the cultural capital (including linguistic capital) requisite to 
transcend ethnic and social boundaries. 
Tileshüp’s education began with immersion in a second language with no primary 
language support and then second language instruction with the primary language taught 
as subject. Tileshüp’s had been enrolled in a class where Mandarin was the language of 
instruction because his father wanted him to develop proficiency in Mandarin. However, 
while Tileshüp was in junior secondary school, his father became concerned with 
Tileshüp’s low Uyghur literacy. Tileshüp’s father enrolled his son in a Mandarin-Uyghur 
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(shuāngyǔ) senior secondary school with the intention that Tileshüp would learn how to 
read and write in Uyghur, an objective that Tileshüp was able to realize. 
Tileshüp was attending law school at a public university in Urumchi in 2008. In 
response to a question about employment prospects, Tileshüp referenced his Uyghur and 
Mandarin language proficiencies as related to a wide-range of opportunities. He said, “I 
can do whatever I want. I’m a bilingual.” This statement indicates a positive attitude 
toward Uyghur-Mandarin bilingualism – a typical stance among all of the consultants. As 
for the position to which he aspired, Tileshüp stated, “I can be a boss.” This statement 
may be interpreted as an expression of confidence in maximizing returns on investments 
in Mandarin language learning. Tileshüp possessed both Uyghur and Mandarin linguistic 
capital (forms of cultural capital); he anticipated converting knowledge of these systems 
of communication into a position at the highest level of organizational management 
(labor that could be converted into economic capital).  
Tileshüp indicated that he would be an effective mediator of Uyghur-Han Chinese 
disputes because of his command of Uyghur and Mandarin. He said, “There are a lot of 
contracts and dissension cases about Uyghur and Han Chinese. So I feel I could [mediate 
Uyghur-Han Chinese disagreements].” I was encouraged that Tileshüp was seeking out 
an occupation that might contribute to the resolution of disagreements between Uyghurs 
and Han Chinese. He envisioned himself as a linguistic and cultural broker, a person who 
could serve as an intermediary and facilitate communication between Uyghurs and Han 
Chinese (Paine, 1971; Tse, 1996). Tileshüp expected to exploit his linguistic capital by 
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placing himself in a domain where monolingual Han Chinese and Uyghurs meet to 
resolve differences. 
Yusuf, educated in a Uyghur (mínkăomín) primary school and Mandarin-Uyghur 
(shuāngyǔ) junior and senior secondary schools, also envisioned himself as a mediator 
between monolingual Han Chinese and monolingual Uyghurs. Yusuf made reference to 
investments in Mandarin, describing the labor (and emotional pain) associated with 
attending a school where the language of instruction differed from his home language. He 
stated, “I went to a Uyghur school about one year. I wanted to stay, [but] my sister told 
me that I should go to Han school when I finished my first year of primary school. I did 
not want to go, I cried. They did not care. My mother sent me to a Han school. I could not 
understand anything in class at first, but later on I started to speak Chinese and I started to 
understand. Anyway, I was watching my sister go to a Uyghur school, so I always wanted 
to go to a Uyghur school. But I went to a Han school. I still regret that I did not went to a 
Uyghur school.” Yusuf expressed an expectation to obtain a return on the possession of 
Uyghur and Mandarin linguistic capital, although he was not as confident as Tileshüp 
regarding conversions of capital. He suggested that Mandarin language skills might be 
“cashed in” (i.e. converted) by obtaining employment in occupations requiring linguistic 
competence in both Uyghur and Mandarin. 
Early in my interview with Yusuf, he indicated that there was nothing optional 
about making investments in Mandarin, and seemed unsure that a return would 
materialize. He said, “One thing is if we go to a bank here and write our name in Uyghur 
on papers, they would refuse to serve us. So for our own good I think we have to learn. 
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Maybe it is good for finding a job, but other things we only hope – Allah bless us. We 
learned it because we thought it is going to help. And it will help.” Yusuf’s statement 
indicates that Uyghur is an unacceptable (i.e. illegitimate) script at the bank, an institution 
controlled by the CCP. At this institution, Standard Chinese (the script corresponding to 
the PRC’s official language of Mandarin) is the legitimate script. Yusuf bluntly states that 
bank employees would “refuse to serve” individuals who did not possess Chinese literacy 
skills, a type of symbolic violence (an exercise of power and submission) against 
individuals lacking this form of linguistic capital (Bourdieu, 1991; Grenfell, 2011a). 
Although Mandarin and Uyghur are the legal official languages of the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region (Blachford, 2004), many government documents are printed 
only in Chinese. In 1993, of 2,069 official documents issued by three Xinjiang 
governmental departments, 1,873 were in Chinese, while only 196 were in Uyghur 
(Jianabuer, 1993). Equality of government service is challenged by the high proportion of 
government workers who are Han Chinese and do not speak minority languages. Public 
media are “perhaps the only arena where the government has done a relatively good job, 
particularly in radio and television broadcasting that effectively targets at minority 
populations with rather high illiteracy” (Zhou, 2004, p. 88). By the early 1990s in 
Xinjiang, the regional radio station and 36 local stations had regular programs in Uyghur, 
Kazakh, Kirghiz, Mongolian, and Xibe. The regional television station and 23 local 
stations have regular programs in Uyghur, Kazakh, and Mongolian (Apana, 1992). “The 
CCP has held tight control over the public media because of its belief of the media’s 
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force in stabilizing or destabilizing the state, a force that is considered second only to the 
armed forces” (Zhou, 2004, p. 89). 
The general tone of this statement is somewhat despondent – Yusuf’s expected 
return on Mandarin investment lacks optimism and is shaded with compulsion. Yusuf 
states that Uyghurs have to learn to read and write in Chinese in “for our own good.” This 
type of sentiment is evocative of Skutnab-Kangas’ argument that indigenous/tribal and 
minority mother tongues are subjected to structural and ideological violence through 
rhetoric that, “‘We’ are ‘helping’ ‘them,’ and that they want it, for their own good” 
(2010). Uyghur students consistently encounter ideological messages, such as the 
following (found on signs in many classrooms in Xinjiang), “Chinese is our national 
language. Learning Chinese is necessary to make the nation strong and the people rich.” 
This message carries a nationalistic ideology, implying that student investments in 
Mandarin Chinese are essential for national development and collective prosperity. My 
consultant Möshük suggested that Mandarin Chinese proficiency might be rhetorically 
connected with national strength because academic and specialist knowledge is published 
in Chinese only. Mandarin Chinese proficiency is necessary for access to this 
information, which may be used to advance national programs (e.g. research and 
development, generally; the space program of the PRC, specifically). The meaning of the 
clause following the conjunction is unambiguous, asserting that Mandarin Chinese 
proficiency is requisite for the generation of collective wealth.  
Yusuf says that Mandarin competency might be valuable in obtaining 
employment, but he is not confident that Mandarin will be beneficial for “other things.” 
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Mandarin competence may equip Yusuf to participate in the Han Chinese labor market, 
but whether these skills will contribute to a strong sense of identity and a sense of 
belonging to his Uyghur community is unresolved. If by “other things,” Yusuf is 
referring to the entire scope of activity beyond employment, this is an expression of a 
profound uncertainty in Mandarin linguistic investment. Yusuf attaches the phrase “Allah 
bless us” to a statement on the “hope” for a return on Mandarin linguistic investment. 
According to Möshük, another consultant, this supplication is usually verbalized when 
considering or experiencing something dreadful. This prayer indicates that Yusuf was 
concerned that he would not derive benefit from his Mandarin language skills, and may 
even have a negative consequence. 
Later in my interview with Yusuf, he expressed more optimism and articulated a 
vision of himself, like Tileshüp, as a mediator assisting members of Uyghur and Han 
Chinese communities. He said, “If the society can go to the right way, I think learning 
Chinese can help us. Uyghur farmers can’t speak Chinese, we can build a bridge between 
Uyghur farmers and Han Chinese, because we can speak Chinese. Also [Uyghur] 
mínkăohàn students can’t read Uyghur, we can read and write. So I think it can help us 
get a job.” Yusuf calls attention to monolingual Uyghurs and Uyghur mínkăohàn lacking 
Uyghur literacy skills as Uyghur populations that may need language assistance. He 
identifies Uyghur farmers as opposed to Han Chinese migrants, two groups that 
sometimes come into conflict when competing for scarce agricultural resources (Radio 
Free Asia, 2009c, 2009d). Yusuf envisions himself obtaining employment based on 
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qualifications related to Mandarin and Uyghur language skills – as a linguistic broker 
between Han Chinese and Uyghur linguistic communities (Tse, 1996). 
Both Tileshüp and Yusuf demonstrate how Uyghur young adults are exercising 
agency and repositioning themselves in opposition to the official discourse on Uyghurs. 
By exploiting the climate following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S., and the 
fact that some Uyghurs were found fighting in Afghanistan, China has portrayed Uyghurs 
as a source of serious Islamic terrorist threat in Xinjiang. According to Human Rights 
Watch, “The incorporation of the ‘terrorist’ label into the public discourse has in turn 
heightened distrust between the Uighur and ethnic Chinese communities in Xinjiang. 
Uighurs interviewed in the region point out that opponents to Chinese rule in the area 
have been given many labels over the last half-century: they were described by the state 
as feudal elements and as ethnic nationalists in the 1950s and 1960s, as counter-
revolutionaries in the 1970s and 1980s, as separatists in the 1990s, and now, since 2001, 
as terrorists” (2005). Tileshüp and Yusuf’s ambitions diverge markedly from the sinister 
motives attributed to the Uyghur ethnic community in public discourse. The association 
of “Uyghur” with “terrorist” is a form of symbolic violence, representing the imposition 
of a category of perception upon dominated social agents (Bourdieu, 1991). I argue that 
this state-authored perception is especially pernicious because, as China lacks media 
freedom (Reporters Withour Borders, 2012), citizens have little ability to compare 
sources of information and come to independent judgments about this claim. 
Anwar, like Yusuf, was educated in Uyghur (mínkăomín) primary and Mandarin-
Uyghur (shuāngyǔ) junior secondary and senior secondary schools. Anwar expressed a 
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more critical perspective than Tileshüp or Yusuf, recognizing the social inequalities that 
prohibited full access to state institutions. Anwar suggested that social inequalities 
nullified the value of Mandarin linguistic capital, thus undermining potential conversions. 
He stated, “Every year before high school students graduate, colleges from all around 
China will go to high schools and advertise themselves, but aviation universities, and 
astronomy universities, you can see they write that on their advertisement, ‘Only take 
Han Chinese students.’ We can see from that, we don’t have a chance to learn those 
stuff.” Anwar described ethnic discrimination in college recruitment, a practice consistent 
with the pervasive and well-documented ethnic discrimination in employment (i.e. job 
recruitment announcements in Xinjiang commonly reserve positions for Han Chinese in 
civil servant posts and private sector jobs) (Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 2006a, 2009d, 2011a). These types of discriminatory practices are instances of 
symbolic violence, manifest in the “imposition of a cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary 
power,” a cultural practice not seen as a choice, but as natural and undisputed (Bourdieu, 
1977c, p. 5). There are elements of reproduction and symbolic violence here because 
systemic ethnic discrimination in college/employment recruitment practices perpetuates a 
social structure favoring the dominant Han Chinese. Discrimination in college 
recruitment practices prevents Uyghur students from obtaining academic credentials (a 
form of institutionalized cultural capital) that might be converted into economic capital 
(Bourdieu, 1977c, 1991). 
Bourdieu argued that “speech always owes a major part of its value to the value of 
the person who utters it” (1977a, p. 652). “He suggests that the value ascribed to speech 
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cannot be understood apart from the person who speaks, and that the person who speaks 
cannot be understood apart from larger networks of social relationships... However, 
speakers’ abilities to command respect are unequally distributed because of symbolic 
power relations between interlocutors” (McKinney & Norton, 2011, p. 78). Bourdieu 
argued that the definition of linguistic competence should be expanded to include the 
“right to speech” or “the power to impose reception” to account for unequal power 
relations between what he termed “legitimate” and “illegitimate speakers” (1977a, p. 
648). “Bourdieu’s foregrounding of power relations in language use has important 
implications for how language learners are positioned by others, for the opportunities 
they get to speak, and for the varieties of language that we teach and they use” 
(McKinney & Norton, 2011, p. 78). Systemic exclusion from certain disciplines in higher 
education and employment is indicative of a stratified society where the value of 
Mandarin linguistic capital in Uyghur possession is undermined by powerful social 
forces, such as ethnic discrimination. For Uyghurs engaged in Mandarin language 
acquisition, contextual factors, including population (Toops, 2004a) and social distance 
(Schumann, 1976) effectively restrict access to “a variety of conversations in their 
community” (B. Norton & Toohey, 2001, p. 310), impacting the development of target 
language competence (Hymes, 1966) and the assertion of social identities. 
Anwar seemed frustrated when contemplating conversions of linguistic capital 
into economic capital. He stated, “When we are looking for a job, our identity is our 
disadvantage. Han Chinese is the first. We talked about mínkăohàn, mínkăomín and 
bilingual. Maybe mínkăohàn can be the second to concern and then bilingual and then 
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mínkăomín.” Anwar presented what might be called a hierarchy of employability. In this 
ranking system, Han Chinese are positioned on the top tier (i.e. have the highest 
prospects for employment); Uyghurs educated in Mandarin (mínkăohàn) are positioned 
on the second tier; Uyghurs educated in Mandarin and supplemental Uyghur (shuāngyǔ) 
are positioned on the third tier; and Uyghurs educated in Uyghur only (mínkăomín) are 
positioned on the bottom tier (i.e. have the lowest prospects for employment). Anwar’s 
hierarchy of employability indicates that the value of linguistic capital is undermined by 
entrenched social discrimination. According to Anwar, Han Chinese are more 
employable than Uyghur mínkăohàn (individuals whose Mandarin competence is often 
equivalent with Han Chinese) solely because of Han Chinese ethnic membership. Anwar 
positions Uyghurs according to education types, with language of instruction serving as 
the distinguishing factor. 
I argue that this ranking system belies something more complex because 
“language of instruction” is a designation that does not plainly reveal socialization 
factors, that is, “socialization through the use of language and socialization to use 
language” (Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986, p. 163). On language socialization, Ochs stated, 
“children and other novices in society acquire tacit knowledge of principles of social 
order and systems of belief (ethnotheories) through exposure to and participation in 
language-mediated interaction” (1986, p. 2). Uyghurs educated in Mandarin (mínkăohàn) 
from an early age in predominantly Han Chinese classrooms learn not only Mandarin, but 
Han Chinese cultural knowledge, norms, conventions and ways of being that are accepted 
by and acceptable to Han Chinese communities (Cole & Zuengler, 2003, p. 99). 
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Immersed in Han Chinese “communities of practice,” Uyghurs educated in Mandarin 
(mínkăohàn) acquire Mandarin linguistic competence (i.e. capital) through social 
interaction and collaborative activity (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998). “Through 
their participation in social interactions, children come to internalize and gain 
performance competence in these sociocultural defined contexts” (Elinor Ochs, 1986, p. 
2). An education in Mandarin “allocates” some Uyghurs to positions of higher social 
status among other Uyghurs, but not equal to or above Han Chinese (Meyer, 1977, p. 74). 
Anwar’s use of mínkăohàn deserves parsing because an education in Mandarin is 
significantly different given contextual differences stemming from population factors 
(Meyer, 1977, p. 74). Uyghurs in predominantly Uyghur classrooms, whether educated in 
Mandarin (mínkăohàn), Mandarin and supplemental Uyghur (shuāngyǔ), or Uyghur 
(mínkăomín) do not acquire Mandarin linguistic competence through social interaction 
and collaborative activity with Han Chinese (Enninger, 1984; J. K. Hall & Verplaetse, 
2000; Haugen, 1972). They do not have the opportunity to internalize and gain Mandarin 
performance competence or familiarity with Han Chinese cultural knowledge, norms, 
conventions and ways of being because of ethnic segregation (Lave & Wenger, 1991; 
Wenger, 1998). I argue that a lack of Han Chinese cultural capital (Cole & Zuengler, 
2003; Elinor Ochs, 1986) is why Uyghurs are positioned below Han Chinese on the 
hierarchy of employability. Some Han Chinese employ Mandarin proficiency (however 
measured) in academic and employment recruitment activities as discrimination by proxy 
(Bourdieu, 1986). Uyghurs are excluded from sectors (and preemptively silenced) by 
recruitment practices that propagate symbolic violence through a process of systematic 
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misrecognition and the reproduction of a cultural arbitrary (K. R. Johnson & Martinez, 
2000).  
The Uyghur young adults interviewed in this study expressed a variety of 
expectations on returns from their investments in Mandarin. In this section, I presented 
the perspectives of Tileshüp, Yusuf and Anwar in order to demonstrate the variety of 
expectations on returns. Tileshüp and Yusuf envisioned themselves as linguistic brokers 
between Uyghur and Han Chinese communities (Bourdieu, 1991; Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 2011b; McKinney & Norton, 2011); they anticipated 
converting linguistic capital into economic capital by obtaining employment in positions 
requiring linguistic competence in both Uyghur and Mandarin. Tileshüp anticipated a 
maximum return on investments in Mandarin by leveraging his linguistic capital to obtain 
a position at the highest level of organizational management. I argue that his confidence 
may be attributable to his mínkăohàn social status and Uyghur-Han Chinese bicultural 
competence (Tse, 1996). Yusuf was more tentative than Tileshüp in his expectations on 
returns from investment in Mandarin. Yusuf stated that it was important to learn 
Mandarin “for our own good,” suggesting a motivation informed by survival criteria in a 
Han Chinese-dominated environment (LaFramboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993; Meyer, 
1977). Anwar articulated a more critical perspective, suggesting that systemic and 
systematic discrimination on the basis of ethnicity determines the range of available 
opportunities to an individual in Xinjiang. Anwar stated that members of the dominant 
Han Chinese ethnic community had the widest range of employment prospects, while 
Uyghurs of differing education types had fewer opportunities. I also argue that the 
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ranking system described by Anwar, though based on Mandarin language competence, 
makes tacit reference to degrees of Han Chinese language socialization, the formation of 
Han Chinese cultural capital and habituation to Han Chinese ways of being (Leather & 
van Dam, 2003). In the following section, I focus on the language choices of Uyghurs, 
and how these practices are mediated by the changing language ecology of Xinjiang 
(Bourdieu, 1986; Cole & Zuengler, 2003; Elinor Ochs, 1986). 
4.4 THEME THREE: LANGUAGE CHOICE 
All of the Uyghur consultants, being bilingual in Uyghur and Mandarin, indicated 
that they made language choices, a process governed by the interlocutors involved, the 
situation of the interaction, the content of the discourse, and the function of the 
interaction (Mühlhäusler, 1996, 2001; Toops, 2004a). Several of my consultants affirmed 
that they engaged in Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching, defined by Myers-Scotton as “the 
alternation between two varieties in the same constituent by speakers who have sufficient 
proficiency in the two varieties to produce monolingual well-formed utterances in either 
variety” (F. Grosjean, 1994). In this section, using data obtained during interviews, I 
analyze the language choices (including code-switching) of four of my consultants. I 
explore the implications of these practices on language maintenance and language shift, 
described by Fasold as “the long-term, collective consequences of consistent patterns of 
language choice (2000, p. 23). Interpretations of languages choices make reference to 
Bourdieu’s concepts of capital and symbolic marketplaces (1984, p. 239) in a language 
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ecology marked by a changing population and unstable diglossia, with shifting domains 
for linguistic varieties (Bourdieu, 1977a; Heller, 1992). 
Abdurehim was educated in Uyghur (mínkăomín) primary and secondary schools 
in Urumchi. He completed medical school (where Mandarin was the language of 
instruction) and is now training in a residency program in Urumchi. Early in our 
interview, Abdurehim received a phone call from a friend. Through the course of his 
conversation, I noticed that he was engaging in Mandarin-Uyghur intersentential 
switching, alternating between these two languages at sentence and clause boundaries 
(Enninger, 1984; Fishman, 1972; Toops, 2004a). My digital voice recorder was on and I 
recorded Abdurehim’s turns in the conversation. The original language is identified, 
transcribed and followed by English translations. 
Abdurehim (1) [in English]: Hi 
 
Abdurehim (2) [in English]: No. 
 
Abdurehim (3) [in Mandarin]: Démàn kāfēiwū, gén yí gè péngyou. (Vine 
Coffeehouse, with a friend.) 
 
Abdurehim (4) [in Mandarin]: Chī fàn de ne. (I’m eating.) 
Abdurehim (5) [in Uyghur]: Axsham bir toygha barghan. (I was in a wedding the 
other night.) 
 
Abdurehim (6) [in Uyghur]: Mes bopqaptimen he? Sen hazir nime qiliwatisen? (I 
got drunk right? What are you doing now?) 
 
Abdurehim (7) [in Uyghur]: Kim ning uyi ge? (Whose home are you going to?) 
 
Abdurehim (8) [in Uyghur]: Hammang ning. Waxting bolsa kurusheyli bir dem 
dinkiyin. (Your aunts. If you’re free we can meet up later). 
 
Abdurehim (9) [in Mandarin]: Chī fàn. Wŏ yĕ zài chī fàn. Nayí – (Eating. I’m 
also eating now. Which – ) 
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Abdurehim (10) [in Uyghur]: Kim mu? Nime dey sen? (Who? What are you 
taking about?) 
 
Abdurehim (11) [in Mandarin]: Wŏ jì de ne. Yĭ hòu zài shuò, hăo bu hăo? (I 
remember it. Can we talk about it later?) 
 
Abdurehim (12) [in Mandarin]: Yĭ hòu zài shuò. Wŏ yě zài chī fàn ne. Nĭ chī 
wánfàn gěi wŏ dă diàn huà. Huò zhĕ shì wŏ chī wánfàn gěi ní dă diàn huà. Zài 
chéng jiè zuò yǐ hòu? (Let’s talk about it later. I’m also eating. Call me when 
you’re done eating. Or I’ll give you a call when I’m done eating. We can spend 
some time together at Orange Street Bar.) 
 
Abdurehim (13) [in Mandarin]: Méiyòu. Méiyòu. Wŏ gén yí gè wàiguó péngyou. 
(No. No. I’m with a foreign friend.) 
 
Abdurehim (14) [in Mandarin]: Chī wánfàn kéyĭ. Yí gè xiaó shí huò shì liăng gè 
xiáoshi. (I’m free after eating. In one or two hours.) 
 
Abdurehim (15) [in Mandarin]: hăode (Good) [in English]: okay 
 
After Abdurehim ended the call, I commented that he had alternated between 
Mandarin and Uyghur during the conversation.31 He explained that he was conversing 
with a Uyghur friend who was educated in Mandarin (mínkăohàn). He remarked that 
Uyghur mínkăohàn typically “mixed languages” (i.e. practiced Uyghur-Mandarin code-
switching), a tendency documented by other scholars (Carol Myers-Scotton, 1989). 
Abdurehim elucidated his language choices by stating, “I’m with Uyghur people or 
mínkăomín people, we all use Uyghur, our own language, but with mínkăohàn people, we 
sometimes mix together. Just like who called me, he’s mínkăohàn, but he’s my best 
friend. We sometimes mix Uyghur and Chinese, or simply in Chinese, sometimes mix 
English, something like that. Mix three languages together.” 
                                                
31 Abdurehim had also used an English greeting (hi) and an English discourse marker (okay), habitual 
expressions consisting of English loanwords (1984). 
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Abdurehim’s language practices were contingent upon his interlocutor (Finley, 
2007; Smith, 2002). He reported using monolingual Uyghur when conversing with 
Uyghur mínkăomín. Abdurehim’s language practices were more varied when conversing 
with Uyghur mínkăohàn. He described three types of language practices: monolingual 
Mandarin; Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching; and Uyghur-Mandarin-English code-
switching. It is remarkable that Abdurehim did not include monolingual Uyghur among 
the languages used when conversing with Uyghur mínkăohàn. This omission may be 
attributed to the linguistic inventory of Uyghur mínkăohàn, which may be Mandarin 
dominant in regard to lexicon. 
On Uyghur perceptions of Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching, Abdurehim said, 
“Some people just couldn’t bear this, while we are in public location, some Uyghur 
people say, ‘Why do you speak just in Chinese, or in Uyghur, just mix together, or 
something like that?’ Some people will say that, or some people say, no I don’t mind… 
Older people or some people have kind of strange ideas, like if you are Uyghur, you 
should something, something, something.” In a context marked by significant population 
changes (i.e. an influx of Han Chinese migrants (F. Grosjean, 1994)) and the 
corresponding punctuation of Uyghur linguistic equilibrium (Toops, 2004a), it is 
unsurprising to encounter puristic perspectives, including negative attitudes towards 
code-switching or advocacy for monolingual language practices (Dixon, 1997). In 
Xinjiang, diglossia is extremely unstable because Mandarin is “leaking” (Dyers, 1999; 
Kamwangamalu, 2002) and spreading into formerly Uyghur domains, including 
education (Fishman, 1972). Given this instability, “Purism may then be viewed as a 
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tendency to reject features perceived as representing domination and threatening the 
distinct identity, and therefore the separate existence, of the dominated. Any number of 
the cultural symbols may be chosen for rejection, and language is a very common choice” 
(Dwyer, 2005; Schluessel, 2007). 
Abdurehim later described the language practices of his nieces and nephews, all 
educated in Mandarin (mínkăohàn). He said, “They are all in Chinese primary school 
right now, and they all speak Chinese at home. No kids speaking their own language… 
When they are playing with each other, and other boys or kids. My parents and their 
parents, the whole family speaks in Uyghur. They always emphasize that you should 
speak in your own language. But, while they are playing, or they are learning things, they 
always speak in Chinese.” Abdurehim reported that his nieces and nephews were 
communicating primarily in Mandarin in several domains, including school, home and 
the neighborhood (Jernudd & Shapiro, 1989, p. 227). He stated that the parental 
generation communicated in Uyghur at home, suggesting that his nieces and nephews 
possess some degree of Uyghur language competency, but Mandarin appears to be their 
dominant language. These language practices evoke a pattern of language shift in 
immigrant groups whereby the first generation (represented by Abdurehim’s parents) is 
Uyghur dominant Uyghur-Mandarin bilingual; the second generation (represented by 
Abdurehim) is Uyghur-Mandarin bilingual; and the third generation (represented by 
Abdurehim’s nieces and nephews) is Mandarin dominant Uyghur-Mandarin bilingual. 
According to this general pattern, the fourth generation is predicted to have command of 
the dominant language only (Fishman, 1972). 
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Tileshüp, as mentioned previously, was educated in Mandarin (mínkăohàn) 
through junior secondary school but transferred to a Mandarin-Uyghur (shuāngyǔ) senior 
secondary school. When asked about language practices at home, Tileshüp stated, “When 
I’m with my mom, my sister, my brother, I talk to them in Chinese. When I talk to my 
father, I talk in Uyghur. He is mínkăomín.” Later, Tileshüp stated that his mother, sister 
and brother were all educated in Mandarin (mínkăohàn). Tileshüp’s language choices 
were related to type of language education experienced by the respective interlocutor 
(Appel & Muysken, 2006). According to speech accommodation theory (F. Grosjean, 
1994), Tileshüp’s language choices may be interpreted as acts of convergence. Tileshüp 
identified language of education as the variable that determined his language choices. 
The prominence of this variable may have implications on the process of Mandarin 
language shift because of the accelerated promotion of a Mandarin dominant curriculum 
and the consolidation of  Uyghur and Han Chinese schools (Giles, 1973). 
Miragul was educated in Uyghur (mínkăomín) in primary school and Mandarin-
Uyghur (shuāngyǔ) in junior and senior secondary schools. She communicated in Uyghur 
at home with her parents, who were also educated in Uyghur (mínkăomín) schools. 
Miragul’s senior secondary school was predominantly Han Chinese, although her class 
was entirely Uyghur.32 She stated, “Han Chinese were all around us so we mix Uyghur 
and Chinese almost all the time. That’s also happening in college.” Miragul attributed her 
tendency to code-switch between Uyghur and Mandarin as a consequence of being “all 
                                                
32 Within school segregation, the placement of second language learners in separate classes, is also 
common in language minority contexts in the U.S. (Conger, 2007). 
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around” Han Chinese, a consequence of the Xinjiang school consolidation movement that 
began in the late 1980s (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2010b, 2011d). 
As stated by Wei, “a person’s bilingualism is reflected in the internal uses of each 
of his languages” including non-communicative uses such as internal speech (Dwyer, 
2005; Radio Free Asia, 2004, 2011a). The following statement describes the internal 
speech and “cognitive behavior” (i.e. language consciousness) (2000, p. 32) of 
Ayitbayev, a young man who was educated in Uyghur (mínkăomín) primary and junior 
secondary schools and a Mandarin-Uyghur (shuāngyǔ) senior secondary school. 
Ayitbayev stated, “I went to a Uyghur school for nine years; we’ve learned Han Chinese 
but we never talk in Chinese. Our thoughts are in Uyghur. Now all of our classes are in 
Han Chinese. Sometimes I read books in Uyghur. Han Chinese always ask me why I am 
not reading books in Chinese. I do not like to read Chinese books at all. I like to read 
books in Uyghur because I understand better when I am reading. But now the way I think 
is changing – changing to Chinese. I think in Chinese. I use to translate Uyghur to 
Chinese first in my mind to understand it, now we think directly. I think I used to speak 
Uyghur with no problem, but now I feel like something is wrong when I am speaking 
Uyghur.” 
This statement offers a personal and profound commentary on language 
consciousness and the subtle process of language shift (Fishman, 1972). Ayitbayev 
suggests that the learning of Mandarin is leading to the replacement of Uyghur, at least as 
the language of his internal dialogue. This experience evokes “subtractive bilingualism,” 
a process whereby another language eventually replaces the learner’s first language 
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(Fishman, 1972). Consistent with an expanded definition of “subtractive bilingualism,” 
this process “implies a society in which one language is valued more than the other, 
where one dominates the other, where one is on the ascendant and the other is waning” 
(Valenzuela, 1999). Valenzuela would also argue that subtractive schooling “subtracts” 
native culture “cultural resources” and cultural competency in the home culture through 
subtractive assimilation, a process which functions to “fracture students’ cultural and 
ethnic identities” (1999, p. 5). Ayitbayev indicated a depletion in Uyghur language 
confidence, a condition that may have implications for changes in cultural identity and 
language shift, a process sometimes “accompanied by considerable tension and trauma” 
(K. Glaser, 2007, p. 153). These psychological responses to language shift sometimes 
result from being surrounded by structures and discourses that portray ethnolinguistic 
minority languages as inferior or “low quality” (Dwyer, 2005, p. 8) – an experience 
which “interferes with [ethnolinguistic community members’] ability to attain a positive 
self-image and stable cultural identity” (K. Glaser, 2007, p. 153). 
The Uyghur consultants who participated in this study reported and exhibited the 
use of a variety of languages, including monolingual Mandarin, monolingual Uyghur, 
Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching, and Uyghur-Mandarin-English code-switching, 
language choices governed by a number of factors described by Grosjean (1994). As 
stated by Heller, “The use of multiple languages “permits people to say and do, indeed to 
be two or more things where normally a choice is expected” (Heller, 1988, p. 93). 
Strategic language choices allow Uyghurs to achieve positions in Han Chinese controlled 
domains, while still laying claim to a Uyghur identity. Consistent with Heller (1988), it is 
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reasonable to assert that Han Chinese rely on norms of language choice (i.e. Mandarin 
accommodation) to maintain symbolic domination, while Uyghurs use linguistic 
resources and practices, such as code switching, to resist or redefine the value of 
symbolic resources in the linguistic marketplace. 
The contemporary language choices made by Uyghur young adults are 
consequential because they indicate a linguistic habitus that may impact the 
intergenerational transmission of language, considered to be the most significant factor in 
determining the future of a language (Austin, 2008). The domination of Mandarin in the 
Xinjiang education system is a critical factor because the language choices of Uyghur 
young adults appear to be connected with language of instruction in school 
(Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2010b, 2011d; Finley, 2007). All of the 
consultants were cognizant of the aggressive CCP efforts to implement a dominant 
Mandarin-language curriculum in schools throughout Xinjiang (Dwyer, 2005; Radio Free 
Asia, 2004, 2011a). In the following section, I describe “linguistic anxiety,” as expressed 
by Uyghur young adults – the trepidation associated with subtractive bilingualism and 
language shift toward Mandarin. 
4.5 THEME FOUR: LINGUISTIC ANXIETY 
A fourth theme that emerged from the data was “linguistic anxiety,” what Bulag 
defined as a deep unease about language loss, experienced by minority communities 
subject to the assimilative pressures of a dominant power (2003). Bulag formed this 
concept to describe the emotional condition of Mongolians from the Han Chinese-
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colonized territory of Inner Mongolia regarding language shift toward Mandarin. This 
community is losing their language, “arguably the last stronghold of their ‘nationality’ 
status” as they become “a depoliticized and deterritorialized ‘ethnic group’ in an 
increasingly primordial, multicultural ‘Chinese Nation’ (Bulag, 2003, p. 753). Several 
consultants articulated expressions of linguistic anxiety, such as Abdurehim, who stated, 
“Now all of the mínkăomín people are same with the mínkăohàn people. No matter in 
speaking, no matter in thinking, when writing and hearing, all the same. Just like Han 
people, just like mínkăohàn people. We have kind of wealth that we know all of the 
Uyghur culture, all of the Uyghur history, and we can write, we can hear. They can hear, 
they can understand, but they cannot write. We can read, but they can’t. They lose so 
much actually. They lose Uyghur culture and writing and reading.” Abdurehim expressed 
an anxiety concerning cultural homogenization, defined as a “loss of [Uyghur] cultural 
distinctions” (Grenoble, 2011, p. 34), and identified a decline in Uyghur language literacy 
skills among Uyghurs as a consequence of a Mandarin dominant curriculum and Uyghur-
Han Chinese school consolidation (Dwyer, 2005; Radio Free Asia, 2004, 2011a). 
Several Uyghur consultants expressed related sentiments, that is, consciousness of 
Han Chinese (mínkăohàn) socialization and awareness of Uyghur mínkăomín as the 
keepers of Uyghur tradition, such as Memet, who stated, “Are you asking that if I can 
speak Chinese as good as Han Chinese? Yes, I think so. But I can’t speak Uyghur as 
good as mínkăomín students. I can read Uyghur or write in Uyghur, but not as fast as 
mínkăomín. About how they judge us – it’s a fact that we grew up with Han Chinese, 
maybe sometimes we do act Han Chinese or think Han Chinese – I can’t deny that. After 
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I came to collage, there are a lot of mínkăomín students around me now. I also want to be 
friends with them. They are keeping our traditions – seems like we did not, like we 
betrayed. But we also want to know them – be close to them. For some reason, most 
mínkăomín – they think that we act Han Chinese and they exclude us. So we are afraid 
that we can’t get along. We do not know what to do. I just hope this situation can be 
better in the future. I will try my best to make friends with them, and try my best to let 
them know that we love our own traditions.” Memet indicated cognizance of Han 
Chinese cultural transfer, and a corresponding experience of Uyghur deculturation 
(Spring, 1994). The following paragraphs describe my consultants’ sense of unease 
related to language shift towards the use of Mandarin and the obsolescence of Uyghur as 
a marker of ethnic identity. 
Abdurehim expressed a concern over the expansion of Mandarin in the Xinjiang 
education system (Dwyer, 2005; Radio Free Asia, 2004, 2011a) as related to Han Chinese 
socialization. He stated, “When I was a child, there are so many Uyghur primary schools, 
middle school, and I studied in my own language in primary school and secondary 
school, but not in college. College is all Chinese and English. But now the children don’t 
have any choice to go to their own language school. It’s all Chinese right now. It’s so 
pity, but I can’t do anything for it.” Speaking of his mínkăohàn niece, Abdurehim said, 
“I’m afraid that she totally will go into the Chinese culture. And their mind, their thought, 
their thinking is all in this one way, just like Han people.” This sentiment was evocative 
of Bourdieu’s conceptions of social and cultural reproduction (Bourdieu, 1977c), and the 
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major role of the education system in the transmission and inculcation of the dominant 
Han Chinese culture (including cultural capital). 
Abdurehim stated that Mandarin language dominance was impacting Uyghurs’ 
English language acquisition due to Mandarin interference. He was concerned that 
Uyghurs might lose advantages associated with L1 Uyghur positive transfer when 
learning English as a second language. In terms of language structure, the Uyghur lexicon 
contains a number of Indo-European lexemes; both Uyghur and English are stress-based; 
and Uyghur has a larger consonant and vowel inventory than Chinese, facilitating the 
phonological acquisition of English L2 (Dwyer, 2005, p. 43). These features give 
Uyghurs an advantage over their Chinese-speaking counterparts when learning English. 
Abdurehim suggested that some negative Mandarin L1 interference was 
attributable to the different phoneme combinations in the two languages, a documented 
pronunciation issue for Mandarin L1 English learners (F. Zhang & Yin, 2009). Mandarin 
morphemes generally consist of a consonant plus a vowel [CV], with no consonants 
clusters and usually end with a vowel (exceptions are sound combinations consisting of 
eight front nasal final sounds [n]; eight back nasal final sounds [ng]; and the special 
cases: [er], [hm], [hng], [ng], [~r]). Learners often add a schwa /./ to final consonants as a 
result of transference of Mandarin phonological rules to English. Abdurehim provided 
several examples of this, including work [wɜrk], glass [glæs] and bath [bæθ] (pronounced 
by his niece as [wɜr-k.], [glæ-s.] and [bæ-θ.], respectively). In contrast with Mandarin, 
consonant final sounds are typical in Uyghur phonology [CVC, CVCC] Engesæth, 
Yakup, & Dwyer, 2009), a structure that being common to Uyghur and English (Odlin, 
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1989), would contribute to positive transfer and facilitate English language acquisition 
for Uyghur L1 English learners. 
Rebiya linked the loss of the Uyghur language to the obsolescence of ethnicity. 
She said, “I think Chinese is really widespread, but how about our language?! How about 
Uyghur language?! Han schools, bilingual schools, someday schools are not going to 
teach Uyghur anymore, if it goes like this. My mother said, ‘If the culture vanish, the 
ethnic group is going to vanish.’ I think we have to think about this now.” Rebiya 
connected the spread of Mandarin and Mandarin-Uyghur bilingual schools to the 
disappearance of the Uyghur language from the Xinjiang education system. An alternate 
reading of the phrase “teach Uyghur” may signify something more extensive than a 
system of communication, that is, the inculcation of ethnic habitus (May, 1998). Such an 
interpretation is substantiated by Rebiya’s mother’s subsequent quote. Uyghur schools 
were important to Uyghurs, not only because Uyghur was a language of instruction, but 
because Uyghur schools were a site for the inculcation of Uyghur cultural knowledge, 
norms, conventions and ways of being (Cole & Zuengler, 2003; Elinor Ochs, 1986). 
Uyghur teachers in Xinjiang face a number of challenges. CCP restrictions on 
government employees practicing religion keeps many Uyghurs, who are Muslim, out of 
jobs as teachers. “If they are caught attending mosque or fasting during Ramadan, they 
can be dismissed or demoted” (Demick & Pierson, 2009). Uyghur teachers must 
demonstrate a certain degree of Mandarin language competence (assessed through 
performance on the Hànyǔ Shuǐpíng Kǎoshì, a standardized test of Mandarin language 
proficiency for non-native speakers) to maintain employment. This standard was 
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introduced in September 2002, when Xinjiang University discontinued courses in Uyghur 
and transitioned to monolingual Mandarin as the language of instruction (Groβe, 2002). 
“Since 2002, 140 teachers whose Chinese was deemed inadequate for university 
pedagogy were forced into early retirement. Younger teachers without adequate standard 
Chinese language skills were asked to learn those skills by May 2004 or risk losing their 
jobs” (Dwyer, 2005, p. 40; Radio Free Asia, 2004). According to recent interviews 
conducted by Radio Free Asia (2011b), at least 1,000 primary school teachers in the 
Xinjiang have lost their jobs since 2010 because “they could not speak Mandarin in 
addition to their own Uyghur language.” 
In September 2011, a Uyghur veteran primary school teacher of 28 years from 
Kashgar was jailed for eight days following an altercation with her principal over the use 
of Mandarin in the school’s curriculum. She claimed she was overlooked for a promotion 
because of her inability to speak Mandarin fluently. According to the teacher, her 
principal admitted that she was a good teacher, but not “modern” enough and was 
constantly “fighting the government,” so the school could not offer her the promotion 
(Radio Free Asia, 2011b). 
Consistent with Cesàro (2002), who conducted a dissertation study on the culture 
and politics of food among the Uyghur in contemporary Xinjiang, I found that “the 
practices and discourses I had observed and recorded during my fieldwork were rather 
complex and could not be simply pigeon-holed as ‘traditional’/‘non-traditional’, or 
‘Uyghur’/‘non-Uyghur’” (Cesàro, 2007, p. 186). Several Uyghur mínkăohàn indicated 
that beyond linguistic anxiety, a Han-stream education has resulted in the obsolescence of 
 
 171 
Uyghur cultural knowledge. Möshük, who was educated in Mandarin (mínkăohàn) in a 
predominantly Han Chinese class, explained that Han Chinese teachers sometimes spread 
misinformation. Möshük told a story about an incident that occurred in her junior 
secondary Political Education course. A Han Chinese classmate has asked why Uyghurs 
do not eat pork, and the Han Chinese teacher had responded that, “Pig is Uyghur’s god.” 
Möshük believed this until corrected by her parents in senior secondary school. She 
explained that many Han Chinese teachers, being ignorant of the meaning of Uyghur 
cultural practices (including Islam) contributed to the corruption of Uyghur cultural 
knowledge. 
Another consultant, Reyhan, stated, “I went to Chinese school. I still don’t know a 
lot of our tradition. I’m having problem with that. You can’t be certain that Chinese 
school is the best for kids.” This quote indicates a feeling of ambivalence towards a 
Mandarin (mínkăohàn) education in a predominantly Han Chinese school. Reyhan 
appeared to be questioning the CCP ideology that a Han-stream education is irrefutably 
beneficial for Uyghurs (Jia, 2009a; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2010). Reyhan recognized Uyghur 
schools as conduits enabling the transmission of Uyghur cultural knowledge and later 
stated that she would send her own children to a Uyghur school if this option were 
available.  
All of the Uyghur consultants asserted that the Uyghur language was an important 
marker of Uyghur ethnic identity. However, this form of cultural capital did not set a 
parameter on perceived boundaries of Uyghur in-group membership. Some consultants 
recognized a “conflict” between Uyghur mínkăomín and Uyghur mínkăohàn, particularly 
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those Uyghur mínkăohàn who used Mandarin in the home domain. Yakub articulated this 
distinction when stating, “One [group of Uyghurs] grew up with Han Chinese and also 
went to Han school so they act like Han Chinese. Another one type is even though they 
went to Han school, but they speak Uyghur in when they came home, they play with 
Uyghur kids, their friends are also Uyghur, so there won’t be language gap between us, 
and there will be no conflict.” Uyghur language competence was recognized by my 
consultants as important although none suggested that Uyghur language proficiency was 
a criterion measure for ingroup or outgroup membership (Sumner, 1906). Rather, several 
consultants expressed grief and resignation regarding changing structural conditions, such 
as the expansion of Mandarin through curriculum modification and the consolidation of 
Uyghur and Han Chinese schools (Dwyer, 2005; Radio Free Asia, 2004, 2011a). As 
Abdurehim opined on the elimination of Uyghur as a language of instruction, “It’s so 
pity, but I can’t do anything for it.” 
Factors of power and influence do play a significant role in language planning, the 
dominance of some languages and the dominated status of other languages (Colin Baker 
& Jones, 1998). However, as Fishman (1997) has pointed out, languages become 
endangered because they lack informal intergenerational transmission and daily life 
support, not because they are not being taught formally in schools or lack official status. 
While Fishman’s assertion may pertain to some contexts, I would argue that in Xinjiang, 
coercive, institutional, and hegemonic practices are in place lead to families not 
transmitting the language over generations. The language policy currently implemented 
in Xinjiang “implicitly categorizes the Uyghur language as disloyal” (Dillon, 2002). 
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Institutionally, the CCP has made significant investments to eliminate Uyghur language 
schools through compulsory transition to a Mandarin dominant curriculum and 
consolidation with Han Chinese schools (Dwyer, 2005; Uyghur Human Rights Project, 
2009b). A Uyghur teacher, whose classes consisted of both Uyghur and Han Chinese 
students remarked that the current language policy undermined the status of the Uyghur 
people. She stated, “Of course we need to learn the Han language. Everyone knows that it 
is important to use the Han language but our Uyghur language is also important. The 
policy makes our Uyghur students feel our language is not important, so the Han students 
do not have to learn it. We Uyghurs often regard people who speak our language as our 
friends because they respect our culture – like the Uyghur saying, ‘recognize the 
language not the face to be friends’ (L. Tsung, 2009, p. 136). These state-sponsored 
practices contribute to the sum total of symbolic violence towards the Uyghur language. 
4.6 DISCUSSION 
This study utilizes language ecology as one component of a theoretical framework 
to describe language-related issues with an emphasis on contextual factors (Haugen, 
1972). I argue that the migration and settlement of Han Chinese (Toops, 2004a) coupled 
with the promotion of Mandarin (and corresponding marginalization of Uyghur and other 
ethnic minority languages) in the Xinjiang education system (Dwyer, 2005; Radio Free 
Asia, 2004, 2011a) has resulted in a punctuation of the linguistic equilibrium of the 
region (Dixon, 1997). Although population factors are of primary importance (Enninger, 
1984; Haugen, 1972), it should be recognized that “the current population situation [in 
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Xinjiang] is similar to that of the Qing when many Han lived in the area [in the early 
1800s] (Toops, 2004a; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Population Census Office, 
2002). 
CCP Language Policies that emphasize Mandarin, developed in the bureaucratic 
center of the PRC and imposed on the periphery, are also of crucial importance 
(Blachford, 1999; Dwyer, 2005; Harrell, 1995). As phrased by Goodman, “The emphasis 
given to linguistic assimilation within Open Up the West policies in Xinjiang is clearly an 
attempt to homogenize the culture and identity of citizens, as well as to ensure the 
dominance of the Chinese language” (2004, p. 62). Gal cites global processes like 
colonization, the expansion of capitalism and transnational labor migration as having 
replaced the former earlier processes of “dispersion of populations and the peopling of 
the world,” so that “relatively egalitarian linguistic diversity, based on small-scale 
languages whose speakers believe their own language to be superior, [has been changed] 
into stratified diversity: local languages are abandoned or subordinated to ‘world 
languages’ in diglossic relations” (1989, p. 356). 
This description is pertinent to the language ecology of Xinjiang where, in the 
words of a consultant, Yakup, “Chinese is widespread, and jobs are going to require us 
[to speak] Chinese. It was not like this ten or twenty years ago, but along with the 
developing and globalization we also need to learn English, not only just Chinese. So 
learning Chinese is a something we must to do as a Chinese citizen.” Uyghur students 
differ from their Han Chinese counterparts because they are expected to achieve 
proficiency in three languages: Uyghur, Mandarin, and English. Each of these languages 
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serves different functions: Uyghur for cultural identity; Mandarin for participation in 
Han-Chinese dominated spheres and institutions, including the economy and higher 
education; and English for information, employment and educational opportunities.   
In my approach to thematic analysis, I have made an effort to situate and 
contextualize data on the language practices of my Uyghur consultants within the 
framework of language ecology, as deeply embedded in the social context (Spolsky, 
2004). Both Haugen (1972) and Bourdieu (1991) critique descriptive linguistics for 
ignoring the complex social, historical and political conditions that mediate linguistic 
practices. In Xinjiang, “horizontally structured multilingualism is being replaced by a 
much less structured vertical plurilingualism,” a replacement that Mühlhäusler calls, “a 
recipe for future conflict and of course the danger that one of the more powerful ‘killer 
languages’ such as [Mandarin] will simply take over. Colonialism, it should be 
remembered, through its practices, was responsible for a massive habitat destruction of 
indigenous languages and it is this destruction of habitat, that has made it much easier for 
languages such as [Mandarin] to take root” (1997, p. 11).33 As stated by Schieffelin, 
“everyday language practices, local metalinguistics, and language ideologies that are 
embedded in complex cultural and historical moments intersect in ongoing processes of 
social reproduction and rapid cultural change” (2000, p. 296). “This is where a notion of 
language ecology in terms of an ecology of language practices can take us forward, since 
                                                
33 Mühlhäusler uses “English” as an example “killer language” (Malik, 1994). As is appropriate to this 
discussion, I have substituted “Mandarin” for “English” in brackets. Also note that the phrase “killer 
language” (1997, p. 11) has been criticized for imbuing languages with agentive capacities (Nettle & 
Romaine, 2000, pp. 5-6; Price, 1984, p. 170). 
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it gives us a way of thinking about language practices within changing social and cultural 
practices” (Pennycook, 2010, p. 104). 
As an interpretive approach, a practice of the ecology of language can serve as a 
heuristic to the reading of statements, such as that made by Bahtiyar, “When I was a kid, 
bilingual [education] is not really popular in our town. All the kids of rich people or kids 
of cadre went to Uyghur school. At the end of the 90s, maybe it was 1996, mínkăohàn 
students or students who can speak good Chinese became more popular or I should say 
can get a better job than mínkăohàn students. After that, learning Chinese became 
popular. Rich people and cadre started to send their kids to Han school. Mínkăomín 
students were kids of farmers – it’s still same now.” Here, Bahtiyar alludes to Mandarin 
proficiency, a form of linguistic capital, as convertible to popularity (i.e. cultural capital) 
and increased employment opportunities, labor that can be converted into wealth (i.e. 
economic capital). 
It is significant that wealthy Uyghurs began the trend of sending their children to 
Han Chinese schools. This movement also initiated a transfer of monetary capital for 
Uyghurs, including tuition (e.g. Han Chinese schools require higher tuition than Uyghur 
schools) and transportation costs (e.g. Uyghur students at Han Chinese schools must 
attend school on weekends in preparation for the Mandarin-medium college entrance 
exam). As a corollary, the promotion of a Mandarin curriculum is contributing to the 
marginalization or elimination of the transmission of “traditional knowledge,” defined by 
Posey as “the social process of learning and sharing knowledge, which is unique to each 
indigenous culture” (1999, p. 4). In the words of Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, “It is 
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exactly this transmission process that is at grave risk as soon as indigenous children 
attend schools where their languages are not the main teaching languages and where their 
cultural practices do not permeate the learning processes. This is linguistic and cultural 
genocide, according to articles IIb and IIe of the UN 1948 Genocide Convention” 
(Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000; 2001, p. 14). 
Several Uyghur consultants described choices related to language practices as 
contingent upon the field, defined by Bourdieu as networks of social relations between 
positions that are occupied by social agents with a “distribution of different currencies of 
power” and “relatively autonomous social microcosms, spaces of objective relations 
which have a logic and a necessity that is specific and irreducible to those that govern 
other fields” (1992, pp. 94-95). Domestic, scholastic and peer-group fields were pertinent 
to this study, as these configurations of settings and participants were cited frequently as 
related to language choices and practices. Yusuf’s language practices exemplify one type 
of mínkăohàn language practice, “I use Uyghur at home. After when I came to college, 
most of my roommates are mínkăohàn. When mínkăohàn communicate with each other 
we mix, we mix these two languages.” Here, the Uyghur language practices of Yusuf’s 
family (i.e. domestic field) do not correspond to the Mandarin language practices of the 
school (i.e. scholastic field) or the Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching language practices 
of Yusuf’s friends (i.e. peer-group field). Yusuf was faced with the triple task of 
acquiring language appropriate for three markedly different field contexts. 
It is well established in sociolinguistics that one language variety does not index 
one social position in a straightforward way (Elinor Ochs, 1990; Elinor Ochs & 
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Schieffelin, 1989). However, May argues that, “historically associated languages 
continue often to hold considerable purchase for members of particular cultural or ethnic 
groups in their identity claims” (2005, p. 330; 2011). Several Uyghur consultants asserted 
that the Uyghur language was an important component of Uyghur identity, such as 
Rebiya who lamented, “Han schools, bilingual schools, someday schools are not going to 
teach Uyghur anymore, if it goes like this. My mother said, ‘if the culture vanish, the 
ethnic group is going to vanish.’” Rebiya linked the expansion of a Mandarin dominant 
curriculum with the vanishing of Uyghur culture and concurrent Sinicization. In my 
reading, Rebiya is concerned that language shift toward Mandarin will contribute to the 
loss of recognition of Uyghur as a distinct ethnic community. A shift from Uyghur would 
mark the loss of an important symbolic resource used to index or perform Uyghur 
identity (Bourdieu, 1991; Duranti, 1997). 
This study utilizes a conception of identity informed by Hall, who stressed that 
identities are not unified but increasingly fragmented, not singular, but “multiply 
constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic discourses, practices and 
positions” (1996, p. 4). Identity is not an essentialist notion, given through race, gender, 
community membership, or kinship network. Rather, identity “forms a trajectory across 
the different institutional settings of modernity” (Giddens, 1991, p. 14). Although identity 
is always in process and never complete, this does not equal fragmentation because, “A 
person may make use of diversity in order to create a distinctive self-identity which 
positively incorporates elements from different settings into an integrative narrative” 
(Giddens, 1991, p. 190). 
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Lippi-Green described language as “the most salient way we have of establishing 
and advertising our social identities” (1997, p. 5). This concept is consistent with 
Bourdieu for whom, “Language is a loaded resource that is inextricably bound within the 
construction and negotiation of identities within the development of multilingual 
repertories” (J. B. Clark, 2011, p. 22). However, as stated by Miller, “the concept of 
‘making use of diversity’ is an important one, and presupposes a certain level of 
linguistic and symbolic capital. That is, using diversity in this way implies the notion of 
agency, in which one draws on a range of language and other resources” (2003, pp. 41-
42). Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching may be interpreted to be a form of adaptation to 
specific environmental conditions (Mühlhäusler, 1996, 2000) in order to resist or redefine 
the value of symbolic resources in the linguistic marketplace (Heller, 1992), but the 
concern among many Uyghurs is that the choice to use the Uyghur language as a 
symbolic resource is being undermined. My data suggests a high degree of ambivalence 
toward Mandarin; this form of cultural capital is conceived of as requisite for 
participation in the Han Chinese dominated economy, yet of a colonial nature 
(Pennycook, 2000) and damaging to the demarcation of Uyghur social identity (Gee, 
1992).
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Chapter 5: Case study narratives 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The language ecology of Xinjiang consists of high prestige language varieties 
(e.g. Mandarin, Mongolian, Standard Uyghur), low prestige varieties (e.g. Kashgar 
Uyghur, Kazakh, Salar, Tuva, Urumchi Chinese), and foreign languages (e.g. English, 
Mandarin) (Dwyer, 1998; Laponce, 1987). Many educated Uyghurs, Xibe, Tatars, 
Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz (among other groups) are bi- and trilingual, assets that may be 
utilized to facilitate cross-border trade (Gosset, 2006) and information technology 
research and development (Dwyer, 2005, pp. 64-65). Since the 1980s, “Multilingualism 
and cultural pluralism have been progressively curtailed in favor of a monolingual, 
monocultural model, and a concomitant rise of an oppositional modern Uyghur identity” 
(Dwyer, 2005, p. ix).  
In the Xinjiang education system, Uyghur schools are shifting to Mandarin, if not 
subject to outright consolidation with Chinese schools (Dwyer, 2005; Radio Free Asia, 
2004; Schluessel, 2007). Contemporary CCP language ideology is notable for linking 
Mandarin language proficiency with increased employment opportunities for Uyghurs 
(Jia, 2009a, 2009b). Most Uyghurs are multilingual: L1 Uyghur and L2 Mandarin. In 
addition to these languages, some Uyghurs are proficient in other high prestige, low 
prestige and foreign languages. The Uyghur young adults who participated in this study 
reported and exhibited the use of a variety of languages, including monolingual 
Mandarin, monolingual Uyghur, Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching, and Uyghur-
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Mandarin-English code-switching; language choices governed by a number of factors 
described by Grosjean (1994). This study is concerned with language practices of Uyghur 
young adults. 
This chapter consists of four narratives, from a male and female Uyghur 
mínkăomín and a male and female mínkăohàn. These narratives were formed from semi-
structured and ethnographic interviews, and observations of language practices. At the 
end of each narrative, I present a table that features the results from a 94-item expressive 
vocabulary assessment. Consultants were tasked to name pictures, kinship terms, jobs, 
numbers, and colors. The purpose of this assessment was to obtain one measure of 
consultants’ expressive vocabulary in Uyghur, that is, the richness of their Uyghur mental 
lexicon and Uyghur lexical retrieval (Ammerlaan, 1996; Schmid & Köpke, 2008). The 
prediction is that attriters would have a reduced Uyghur lexicon through consistent L1 
underuse (Köpke & Schmid, 2004).   
In the following narratives, I focus on domestic and academic fields of language 
use because these domains play a prominent role in structuring language practices. The 
approach taken in this study is to analyze and understand language in a cultural context 
and the social conditions of its production and reception (Bourdieu, 1991). Language 
practices are investigated in context, as shaped by and shaping cultural, political and 
historical conditions. 
The four case study narratives provide a foundation for the discussion of how 
domestic and academic fields structure linguistic competence, and give momentum to 
language practices. This chapter builds on the previous chapter by presenting detailed 
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vignettes. Where the earlier chapter incorporated quotations in support of general themes, 
this chapter is a “thick description” of consultants’ language practices (Geertz, 1973). 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide insight into the dense, contextual, and 
interpenetrating nature of contextual factors that influence young adult Uyghurs’ 
language practices. 
5.2 ATHENA 
Athena was twenty-two years old and in her fifth year of college when we first met 
in 2008. I made her acquaintance at an English speech competition in which she was a 
contestant and I was a judge. When she spoke at the podium, I was impressed by her 
confidence and articulate delivery. During a break in the competition, I approached her 
in the lobby and invited her to participate in my study. She agreed and we exchanged 
contact information. 
Athena is a close friend of Messi, another case study participant. He was present 
for a few minutes during two semi-structured interviews with Athena. I asked Athena if 
his presence had any effect upon her and she said that she was at ease with him around. 
One special memory I have is when Athena, Messi and I had lunch – mutton and leghmen 
– at Athena’s family’s home. The three of us were also together on a more frightening 
occasion, when during a police sweep of a bar, Messi and I were taken away and 
detained for a few hours. When Messi and I were released, we reunited with Athena at 
the bar and enjoyed a night of Uyghur hip-hop. 
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I chose Athena’s pseudonym because I knew she had an affinity for Greek 
Mythology. I later asked her to select her own pseudonym, but she decided to keep the 
one I had given her. Athena attended a mínkăomín primary school and bilingual middle 
and high schools. At the end of high school, Athena opted to take the mínkăomín college 
entrance exam. She is currently a graduate student studying modern Uyghur at a public 
university in Urumchi. Athena has a light complexion and long, dark brown hair. She 
wears glasses with thick rims. Athena asserts that she looks smarter than she actually is, 
but I believe that comments like this are part of her self-deprecating charm. 
Athena’s paternal grandparents are from Atush, a city in west Xinjiang. They did 
not speak Mandarin, but before her paternal grandfather died, “he told my father to study 
Chinese very hard.” Athena’s father was born in Kashgar, a city in the extreme west of 
Xinjiang, and was educated as a mínkăomín.34 When he was eighteen, he became a 
member of the CCP and joined the People’s Liberation Army. He attended college at the 
Minzu University of China in Beijing. After leaving the army, Athena’s father returned to 
Urumchi and started work at a television station. Athena addresses her father with the 
Uyghur kinship term dada (father); she has various jocular nicknames for him, including 
noghuch (rolling pin) on account of his protruding belly. Athena described her father as 
strict and with little tolerance for misbehavior, especially when it came to her studies. 
Athena’s maternal grandparents were born in Kashgar. They moved to Korla, a 
city in central Xinjiang, where Athena’s mother was born. Her mother’s immediate 
                                                
34 Athena’s father and mother do not know their date of birth. On her father’s identification card, his date 
of birth is listed as 10/1/1949 (the date of the establishment of the PRC) while his hùkǒuběn (official 
residence file) has a different date. 
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family moved to Urumchi when her mother was in primary school, but her mother 
remained in Korla with other relatives to attend school. Athena’s mother identifies as a 
mínkăohàn, but Athena challenges this designation because her mother did not complete 
school. The Cultural Revolution interrupted her studies. As part of the “Down to the 
Countryside Movement,” she was sent to live and work in a rural area. She reunited with 
her parents and siblings in Urumchi after the Cultural Revolution. In Urumchi, Athena’s 
mother worked at a general store and later at a printing company. Her proficiency in 
Mandarin and Uyghur helped her obtain a job as a translator in this printing company. 
Athena addresses her mother with the Uyghur kinship term apa (mother). Athena 
sometimes teasingly calls her mother xotun (old lady) or choshqa (pig). 
Athena has one older sister who works as a Mandarin-Uyghur translator at a 
television station. Athena said, “Her Chinese is really good. We together watched only 
Chinese television when growing up.” Athena’s sister took an exam to enter a bilingual 
middle school but failed. According to Athena, this “really pissed off” her father. Athena 
calls her sister choshqa (pig) because this is her year-animal according to the Chinese 
zodiac. Her sister calls Athena kala (cow) because Athena was born in the year of the 
cow. 
Athena’s family converses entirely in Uyghur, although they do use Mandarin 
lexical borrowings such as diànshì (television), shǒujī (cell phone) and duǎnxìn (text 
message). Athena stated that she does not like to use Mandarin when conversing with 
Uyghurs. She said, “As long as he or she can understand Uyghur, I just speak Uyghur. I 
think it’s weird to speak another language to a person who knows both the mother 
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language [and Mandarin]. I don’t like that. I hate that. To mínkăohàn – I really don’t have 
much mínkăohàn friends – if I have to, I would [speak] half-Uyghur, half-Chinese. I 
wouldn’t just speak Chinese. Uyghur is natural because we are not mínkăohàn.” 
Athena’s mínkăomín father sometimes teases her mínkăohàn mother on account 
of her mother’s Uyghur pronunciation. Athena said that she does this too “because some 
Uyghur words my mother can’t say correctly. My father will not make those mistakes.” 
This quote reveals that Athena and her father have a normative conception of Uyghur 
phonology that does not always accord with Athena’s mother. Although Athena attributes 
her mother’s Uyghur phonology (for a certain number of lexical items) to her education, 
it is possible that her mother is using Kashgar Uyghur, a low-prestige variety, and that 
Athena and her father are using the high-prestige variety of Standard Uyghur (Dwyer, 
1998; Laponce, 1987). 
Athena’s family members speak Mandarin only when a Han Chinese guest is 
present, such as her father’s workmates. “We use Chinese only to those people. We have 
to because they don’t understand Uyghur.” This quote indicates that Athena and her 
family (all Uyghur-Mandarin bilinguals) accommodate their speech toward Han Chinese 
interlocutors by using Mandarin, a common language (Giles, 1973); the direction of 
accommodation described by Athena is the unmarked choice (Gross, 2009). 
Athena has lived in the same district of Urumchi her entire life. In her youth, 
Athena interacted only with Uyghur children. However, after her family purchased their 
first television, Athena and her sister spent more time watching television than playing 
with other neighborhood children. She attributes her Chinese television viewership to 
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giving her an advantage in developing proficiency in Mandarin. She did not watch 
Uyghur programs. With one good friend, Athena often read Japanese comics that were 
translated into Chinese. 
Athena spent four years in preschool. Uyghur and Han Chinese children attended 
this center, but within this building, classes were ethnically segregated. Uyghur teachers 
(using Uyghur as the language of instruction) and Uyghur children occupied some rooms. 
Han Chinese teachers (using Mandarin as the language of instruction) and Han Chinese 
children occupied other rooms. 
Athena and her sister attended a Uyghur primary school. She said, “I guess [my 
parents] thought we don’t really have to go to Han Chinese school to learn Han Chinese 
because we watch Chinese TV already at home. So I guess we can learn Chinese through 
the TV.” Athena spoke Uyghur with classmates and friends. In primary school, she 
became literate in Uyghur kona yëziq. All of the teachers at her primary school were 
Uyghur, including the Mandarin-language teacher. This was her favorite teacher and 
Mandarin was her favorite subject, “Maybe because I know that Chinese is important at 
that time, already.” There was little content on Uyghur culture in school although Athena 
did recall learning of Sadir Palwan (1798-1871), a legendary Uyghur hero from Ghulja 
who battled Qing dynasty warlords. The lack of a culturally relevant pedagogy for 
Uyghurs in Xinjiang is indicative of how schools “deculturalize” students, that is, the 
educational process of destroying a people’s culture and replacing it with a new culture 
(Spring, 1994). The curriculum (i.e. content and textbooks) of the Xinjiang education 
system reflects only the culture of the dominant Han Chinese group. Through this 
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curriculum, the culture of schools in Xinjiang undermines the culture of Uyghur students. 
During vacations in fourth through sixth grades, Athena and her sister took private 
English courses. During these courses, Athena learned the English alphabet and some 
vocabulary. 
Athena took a comprehensive Mandarin and mathematics test after completing 
primary school. She earned a high score and was placed in a shuāngyǔ shìyànbān 
(bilingual experimental class) in a Uyghur middle school. Students with relatively low 
scores (like Athena’s sister) received a middle school education with Uyghur as the 
language of instruction. In 1999, the year after Athena finished middle school, all classes 
transitioned to Mandarin as the language of instruction. In Athena’s shuāngyǔ class, 
Mandarin was the primary language of instruction, except for in language arts classes 
(e.g. literature and Uyghur grammar). English was part of the curriculum for the bilingual 
experimental class. English was Athena’s favorite subject, and she excelled due to the 
advantage obtained from her participation in the private English courses. During middle 
school, she had limited exposure to English outside of class. 
Athena attended a Chinese high school. This school was not elite, but Han 
Chinese students had to take an exam to gain entrance. Athena stated that all of students 
in her bilingual experimental class matriculated automatically, “even the worst students.” 
At this school, all of Athena’s teachers were Han Chinese, except for in literature class, 
which was taught by Uyghur teachers. In this class, Athena read some of the writings of 
Mahmud al-Kashgari, an 11th century Turkic scholar. She was also introduced to ancient 
Turkic languages and orthographies. In English class, Athena read excerpts of texts, such 
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as Martin Luther King, Jr.’s I Have a Dream and Charles Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities. 
Outside of class, she occasionally watched English language movies. 
After her first year of high school, Athena had a pivotal experience related to 
English. She participated in a summer course at a public university in Urumchi with 
student-teachers from an American university. This was a positive learning experience 
and she decided to major in English at college. Athena’s motivation to learn English was 
partly driven by a desire to “understand songs…I started to listen to Eminem.” Her 
family, especially her father, stressed “the importance of Chinese and English.” 
Athena took the mínkăomín science discipline college entrance exam and was 
accepted by her first choice of college. She enrolled as an English major. Because Athena 
took the mínkăomín version exam, she was required to take yùkē (a year-long preparatory 
course in Mandarin for ethnic minority students). Athena, already fluent and literate in 
Mandarin, perceived this remedial course as a waste of time. She confessed, “I became 
really lazy after that.” In college, English courses began at an introductory.  
Athena took private English courses during the weekends and breaks of her first 
two years because she felt her English language skills were not being developed at 
school. She participated in a speech contest organized by the private school and placed 
third. In 2007, she took part in a regional English speaking competition for the first time 
and finished in the top eight. In 2008, she participated in the contest again and earned a 
trip to a national competition in Beijing. Athena made Han Chinese friends for the first 
time when participating in this speech competition. Before this experience, she did not 
feel it was “necessary” to make Han Chinese friends; she said she had enough Uyghur 
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friends to share her interests. Although Athena now counts some Han Chinese as friends, 
she does not interact with these individuals frequently. Friendship groups are 
consequential for language acquisition and language use because informal conversations 
with target language speakers are a form of investment through which learners assert 
social identities (B. Norton & Toohey, 2001). 
In her free time, Athena enjoys listening to music, watching movies and television 
programs. At the start of college, she listened to Eminem, Backstreet Boys and Michael 
Jackson, but her tastes have now expanded beyond American pop to include Uzbek, 
Spanish, Russian, Mandarin and Turkish music. Athena is an avid movie fan; she 
regularly purchases English language DVDs and downloads English language movies. 
She used to watch movies at a theater but has ceased because they are in Mandarin. She 
said, “I don’t think it’s useful anymore for me.” Athena’s favorite website is bǎidù – a 
Chinese search engine. She uses the Internet primarily to download music and movies, 
chat with friends, and email. 
Athena lived in a dormitory throughout college. Her roommates were all Uyghur. 
They normally conversed in Uyghur and used the same Mandarin lexical borrowings as 
within Athena’s family. Athena and her roommates occasionally spoke in English but 
never engaged in extended conversations in this language. 
At the end of college, Athena followed her parents’ directive to take the graduate 
school entrance exam in Uyghur language studies. She had no desire to take this exam, 
and purposefully did not prepare. Despite this, Athena did pass the graduate school 
entrance exam and now studies modern Uyghur at a public university in Urumchi. She 
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moved back in with her family for graduate school. More than half of Athena’s graduate 
school classmates are members of non-Uyghur ethnic groups. Athena expressed some 
bitterness toward her Han and Hui Chinese classmates. According to her, “they’re not 
learning [Uyghur] for academic purposes,” but only to obtain government jobs. She was 
also bitter about the ease with which non-Uyghurs could enter graduate school for 
Uyghur language studies (non-Uyghurs do not have to take an entrance exam to study 
Uyghur at the graduate level). Their tuition is reduced – about half of what Uyghurs must 
pay. She surmised that the CCP is encouraging non-Uyghurs to enroll in Uyghur 
language studies.  
Athena’s dream job is to teach Uyghur to foreign students. She will utilize ethnic 
minority affirmative action policies by applying for jobs reserved for ethnic minorities.35 
Athena is not enthusiastic about teaching Uyghurs and members of other ethnic groups. 
However, she is excited at the prospect of teaching and interacting with Western students 
of Uyghur. She does not perceive her multilingualism as an asset but as a set of skills 
necessary for survival.  
Athena desires to travel and learn about non-Chinese cultures. During one 
interview session, Athena was wearing a necklace with a heart-shaped American flag 
medallion. After pointing it out, she said, “I love America.” In the past, she aspired to go 
to America and enjoy “freedom” but has since abandoned this dream due to financial 
concerns. 
                                                
35 Athena said that ethnic minorities “don’t have a chance” when competing with Han Chinese for jobs 
that are not reserved for ethnic minority applicants “cause the exams are in Chinese.” 
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On the direction of her future, Athena said, “I believe in fate because we believe 
in God. He arranged everything for our whole life, like who you are going to marry. But 
still yes – you can change your fate – if you want to. I’m not fatalist, but I believe in 
fate…whatever God – Allah – gives you…And we can’t complain about that cause it’s 
our fate. It’s the God’s will.” 
Like her parents, Athena is a member of the CCP. She said her father forced her 
to join and that her head teacher changed her test score so that she would pass the CCP 
qualification exam. Athena recognizes CCP membership as having a utilitarian value; she 
believes that being a party member might help her obtain a job. Athena said that she will 
take an oath to join the CCP, and assert belief in atheism, but negated the importance of 
the content of the oath, “We can say that, but we don’t really do that…you can still 
believe [in Allah] in your heart.”  
Among Uyghur friends, Athena communicates orally in Uyghur. She uses English 
only with English-speaking foreigners and in English Corner. English Corner is an 
informal time for English language communication that takes place at schools and 
colleges (and sometimes parks) in China. Athena added, “I don’t like English.” She does 
not converse in this language with other Uyghurs. I observed this to be true. On several 
occasions when Athena, Messi and I were together, she would speak Uyghur with Messi 
and me, only using English to verify that I was following the conversation. Athena 
summarized her behavior in regard to language choice, “To foreigners I would definitely 
speak English. To Chinese I would speak Chinese. But to Uyghur – I know they can 
understand English, Chinese – but Uyghur is their mother language, so that’s it.” 
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Athena sends text messages in Chinese script. She keeps her diary in Mandarin 
because she has an easier time articulating her emotions using Chinese vocabulary. She 
said, almost in defense of this predilection, “I don’t hate Chinese, but I just don’t want to 
speak Chinese to Uyghur people. But I would on texting or on the Internet.” 
Athena conceives of Uyghur mínkăohàn as “half-Uyghur, half-Chinese. They 
went to school with Chinese people so the way of their thinking is more Chinese. They’re 
more open-minded maybe – in not a very good way.” According my reading, Athena’s 
use of the term “open-minded” implied “sexually promiscuous,” a stereotypical behavior 
that some Uyghur mínkăomín associate with mínkăohàn. She described Uyghur 
mínkăohàn as having a “Chinese character.” According to Athena, Uyghur mínkăohàn 
“speak Chinese all the time, even to Uyghur and they don’t know anything about the 
Uyghur customs. It’s annoying so I don’t like mínkăohàn, to be honest. They are different 
from us.” Athena attributed the development of a “Chinese character” among Uyghur 
mínkăohàn to their immersion in Chinese schools and friendships with Han Chinese 
classmates. 
I mentioned to Athena that some Uyghur mínkăohàn were aware that some 
Uyghur mínkăomín disliked them, and how some Uyghur mínkăohàn struggle with being 
characterized as outsiders, and traitors to their culture and people. Athena replied that she 
had read articles on this topic, describing how some Uyghur mínkăohàn felt they were 
outsiders to both Uyghur and Chinese communities. Athena expressed no sympathy for 
Uyghur mínkăohàn feelings of ostracism. She said, “From primary school, or even 
kindergarten, they just speak Chinese – even to their parents. Why? They can speak 
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Chinese at school. It’s enough. Not after class. They have to practice Uyghur. And their 
parents think that it’s good for them to go to Chinese school, but still they have to teach 
them something about Uyghur culture. But maybe the mínkăohàn from the Kashgar or 
Khotan still can speak very fluently, but not in Urumchi. They even date Chinese girls, 
Chinese boys. And that is disgusting for us. We don’t like it.” Athena expressed her 
acceptance of Uyghur-Chinese inter-ethnic friendship, but strongly disapproved of 
Uyghur-Chinese marriage. This is because Uyghurs and Han Chinese have “different 
religion. And we generally don’t like them. But foreigners maybe – you know some 
[Uyghur] people really like foreign people.” 
Athena’s apparent lack of compassion for the mínkăohàn condition may be 
attributed to a mínkăohàn sense of superiority or privilege that mínkăomín resent. Tsung 
and Clarke (2010), in an exploration of identity, language and culture in higher education 
in China, found that Uyghur academics educated in Mandarin believed their mínkăomín 
colleagues to be jealous of their achievements. Smith Finely, in an exploration of the 
complex self-identity of Uyghur mínkăomín, suggested that contemporary mínkăohàn 
“types” existed along a “broad spectrum of hybrid cultural combinations” (2007, p. 220). 
According to Smith Finely, some mínkăohàn feel a sense of shame regarding their 
cultural background or cultural lack, while “others enjoy[ed] more positive identities, 
considering themselves ‘modern’, ‘progressive’ and ‘internationalist’” (Finley, 2007, p. 
220). Perhaps Athena found these “more positive identities” distasteful if/when used by 
mínkăohàn to position themselves as superior to mínkăomín. Athena also distinguished 
Urumchi mínkăohàn, classifying them separately from mínkăohàn from other places in 
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Xinjiang, suggesting that Urumchi mínkăohàn had deficient Uyghur linguistic and 
cultural competence. 
Athena was aware that Mandarin is replacing Uyghur as a language of instruction 
in the Xinjiang education system. She also recognized that more Uyghur students are 
being educated as mínkăohàn. She said, “In primary schools, now they teach the lessons 
all in Chinese so [Uyghur students] don’t know the Uyghur terms of the math or the 
biology or the chemistry.” I told Athena that some Uyghur mínkăohàn were also not 
learning basic Uyghur words. She responded, “That is their fault. They can learn. They 
know when they were little. They just forget – it’s their fault. No one forced them to 
[speak Mandarin and not Uyghur].” Athena did not express a critical awareness of the 
colonial conditions and linguistic imperialism of Mandarin. She appeared to support a 
“blaming the victim” (Ryan, 1971) ideology where, in a clearly stratified 
social/educational context, Uyghurs deprived of equal access to linguistic resources of 
symbolic and cultural value are themselves blamed for their low Uyghur proficiency. 
Athena intends to raise her child in Uyghur and would prefer to send her child to a school 
where Uyghur is the language of instruction. If the schools of the future do not offer 
Uyghur as a language of instruction, Athena will take the initiative to teach her children 
Uyghur literacy skills. She said, “Parents are your first teachers – not the teachers at 
school.” 
Athena expressed confidence in the vitality of the Uyghur language. She said, “I 
think it takes a very long time to really make it disappear – maybe a hundred years.” She 
professed a strong link between Uyghur language and culture and believes that it is 
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impossible to transmit Uyghur culture independent of the language (including literacy). 
She stated, “That would be a disaster for our people.” 
5.2.1 Expressive vocabulary assessment: Athena 
 Athena completed the expressive vocabulary assessment in the spring of 2009. 
She wrote all lexical items in Uyghur. Athena produced the correct Uyghur lexical item 
[N=156] for each item [N=156] in each category [N=10]. She misidentified some items 
[N=9], but was able to produce the target lexical item upon verbal specification. Notably, 
Athena wrote the Mandarin borrowed lexical items for mushroom, pepper, and potato. 
She was able to produce the Uyghur-language lexical items for these objects when 
verbally given their equivalent in English.  
Section total items items correct 
   
1: Animals 12 12 
2: Body & Face 25 25 
3: Family 15 15 
4: Nature 20 20 
5: Food 19 19 
6: Jobs 20 20 
7: Furniture & Appliances 12 12 
8: Transportation 12 12 
9: Numbers 13 13 
10: Colors 8 8 
 156 156 (100%) 
Table 2: Expressive vocabulary assessment: Athena
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5.3 MESSI 
Messi was a twenty-year-old college sophomore when we first met in 2008 at an 
English speaking competition; he was a contestant and I was a judge. I invited him to 
participate in my study because he was eager to discuss issues related to the Uyghur 
language and other aspects of Uyghur culture. He was also interested in participating in 
a project that would publicize the Uyghur people. We became close friends and spent a 
great deal of time together; Messi had a room to himself in one of my apartments. He 
lived with me on the weekends and during school holidays. We had contact on a near-
daily basis, to share a meal, drink a beer, or do work related to the study, such as 
transcribing interviews and member-checking (Bloor, 1983). We traveled twice to his 
hometown of Korla.  
Messi attended a mínkăomín primary school and bilingual middle and high 
schools. In college, he majored in computer science and information technology. Messi is 
currently living in Shanghai and teaching English.  
Messi’s paternal grandparents were born and raised in a town located in central 
Xinjiang, on the northeast edge of the Tarim Basin. Messi’s father was also born in this 
town. The family relocated to the nearby city of Korla before Messi’s father entered 
primary school. Messi’s paternal grandparents worked at a hotel, his grandfather as a 
guard and his grandmother as a maid. Messi’s father was educated in Uyghur schools. He 
obtained employment at a bank after finishing high school. The director of the bank sent 
him to college in Urumchi, after which he returned to his post at the bank. Messi’s father 
was unable to obtain promotion because of the rigid hierarchy in place for members of 
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specific ethnic groups. Frustrated and in poor health, he retired. Messi said that, “his 
father can’t really get along with Han Chinese people and that’s why he retired so 
young.” His father passed away in the fall of 2008. Messi addressed his father as dadoy. 
Messi theorized that the term dadoy is a blend combining dada (father) and oy (interj. 
hey). 
Messi’s maternal grandparents and mother were born in Kashgar. The family 
moved to Korla to escape persecution during the Cultural Revolution because they were 
landowners and thus prime targets for denouncement. Messi’s maternal grandfather was a 
prominent teacher, administrator and academic; he wrote and published articles on the 
Xinjiang education system. In fact, I once discovered a scholarly journal with Messi’s 
grandfather on the cover in a bookstore in the èrdàoqiáo section of Urumchi. He had 
contributed the main article to that issue. Messi’s maternal grandmother was a physician. 
Messi’s mother attended Uyghur schools. Upon graduation, she obtained employment in 
the Korla public library. Messi addresses his mother as apoy. 
Messi has one older sister who is currently a graduate student in Turkey. This is 
not uncommon; Shichor (2003), based on information from Enver Can in Munich, 
estimated that 10,000 Uyghurs resided in Turkey. Messi’s sister excelled in school and 
earned admission to a bilingual middle school in Urumchi. She then went to college in 
Nanjing. After graduating from college, Messi’s sister returned to Korla. Her mother 
wanted her to settle in Xinjiang, but his sister’s dream was to study abroad. She realized 
this dream in 2010 when she moved to Turkey. 
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At home, Messi’s family communicated in Uyghur. When a Han or Hui Chinese 
guest was present, the family spoke with them in Mandarin, but would continue to speak 
in Uyghur among themselves. Interactions with Mandarin-speaking guests were limited 
to the Qurban Héyit holiday season when Han and Hui Chinese would come to Messi’s 
home to visit and eat mutton. On two occasions, in February and November 2009, I 
traveled with Messi to his home in Korla. All conversation was conducted in Uyghur. His 
extended family also communicated exclusively in Uyghur.  
Messi grew up in a neighborhood near downtown Korla. In his youth, the 
neighborhood was completely Uyghur. Messi and his friends communicated in their 
mother tongue. In the summertime, the mínkăomín and bilingual Uyghur children played 
football and swam. Uyghur mínkăohàn did not participate in these activities, a fact that 
Messi attributed to their “different personality.” Messi spoke with nostalgia about his old 
neighborhood and told numerous stories of neighbors sharing food, women drinking chay 
(tea) and men playing poker. Many of the Uyghur residents in Messi’s apartment 
complex were employed at a nearby bank. The relocation of this bank triggered a shift in 
the demographics of the neighborhood; Uyghurs began to move out and Han Chinese 
moved in. 
When Messi was four years old, he and his mother went to Urumchi. They stayed 
with relatives while his mother completed coursework in library studies. His friends in 
Urumchi were Han Chinese and they communicated in Mandarin. After returning to 
Korla, Messi lived at his paternal grandparents’ home for a year. Messi entertained 
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himself by speaking to himself in Mandarin because there were few other children 
around. During this time, he also watched a lot of Mandarin language television. 
Messi was enrolled in, and expelled from, two preschools. These expulsions were 
the result of fights that Messi instigated. At preschool, the teachers and students were 
Uyghur; they communicated in Uyghur. At the intervals where he was not in preschool, 
he stayed at home.  
Although Messi was below the minimum age, his father managed to enroll him in 
a primary school. After attending first grade, all of the students at this school were 
relocated because the school building was unstable. Messi’s second school was “kind of 
shitty” and far from his home. He left this school after completing second grade, and 
went to another school for the remainder of primary school. All of these schools used 
Uyghur as the language of instruction; Messi received a mínkăomín primary school 
education. He began to learn Mandarin as a second language in the third grade. He 
excelled in his Mandarin classes because of the Mandarin he had previously acquired. 
In both middle and high school, Messi attended bilingual schools. All of his 
classmates and friends were Uyghur. Core courses (e.g. physics, chemistry and math) 
were taught in Mandarin by Han Chinese teachers throughout secondary school. 
Humanities courses were taught in Uyghur by Uyghurs. 
In middle school, some teachers insisted that students use Mandarin in class and 
during break, but Messi and his classmates refused to follow this policy. Messi felt that 
his teachers did not provide a strong rationale for him and his classmates to modify their 
linguistic habitus. I asked Messi what he would have said if his teachers had provided a 
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rationale along the lines that “Mandarin is the national tongue.” He replied, “I would say, 
‘Fuck your tongue.’ They didn’t say anything like that. Maybe they’re just following the 
order.” Messi recalled his parents telling him that Mandarin language proficiency was 
good for his future, including employment prospects. 
English was offered as a course of study for the first year of middle school, but 
then discontinued. Outside of school, Messi had some exposure to Anglophone music, 
mainly in the form of pirated Backstreet Boys and Britney Spears VCDs that his sister 
brought home.  
In high school, Messi’s class was transferred to a Han Chinese school where 
Mandarin was the language of instruction. This change prompted him and his classmates 
to reflect upon their language and culture. One of his teachers remarked, “[Uyghur] 
education is facing a really big threat because you guys are the experiment of the 
changing.” Messi felt that the implicit message was, “You’re the rats. You’re the white 
rats. They’re experimenting this new system on you.” The change in the education 
system (i.e. the consolidation of Uyghur and Han Chinese schools and implementation of 
Mandarin as the language of instruction in core courses) was a topic of public debate. 
Messi felt that the purpose of this experiment was to achieve ethnic assimilation, “to be 
one China.” From this teacher, Messi also learned a version of Uyghur history that 
departed from the official narrative. According to this teacher, the Xiōngnú and 
subsequent Turkic ethnic groups (e.g. Uyghur, Uzbek) descended from the Huns. This 
teacher was eventually fired, an incidence that Messi attributed to this teacher’s 
inclination to address “sensitive” issues (Yee, 2003, p. 432). 
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Messi recalled Ismail Tiliwaldi, then CCP chairman of Xinjiang, saying that the 
Uyghur language is undeveloped and we have to learn Mandarin in order to develop our 
selves. Messi rejected this ideology. He said, “Fuck him. That’s totally not true. In my 
mind, the language that is not developed is Mandarin. You told me what you think, but in 
my mind, that’s the undeveloped one. We don’t have to memorize a shitload of characters 
in order to write our language. We just have a little more than a hundred things to 
memorize and then you can write and read. It’s more convenient. It’s much easier.” This 
latter comment was in reference to a conversation in which I had told Messi that all 
languages had equal communicative potential. He later said, “[Uyghur government 
officials] are just like puppets. That makes me really angry. There are people wants to be 
slaves of the Chinese government. I assume those are the governors.” Messi believes that 
the program of bilingual education was devised by well-intentioned Uyghurs, but then 
operationalized in a way that resulted in the marginalization of the Uyghur language.  
Messi said, “I don’t think the Han Chinese people came up with that idea. I think some 
Uyghur fucker came up with the idea. Maybe he was thinking like half-Chinese half-
Uyghur, but when the Chinese person got it, it turned into totally Chinese or just one 
class is in Uyghur.” 
In high school, only humanities courses were taught in Uyghur. If refined or 
specialized terminology was needed, Mandarin terms were used. Messi’s teachers treated 
these courses as marginal because his class was on track for the natural science version of 
the college entrance exam. According to Messi, the teachers “wouldn’t give a fuck if we 
understand or if we listening because it doesn’t important for us.” English language 
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studies were reintroduced during his third year of high school. Most of Messi’s 
classmates did not take this course seriously because English was not a component of the 
college entrance exam. Messi said that his Han Chinese high school English teacher gave 
special attention to him and the small group of Uyghur students who showed an interest 
in learning English. 
Messi’s parents stressed the importance of learning English. Once while watching 
a televised English speaking competition with his parents, Messi’s father told Messi that 
he wanted to see him participate in the competition. One of Messi’s motivations to learn 
English was to honor the wish of his father. He participated in the collegiate and regional 
English speaking competitions for two consecutive years. Messi frequently spoke to 
himself in English – the same method he had used when learning Mandarin, though more 
consciously. Messi began listening to Anglophone hip-hop and watching Anglophone 
films (e.g. The Matrix, Lord of the Rings trilogy, Fight Club). When watching a movie or 
television show, he memorized “cool” English words and practiced using them while 
walking to school. He would incorporate individual lexical items into phrases, and then 
converse with himself. 
Messi also started listening to traditional Uyghur songs, a genre he had previously 
disliked. As he described it, “One day I just found this hunger, this desire from inside for 
traditional songs. My mom and my sister, they love traditional songs. That was pain in 
the ass when I was a kid to sit there and watch that. But from high school I start to enjoy 
it. I used to search Uyghur websites to find music I liked… Every once in a while, I just 
had to listen to traditional songs. It just feels so comfortable inside.” Messi rediscovered 
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some meaning in Uyghur music, a cultural product. Uyghur folk and popular music is 
immediately distinguishable from Chinese music. Accompanied by a driving rhythm 
from stringed instrument(s), lyrics, vocalized in Uyghur, often refer to Uyghur heroes and 
legends. Dillon suggested that Uyghur music, constantly played in bazaars, restaurants 
and at wedding parties, is a statement of cultural assertion (2009a). I would add that, in a 
colonial context like Xinjiang, where freedoms of expression are restricted (Freedom 
House, 2011; S. Wei & Cuifen, 2010), Uyghur music is but one of a few safe statements 
of Uyghur cultural assertion. 
Messi continued to do well in the core courses taught in Mandarin. He enriched 
his Mandarin lexicon through Chinese historical television series that he watched with his 
father. He picked up many literary terms and idioms from these shows and incorporated 
them in his compositions. 
In college, Messi majored in computer science and information technology. He 
did not enroll in yùkē because he had taken the mínkăohàn college entrance exam. 
Mandarin was the language of instruction throughout college. All of his classmates were 
members of ethnic minorities, mostly Uyghur. They all went to bilingual or Han Chinese 
secondary schools.  
Messi’s freshman English course was basic, and he did not attend regularly 
because the material was not challenging. Despite this, he performed well on the final 
exam and passed. His second year English course was slightly more challenging. He took 
an English course during his junior year that required students to memorize terminology 
related to technology. 
 
 204 
When he began to participate in English speaking competitions, Messi received 
some attention from the foreign language department faculty. This attention was a source 
of motivation to attain fluency in English. His desire to leave Xinjiang was another, 
stronger source of motivation. He said, “English is important, especially because I want 
to get out.” Messi said he “doesn’t give a shit about [English language] certificates,” the 
type that are requisite for employment as an English teacher within China. His motivation 
to learn English is directly related to his aspiration to permanently relocate abroad. The 
primary reason he wants to leave Xinjiang is to escape the ethnic discrimination that 
obstructs Uyghurs from obtaining employment. 
In his first college dorm room, where he stayed for a year and a half, all four of 
the roommates were Uyghur. They spoke Uyghur among themselves. Messi recalled one 
of his roommates using Mandarin on the phone when speaking with female romantic 
interests. Messi said that this roommate “would pretend his Chinese is really good.” He 
evaluated this linguistic behavior critically, saying, “I don’t think there is anything to 
show off with your Chinese, especially since a lot of Uyghurs speak good Chinese.” 
Messi moved out of this dorm room because his roommates did not help keep the place 
clean and smoked copious amounts of marijuana. 
Messi’s second set of roommates included a Uyghur (from southern Xinjiang), 
Mongolian and Xibe. All were mínkăohàn; Messi communicated with the Mongolian and 
the Xibe in Mandarin. With his Uyghur roommate, he would speak in Uyghur. Messi said 
of his Uyghur roommate, “His Uyghur is pretty good even though he’s mínkăohàn. He 
was grown up at his grandma and grandpa’s place – he grew in a pretty much Uyghur 
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environment – so that’s why his Uyghur is really good, compared to other mínkăohàn. 
His Uyghur is kind of funny though because he learned it from his grandparents so he 
speaks old-peoples’ Uyghur.” It is established in sociolinguistics that age-based variation 
(among other variables such as geography and gender) occurs in language use among 
speakers or groups of speakers (Milroy & Gordon, 2003). By “old-peoples’ Uyghur,” 
Messi was referring to the lexical, phonetic and/or syntactic patterns of his Uyghur 
roommate’s Uyghur language variety as marked by some form of age-based variation. 
When the roommates played multiple-player video games, they used Mandarin as a 
lingua franca. 
I observed Messi interacting with members of various ethnic groups on many 
occasions; he generally spoke Uyghur with Uyghurs, English with Westerners and Han 
Chinese fluent in English, and Mandarin with Han Chinese not fluent in English. When in 
multilingual contexts (i.e. among Uyghur, Chinese and Western interlocutors), he used 
English. He deviated from this pattern when communicating with Möshük; she would 
sometimes switch from Uyghur to Mandarin, and Messi would follow. He usually 
switched back to Uyghur after a few turns. Messi believed that Möshük was sometimes 
reluctant to speak in Uyghur because she lacked full competence in this language, feared 
making mistakes, and was hesitant to ask for assistance when unsure about usage. On 
occasion, when interacting with Han Chinese, he would pretend to be a monolingual 
English-speaking Westerner. He played this game with them because many Han Chinese 
treat Westerners with more respect than they do Uyghurs. 
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Outside of class, Messi continued to listen to Anglophone music; he also 
downloaded and watched English language television programs. He used these programs 
to develop his English language skills by focusing on the language practices of certain 
characters. He developed this technique with the television series Prison Break. He 
concentrated on specific characters and learned their speaking “style.” Messi repeated 
this technique with the sitcom How I met your Mother and the character Barney. Messi 
said, “Barney is a big asshole in that show, but except the way he thinks about [male-
female] relationships, he’s pretty cool. So that’s why I was repeating him and then trying 
to be like him. Sometimes I would even recite what he’s saying, like put his idea into my 
mind.” Because Messi’s girlfriend was familiar with this television show, she could 
readily identify when Messi was “playing” Barney. Another show Messi regularly 
watched was called Supernatural. “There are two brothers – one is really good guy, one 
is a dick but he’s cool – so I start to try to speak like him.” Messi’s girlfriend confirmed 
that Messi often fixated on television characters who made provocative comments, and 
repeated what they said. 
When speaking English, Messi enjoyed offending others with irreverent 
comments. His sister, who had not previously heard Messi using English, once remarked, 
“You’re not like that when you’re speaking Uyghur.” She then asked Messi’s girlfriend if 
he was “always like this.” His girlfriend confirmed this, to which his sister responded, 
“He’s completely different when he’s speaking Uyghur.” 
Messi believes that different aspects of his personality are on display when using 
different languages. He said, “My Uyghur personality is more like my father. He never 
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speaks that much. My teachers and my parents told me I should respect everyone around 
me so I was afraid that speaking anything would offend them. And also I was shy. I got 
embarrassed really easily. I was afraid to talk about things.” As a child, Messi discovered 
that language could be used to overcome his shyness. “I used to have this in Chinese 
before. When I was a kid, I feel like I could do anything and talk it to Chinese people. I 
could tell [my Chinese friends] anything and then they start to acting weird as I realize 
when I grow up and then I just lost my thing.” With English, Messi discovered a new 
medium for performance. His English language style is to “make jokes all the time; kind 
of rude, mean jokes.” Messi uses profane language in English, but not in Uyghur. 
Messi’s multiple language proficiency has been an asset; he is currently employed 
as an English teacher in Shanghai. Messi pretends to be an Anglophone Westerner when 
teaching Han Chinese students. He hopes to study Uyghur language and literature at 
graduate school. Although Messi’s family supports this plan, some of his Uyghur friends 
question the utility and profitability of this pursuit. Messi is motivated by a desire to 
teach Uyghur to Uyghurs and maintain the vitality of the Uyghur language.36 Messi 
aspires to work in an anthropology department at a university in the West; he wants to 
educate others about Uyghur culture and to “let more and more people know that 
[Uyghurs] exist.”  
                                                
36 Messi once made an implicit reference to the critical period for language acquisition, bemoaning the fact 
that increasing numbers of Uyghurs were not developing competence in Uyghur. He stated, “Maybe they 
will find out it is cool to know Uyghur when they’re 18 or 20 years old. And when they try to learn it back, 
it’s gonna be too late.” 
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On one occasion, Messi recalled being called a member of the “57th ethnic group 
of China” because of his high proficiency in Mandarin.37  Messi refuted this criticism, 
“If people keep thinking that, they’re gonna separate their own people. They don’t want 
to be separated. It’s just miscommunication and misunderstanding on both sides.” Messi 
was weary at the way in which some Uyghur mínkăomín disparage Uyghur mínkăohàn. 
He cited Athena, another case study participant, as an example, saying, “They think 
mínkăohàn are almost assimilated – they’re bad. Think why. Why they’re that way. A lot 
of people don’t think why.” Messi was expressing some concern over the lack of critical 
awareness of the cultural, political and historical conditions that contributed to the 
stratification of Uyghur mínkăomín and mínkăohàn. 
Messi stated that contemporary Uyghur mínkăohàn differ from earlier generations 
of Uyghurs in their linguistic and other habitus. We both observed, on multiple occasions, 
Uyghur children speaking Mandarin when playing.38 Messi recalled that his Uyghur 
mínkăohàn cousins speak Mandarin when playing video games. He remarked that his 
cousins sometimes “said things in front of elders that [he] could not imagine saying” and 
also doing rude things like “walking in front of elders.39 You have to move behind 
them…Mínkăohàn often don’t say Essalamueleykum (Peace be upon you) when they step 
into a house. That’s like the first thing…Before you step in you have to say Essalam 
                                                
37 The CCP officially recognizes 56 ethnic groups within the borders of the PRC. To say that someone is a 
member of the 57th ethnic group of China is to chastise that person as something hybrid and alien. 
38 On the topic of games, Messi said, “I’ve heard the names of the games my mom played. I can recognize 
them because we played the same games. But we’re not even a generation to another generation – I can see 
now kids – it’s like the game’s totally gone. It just disappears in such a short time. It might be still exist in 
the countryside – I hope – but it’s just kind of sad and kind of weird.” 
39 Messi later added that these cousins are modifying some of their behaviors. “My grandma keeps telling 
them and some of them changed.” 
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(Peace) then step in…That’s how you show respect. Mínkăohàn don’t follow these rules. 
And the youngest ones, they just never do it. They were in Han Chinese kindergarten and 
then also Han Chinese primary school so maybe they played with Han Chinese kids all 
the time” and adopted certain behaviors. Some Uyghur mínkăohàn eat in Han Chinese 
canteens, thus breaking the halal dietary practice adhered to by most Uyghurs. Messi 
once considered confronting a Uyghur mínkăohàn who was entering a Han Chinese 
canteen, but his friends discouraged him from doing this because the Uyghur in question 
could not speak Uyghur. 
If he raises children in Xinjiang, Messi prefers that they be educated in Uyghur, 
although he thinks that this option will not be available because of the trend towards 
monolingual Mandarin education (Dwyer, 2005; Schluessel, 2007). Messi intends to 
maintain monolingual Uyghur language practices with his future family. 
Messi considers language to be the most important aspect of culture. He once 
compared himself with Möshük, another case study participant, saying, “She knows less 
Uyghur than I do…I know more about how to be a traditional Uyghur. It’s in here 
[pointing to his heart], but she doesn’t know, sometimes, but not all the time.” Messi said 
that Möshük’s relatively low Uyghur language competence might give the impression to 
other Uyghurs, especially in rural areas, that she has been assimilated. Messi stated that 
some Uyghurs indexed modernity by “speaking Chinese, English and dressing the way a 
Chinese person does, and also eating KFC or Dicks.”40 He rejected these linguistic 
                                                
40 Messi and I called “Dicos” – a fast-food chain – “Dicks” because “Dicos” was spelled as “Diks” in 
Uyghur kona yëziq. This was humorous to us because there is an [o] sound in the Uyghur phonemic 
inventory but the people who transliterated the restaurant name did not include it. 
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practices and consumption patterns, claiming that modernity was predicated on education 
and an objective perspective. 
Messi said, “A lot of people think being Muslim is an important part of being 
Uyghur. I agree with that but I’ve heard there’s some Christian Uyghurs and some 
Uyghurs even not believe in any religions. I think they’re still Uyghur. Even if you force 
a Uyghur to eat pork, he is still Uyghur. As long as they’re considering their selves as a 
Uyghur, as long as they speak our language and as long as they admit that they’re 
Uyghur, they’re Uyghur. It doesn’t matter what you believe.” Messi’s belief evoked an 
notion explored in the previous chapter; some consultants indicated that Uyghur language 
proficiency was not a criterion measure for ingroup or outgroup membership (Jia, 2009a; 
Skutnabb-Kangas, 2010). Yet Messi does recognize Uyghur language proficiency, along 
with self-identification as a Uyghur, as markers of Uyghur identity. Of note, Messi’s idea 
of Uyghur ingroup membership is not predicated on adherence to Islam (religion). He 
also signals that the compulsory ingestion of pork is not criteria for exclusion from the 
Uyghur ethnic community. He likely made this allowance because his mother was 
compelled to consume pork at one point during the Cultural Revolution.  
Messi is pessimistic about the vitality of the Uyghur language. He stated, “I can 
assume two ways. The negative way would be the language would disappear in 50 years. 
It would totally disappear if it goes like this.” He believes that the majority of his 
generation still “has the Uyghur language” but that, in subsequent generations of 
Uyghurs, fluent speakers will be a minority.  As for the alternative, “On the positive 
side, if Chinese government says we’re on the list of disappearing languages, they would 
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do something. Or they wouldn’t. Of course if Uyghurs could get more attention, here and 
overseas, non-Uyghur people could have the awareness of there is a disappearing 
language and culture. Maybe people would support financially and do some research and 
help us to let the language survive. It’s hard though. I’m gonna try that.” Messi also 
acknowledged that Uyghurs must realize that their language is under threat. He said, “We 
have to get our people’s awareness of the language is disappearing. We have to let them 
know it’s in danger. A lot of people have the awareness but they don’t really act. They 
don’t do anything about it…Maybe they think it’s not modern enough, fashion enough, 
which is stupid.” 
5.3.1 Expressive vocabulary assessment: Messi 
 Messi completed the expressive vocabulary assessment in the fall of 2008. He 
wrote all lexical items in Uyghur. Messi produced the correct Uyghur lexical item 
[N=155] for nearly every item [N=156] in each category [N=10]. He misidentified some 
items [N=8], but was able to produce the target lexical item upon verbal specification. 
Like Athena, Messi wrote the Mandarin borrowed lexical items for mushroom and 
potato. He also wrote the Mandarin borrowing for potato. He was able to produce the 
Uyghur-language lexical items for these objects when verbally given their equivalent in 
English.  
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 total items items correct incorrect (item #) 
Section    
1: Animals 12 12  
2: Body & Face 25 25  
3: Family 15 15  
4: Nature 20 20  
5: Food 19 19  
6: Jobs 20 20  
7: Furniture & Appliances 12 11 11 
8: Transportation 12 12  
9: Numbers 13 13  
10: Colors 8 8  
 156 155 (99%)  
Table 3: Expressive vocabulary assessment: Messi 
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5.4 MÖSHÜK 
Möshük was a twenty-three-year-old college student when we first met in 2008.41 
She was an English major at a public university in Urumchi. Möshük attended Han 
Chinese schools throughout grade school, and considered herself a “real” mínkăohàn 
because the majority of her classmates were Han Chinese. This educational trajectory 
coupled with Möshük’s enthusiasm to represent Uyghur mínkăohàn were the primary 
reasons I asked her to participate in my study. Möshük was invested in this study because 
she was interested in discovering the social conditions that resulted in her own weak 
Uyghur literacy skills. She felt that my findings might suggest approaches to Uyghur 
literacy education that might help future generations of Uyghur mínkăohàn learn to read 
and write in their first language. 
Möshük and I developed a close bond during my fieldwork in Urumchi. One of the 
most difficult moments in my fieldwork occurred after Möshük completed the expressive 
vocabulary assessment and declared, in tears, that she “didn’t know [her] mother 
tongue.” I tried to present an objective explanation of the social, political and historical 
conditions that shaped her present Uyghur language competence, but my words felt 
vacuous. I had the feeling that no analysis could soothe what my instrument had exposed, 
namely Uyghur lexical poverty, a symbolic resource used to index or perform Uyghur 
identity (May, 2005, 2011). Through emotionally charged interactions like this, Möshük 
                                                
41 Möshük initially lied about her age, telling me that she was 19. She did this because she did not feel 
comfortable talking about her past when we first met. She had begun college studies at a top-tier college, 
but eventually left that school and transferred to her present (lower ranked) institution. Möshük was 
concerned that I would hold her in low regard if I knew this fact. In August 2010, she revealed the truth. 
This narrative was revised to account for the years she had initially expunged.    
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and I came to understand the implications of linguistic accumulation and dispossession 
on Uyghur identity formation. 
Möshük’s paternal grandparents were born in Urumchi. Her grandfather was a 
truck driver and her grandmother was a housewife. Möshük’s father was born and raised 
in Urumchi. He attended Han Chinese schools and thus was educated as a mínkăohàn. 
When he was 18, Möshük’s father left Urumchi to attend a military college in Xi’an. He 
sent part of his allowance home each month to help raise his sisters. This financial 
contribution engendered a great deal of respect for him. His authority within the family, 
on occasion, surpassed that of his own parents. After graduating from college, Möshük’s 
father returned to Urumchi and worked for the People’s Liberation Army. He retired, but 
was called out of retirement after the events of July 5, 2009. Möshük addresses her father 
using both Uyghur and Chinese kinship terms (i.e. dada and bàba, respectively). 
Möshük’s maternal grandparents were born in the town of Karghalik, southeast of 
Kashgar. They moved to Korla where Möshük’s mother was born. Möshük’s grandfather 
was an officer in the People’s Liberation Army. Möshük’s grandmother was a teacher 
and taught Uyghur to Uyghur students. The family moved to Urumchi when Möshük’s 
mother was a child. She was educated in Chinese schools in Urumchi. After graduating 
from high school, Möshük’s mother taught Mandarin to Uyghur mínkăomín students for 
around 15 years. She retired from teaching because the salary was low and the work was 
exhausting. Möshük addresses her mother using both Uyghur and Chinese kinship terms 
(i.e. apa and māma, respectively). Möshük sometimes calls her mother by the Mandarin 
nickname mĕinǚ (beautiful lady). 
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Möshük has one younger sister. Like Möshük, she also attended Chinese schools. 
Her sister was not a diligent student through grade school; her low marks prohibited her 
from gaining entrance to a four-year college. After graduating from high school, she 
attended a vocational teacher college. During the 2008-09 school year, Möshük’s sister 
performed her teaching practicum as a Mandarin language teacher at a primary school in 
a village near Kashgar. Because she excelled at her vocational college, she later entered a 
program that will grant a four-year degree. Möshük’s sister’s nickname is xiăohēi (little 
black) because of her relatively dark complexion. Möshük’s nickname is xiăobái (little 
white) because of her lighter skin. 
At home, the four members of Möshük’s family speak in Mandarin and Uyghur, 
but “more Mandarin than Uyghur.” They frequently code-switch between these 
languages. When Möshük spoke of Mandarin-Uyghur code-switching, she often became 
excited because she regards this type of language practice as fun. Her father refers to 
Mandarin-Uyghur code-switching as “modern sentence” formation, and Möshük takes 
pride in the ability to code-switch seamlessly. Her father said that many mínkăomín learn 
how to “mix the sentence” (i.e. code-switch) from mínkăohàn. Möshük remarked, “It’s 
fashionable to mix languages…we always mix.” She attributed the practice of Mandarin-
Uyghur code-switching to the four family members’ mínkăohàn education. 
Möshük said that language use varied if other interlocutors were present, with 
ethnicity and age being the primary variables. If an older Uyghur person is present, the 
family members speak only in Uyghur. If the Uyghur visitor is her father’s age (around 
55) or younger, the conversation is conducted in Mandarin or a combination of Mandarin 
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and Uyghur. Möshük said that when all interlocutors are Uyghur mínkăohàn, this is “lots 
of fun. We understand each other. Everyone knows their Uyghur is poor so we don’t have 
to be self-conscious about using correct Uyghur or making mistakes.” Conversations are 
conducted in Mandarin if the visitor is Han Chinese of any age. 
On many occasions, I listened to Möshük speaking on the phone with her mother. 
Conversations usually began in Uyghur, with greetings and questions about location. As 
conversations progressed, Möshük typically switched to Mandarin. Uyghur was again 
used for closings. On one occasion, I could hear Möshük’s mother, and I noticed that she 
was speaking in Uyghur while Möshük was responding in Mandarin. When I asked 
Möshük if this observation was correct, she initially denied it and claimed that they were 
both speaking Mandarin. Eventually she admitted that my observation was correct. 
Möshük seemed embarrassed that she (alone) was using Mandarin.          
Möshük’s parents encouraged her and her sister “to learn Uyghur first.” Her 
father said that Möshük and her sister “must speak Uyghur at home. But gradually, we 
broke the rule.” Möshük claimed that she and her sister often spoke in Mandarin at home 
and/or Uyghur-Mandarin code-switched; their parents gradually adopted these language 
practices. Möshük’s father talked about the importance of Uyghur literacy, but did not 
teach his daughters this skill. Möshük felt that her parents were too busy with their jobs 
to teach her to read and write in Uyghur. 
Möshük lived her first six years in an apartment near the Urumchi airport. She 
had Uyghur and Han Chinese neighbors. In 1994, Möshük’s family moved to a “more 
modern” apartment closer to downtown Urumchi. She said the neighbors frequently 
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changed because many of the apartments were rented out to Han Chinese businessmen 
from other provinces. This neighborhood is more ethnically diverse than her former one, 
with Han Chinese, Uyghurs and foreigners (many Russians from Kazakhstan) living and 
working in same area. There is a large Russian business center in the neighborhood. 
Möshük attended a pre-school near the school where her mother worked. The pre-
school teachers were young Han Chinese women. The students were Uyghur and Han 
Chinese. The teachers spoke Mandarin, so this was the first institutional setting where she 
was exposed to Mandarin. 
Möshük’s primary school was ten minutes by foot from her home.42 During 
primary school, her classmates were Han Chinese, except for one or two Uyghurs. 
Möshük enjoyed her status as an ethnic minority because she was regarded as unique.43 
Mandarin was the language of instruction throughout primary school. All of her primary 
school teachers were Han or Hui Chinese. The majority of her friends were Han Chinese. 
The language of instruction at school differed from the language spoken at home, and she 
experienced some difficulties with Mandarin; she recalled earning a score of 19 (on a 100 
point scale) in Mandarin in first grade. Möshük believed that her parents sent her to Han 
Chinese schools “in order to have a chance to succeed…in this world that is controlled by 
Han. My parents want me to get a better education because Uyghur schools are poor, and 
                                                
42 In April 2009, Möshük and I tried to visit her primary school, but were turned away at the front gate. 
We had no authorization to enter, and no one accepted the line that I was a prospective teacher. I had hoped 
to speak with some teachers, take some photographs and obtain a feel for the environment where she spent 
her primary grade school years. Although I was unable to achieve this goal, just being in the proximity of 
her primary school was sufficient to elicit memories of interactions with teachers and classmates. 
43 Möshük also attracted some negative attention. She felt that her teachers were stricter with her than her 
Han Chinese classmates. “They think I must study hard because they think, because I am Uyghur, my 
native language is not Mandarin, so they want me to pay more attention to my class.” 
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they don’t have advanced education system.” Möshük used Uyghur at school only during 
break-time on the playground with her classmate and best friend, who was also Uyghur. 
The two Uyghur girls were not allowed to be desk-mates.44 
Möshük started learning English in the third grade. She believed that her school 
was the first in the Uyghur region to teach English as a foreign language. A teacher once 
told her, “If you are interested in a certain country, culture or custom, go to learn their 
language.” Because Möshük had a nascent interest in Western cultures, these words 
motivated her to study English. “When I was a little girl, I was interested in English-
speaking countries’ culture. And I watched lots of movies and listened to lots of English 
language pop music. And I became more and more interested in English. And then I 
made a decision to learn English.” 
In middle and high school, the ethnic composition of Möshük’s classmates 
remained predominantly Han Chinese. Mandarin continued to be the language of 
instruction. All of her middle and high school teachers were Han Chinese, except for one 
American English teacher. Most of her friends were Han Chinese. Her use of Uyghur 
continued to be limited to brief conversations with Uyghur schoolmates at break- time. 
In middle school, Möshük had English class every day, or every other day, each 
session lasting two periods. In high school, she had English class every day for two 
periods. In her second year of high school, Möshük chose the liberal arts track and so 
focused on English, Mandarin and history. When the college entrance exam approached, 
the class time allotted to English study increased to four periods a day. 
                                                
44 School desks in China usually seat two students. 
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Outside of class, Möshük read English language magazines. From the Internet, 
she downloaded and watched English language movies and television series. She 
frequently downloaded and listened to English language songs. In high school, Möshük 
developed an aversion to China’s political system. She said, “Especially for Uyghurs it is 
unfair.” She envisioned leaving China and living abroad. She cited the desire to live 
abroad as a major factor in her motivation to learn English. Möshük was not saying that 
she wanted to travel or even sojourn abroad, a sentiment expressed by many of her Han 
Chinese classmates, but that she wanted to permanently relocate. She figured that English 
proficiency would help her realize this ambition. 
Möshük performed well on the college entrance exam. She intended to major in 
English at a top-tier public college in a city outside of Xinjiang. However, her mother 
managed to change her major to physics. After high school, she attended yùkē at 
preparatory center that specializes in Mandarin training for ethnic minority students 
admitted to top-tier colleges. She then started college. However, two and a half years into 
the program, she was increasingly unhappy and decided to leave. Möshük returned to 
Urumchi and enrolled as an English major at a public university. None of her credits were 
transferable so she had to begin college anew. Her classmates were unaware of her past.  
At her college in Urumchi, Möshük often felt like an outsider among her peers. 
This is partly because she was more mature and had experience living independently. She 
also felt alienated because she was an “active and outgoing student.” When teachers 
asked questions to the class, as opposed to calling on a specific student, Möshük often 
took the initiative to answer these questions. This behavior was in contrast to her 
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predominantly Han Chinese classmates who were reticent to speak in class. She 
attributed her behavior “partly to personality and partly to her Uyghur culture. Uyghurs 
are more active. Chinese are shy.” One of the foreign teachers at the college commented 
that Möshük’s classroom behavior was like “a foreign student.” 
In her dormitory, Möshük shared a room with five roommates (two Han Chinese, 
two Hui Chinese and one Uyghur).45 She spoke Mandarin most of the time in her dorm 
room. With her Uyghur roommate, she sometimes spoke Uyghur, but mostly Mandarin 
“because the others are Chinese” and she did not want to exclude anyone. 
Outside of class, Möshük sought out English media. She enjoyed reading English 
language magazines. She frequently downloaded and watched English language movies 
and television series (e.g. Prison Break, Gossip Girl). She often browsed the Billboard 
Top 100 and downloaded featured songs. Möshük’s cell phone was programmed so that 
callers heard a song by the American pop star Rihanna. And when Möshük’s cell phone 
rang, the tone was a song by the Canadian pop star Avril Lavigne. Möshük doesn’t view 
these leisure-time English related activities as “learning.” She said emphatically, “It’s 
pleasure. I enjoy it. I don’t like Chinese songs or Chinese movies. Did you ever see me 
listen to Chinese songs or watch Chinese movies? No way!” 
Möshük sent messages in Chinese script when corresponding with family and 
friends. Whenever I texted her in Chinese, she always responded in English. Möshük also 
texted in English with Messi. 
                                                
45 Möshük’s roommates changed several times over the four-year period that she lived on campus. 
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Möshük sought opportunities to converse in English, often with Western English-
speaking friends. When I first met Möshük, I sometimes spoke to her in Mandarin; she 
almost always responded in English. Even when I spoke in Uyghur, she would usually 
switch back to English after a few turns.  
About half of Möshük’s friends are Uyghur and the others are Han or Hui 
Chinese. She sometimes speaks in Uyghur with her Uyghur college classmates. Möshük 
said she “can use Chinese and English to show myself or show my emotion. But 
sometimes I can’t use Uyghur. I can’t find the words to express my feelings in Uyghur 
and sometimes if I fall in love with a guy, if I express my feelings to him in Uyghur, it’s 
weird… There is a few Uyghur words to express a man’s feeling, especially girl’s 
feeling… It could be my Uyghur’s poor or something… I don’t feel confident when I use 
Uyghur sometimes. When I use English, it’s a real meaning. I don’t need to hide my 
feelings. I don’t need to tell white lies to my classmates, to my roommates. But when I 
use Chinese, I should hide my feelings. And of course I should care about their feelings 
too and tell white lies sometimes, I have too. So it’s not the real me.” In this quote, 
Möshük indicates that her Uyghur lexicon is not rich enough to express emotions. She 
also suggests a language ideology whereby English and Mandarin license specific forms 
of social interaction, associating English with authenticity and Mandarin with deceit. 
In the future, Möshük wants to move to the United States. She aspires to be a 
Mandarin teacher, “but if I could get a job related to English, I’ll be very happy.” She 
wants to become as U.S. Citizen, even if there was a possibility that she would not be 
able to return to China. She said, “In traditional Uyghur family values, if I were a filial 
 
 222 
girl, I must stay with my parents. I cannot go to mainland or even go abroad. I should 
take care of my parents when they’re getting old. I shouldn’t care about my own life 
only… I’m having a dilemma now.” Möshük longs for freedom and to live in an 
environment where ethnic discrimination is not so pronounced. She asked, “What should 
we do? [the CCP] want to kill us. They want to send us to Guangzhou.”46 
Möshük described the current grade-school generation of mínkăohàn as “more 
like Chinese. They speak more Mandarin than Uyghur. And they have little girlfriends 
and boyfriends earlier.” Möshük said there are now many more mínkăohàn students than 
when she was in grade school. This “makes me feel a little bit sad. I don’t want them to 
be like me, their Uyghur is poor.” Möshük said, “Maybe we use more Chinese words 
instead of Uyghur words like zhuōzi.”47 Now Uyghur always say zhuōzi. Maybe few will 
keep the traditional language. I think [the Uyghur language] weak [in the future].” 
Möshük stated, “Right now, all Uyghurs, even if their classmates are all Uyghur, are 
being educated in Chinese. There is no more mínkăomín. A lot of the [bilingual] students, 
they call themselves mínkăohàn right now. I read some articles [about this] on the 
internet.” 
On being a Uyghur mínkăohàn, Möshük said, “Neither Chinese nor Uyghurs 
accept us. It is said mínkăohàn group is a separate ethnic. Chinese are afraid of us, 
because we are smarter, stronger, more open, we are getting into advanced level in 
Uyghur world. While Uyghurs, I mean mínkăomín, are jealous of us, because we can 
                                                
46 Möshük is referring to the government-sponsored Uyghur relocation program where Uyghurs (a high 
proportion of them young women) are being forcibly moved to the east coast of China to work in factories. 
47 Zhuōzi is the Chinese word for “table.” This borrowing is often used in place of the Uyghur word of 
Russian origin üstel. 
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speak Chinese fluently, we know more modern technology and so on. So we are getting 
into an embarrassing position.” Möshük said, “I feel I’ve been assimilated… Mínkăohàn 
Uyghurs have been assimilated in behaviors, dress, appearance and language… From 
going to school with them and being with them all the time, I’ve become like them… 
Sometimes it’s okay. Sometimes I feel disgust. I feel bad. Some of my weakness from 
Chinese, like pouring food on table.”48 
According to Möshük, “Mínkăohàn disrespect mínkăomín. Also mínkăomín don’t 
like mínkăohàn.” That is, she identified mutual animosity between the groups. She 
attributed these bad feelings to a “lack of communication between two groups. If your 
lover is mínkăomín or mínkăohàn, you’ll never say they are bad because you love them. 
If you don’t have a mínkăohàn friend or lover, you will think of them as Chinese.” 
Möshük feels that the CCP has been experimenting with language policy as a tool 
for cultural assimilation. She said, “They control us. Last night, I read something from 
rénrénwǎng (The Chinese version of Facebook). One girl who study in Beijing, she said 
the government try to kill our language so they said you should learn ‘bilingual.’ You 
should learn Chinese more than Uyghur right now.” She said that the government is 
trying to “choose the proper way…the smart way” to kill the Uyghur language. Möshük 
said, “The Chinese government say they want to offer jobs for Uyghurs so Uyghurs must 
learn Mandarin. So they produce mínkăohàn.” However, according to Möshük, “Uyghurs 
                                                
48 When eating, Möshük sometimes picked items that she did not like (e.g. onions, garlic, tomatoes) from 
her bowl and piled them on the table. She said, “This is totally from Chinese because none of my family 
members do that. I’m trying to correct it now.” 
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have no jobs now... They want to kill us, kill our language. Gradually change us to 
Chinese so we never give them trouble because we will be Chinese one day.” 
Möshük said that if she were to have a son, she would have him educated as a 
mínkăohàn. This is because “Uyghur boys drink and smoke in primary school. A boy can 
easily learn some bad things. How to drink, how to smoke or how to take drugs.” In her 
estimation, Han Chinese teachers are stricter than Uyghur teachers. “I’ll send him to 
Chinese school, or try my best to send him to oversea.” But if she were to have a 
daughter, Möshük would have her educated as a mínkăomín and “learn her mother 
tongue. She must know our [Uyghur] culture and customs more because she will be a 
wife and mother.” 
Möshük said, “I will try my best to maintain my Uyghur language skills because I 
should teach my kids Uyghur. They should know their mom is a Uyghur, then at least 
learn a little bit Uyghur. If I live in a place or a country [not in Xinjiang], I will teach my 
kid Uyghur, but I think my behavior will impress him more, such as most of ABC49 who 
cannot speak Chinese at all. I believe the second Uyghur generation who was born at 
oversea, they probably cannot speak Uyghur, but they know they are Uyghurs.” 
According to Möshük, “It’s possible to transmit all aspects of culture without the 
language. You can eat the traditional food. And visit the Uyghur place. You can know, 
become familiar. I think the important thing is to eat the food. Maybe you will love the 
culture because food is part of culture.” She said, “Culture includes many parts. 
                                                
49 American-born Chinese 
 
 225 
Language is most important. But without language you can still teach customs, habits and 
taboos.” 
5.4.1 Expressive vocabulary assessment: Möshük 
 Möshük completed the expressive vocabulary assessment in the fall of 2008. She 
wrote lexical items in Uyghur Latin Yëziqi (Uyghur Latin alphabet) but with no diacritics 
and Chinese. Möshük produced the correct Uyghur lexical item [N=96] for over half of 
the items [N=156] in each category [N=10]. She misidentified some items [N=10], but 
was able to produce the target lexical item upon verbal specification. Notably, Möshük 
wrote the Mandarin borrowed lexical items for several lexical items [N=7], including 
eggplant, mushroom, pepper, potato, desk, refrigerator, and television. She was not able 
to produce the Uyghur-language lexical items for any of these objects when verbally 
given their equivalent in English. 
 After Möshük completed this task, she was momentarily satisfied with her 
performance, but then became upset when I revealed the percentage of items she had 
correctly identified. When Möshük said in tears that she “didn’t know [her] mother 
tongue,” I felt awful because I felt responsible for her sadness. I began to identify and 
explain some of the cultural, political and historical conditions that impacted the 
language ecology of Xinjiang and subsequent language practices. However, feeling more 
didactic than compassionate, I shifted course and suggested to her that she set some goals 
related to improving her Uyghur language skills. I promised to help her learn to read and 
write in Uyghur, an objective that she was able to realize. 
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 total items items correct incorrect (item #) 
Section    
1: Animals 12 9 6, 11, 12 
2: Body & Face 25 20 Body: 5, 7, 11 
Face: 6, 7 
3: Family 15 12 4, 13, 14 
4: Nature 20 7 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 
15, 17, 19, 20 
5: Food 19 15 2, 5, 7, 15 
6: Jobs 20 7 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 13, 
14, 15, 17, 19 
7: Furniture & Appliances 12 5 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11 
8: Transportation 12 6 2, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11 
9: Numbers 13 11 7, 13 
10: Colors 8 4 3, 7, 8, 9 
 156 96 (62%)  
Table 4: Expressive vocabulary assessment: Möshük
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5.5 MIKE 
 Mike was a college student when we first met in 2008. During our first 
conversation, I told him that I was investigating Uyghur language practices among 
Uyghur young adults. He remarked, “Hey man, you want to go to jail?” We both smiled, 
and with a handshake he agreed to work with me. Mike was in Urumchi because he was 
waiting for some documents to be processed so that he could go abroad. He had come 
from a city in northwest Xinjiang and needed to stay in Urumchi because the visa office is 
located there, and it is closer by rail to Beijing. During our first interview session, Mike 
told me a vision of his future that entailed leaving China to study in Europe. He aspired 
to attend a European university where English was the language of instruction. As of this 
writing, for a variety of reasons, Mike has been unable to actualize his dream. 
 I invited Mike to participate in my dissertation study because he was a male 
mínkăohàn; he also struck me as confident and opinionated. The first time I showed Mike 
my interview protocol, he again brought up the police and asked why I was not afraid. 
Having grown up in a city in northwest Xinjiang, where hundreds of Uyghurs were killed, 
imprisoned or disappeared on and after a protest about a decade ago, Mike felt that my 
research might result in retaliation. As we engaged in critical discussions on “sensitive” 
topics, including language policy and the difficulties that Uyghurs faced when seeking 
employment, Mike often reminded me of the necessity of concealing his identity. I have 
done my best to do so; this is why his biographical sketch is less specific than the others 
in terms of place names or other identifying information. 
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 Mike did not know where his paternal grandparents were from.50 His paternal 
grandfather died some time before he was born. Mike’s grandparents lived in Urumchi 
for a period of time, and his father was born in this city, but, due to health issues 
aggravated by the pollution of Urumchi, the family moved to a village in northwest 
Xinjiang. Mike’s father was educated as a mínkăomín. His father is a university teacher 
of Uyghur. Mike addresses his father with the Uyghur kinship term dada. 
 Mike did not know where his maternal grandparents came from. His mother was 
born in the same prefectural capital in northwest Xinjiang where Mike was born. Mike’s 
mother is a university professor of linguistics. He addresses his mother with the Uyghur 
kinship term apa. 
 Mike has one older brother whom he addresses as aka (older brother). Mike has 
no nickname for his older brother; he explained, “because he my brother I can’t do that. 
My father and my brother will kill me. Maybe his friends call him, but I never.” Mike 
rarely addresses his brother by his given name. His father does not allow this and has 
physically punished him for doing so in the past. Mike’s brother was educated as a 
mínkăohàn. The two brothers attended the same grade schools. Mike’s brother is now 
attending college in mainland China. 
 Mike has no nickname. His family does not suffix his name with the Uyghur word 
jan (life), as is common among Uyghur communities in southern Xinjiang. He said that 
                                                
50 To explain his lack of knowledge of family history, Mike said, “My father didn’t tell me so much for 
that because that’s not good for me.” It is possible that Mike did not reveal this information in order to 
protect his identity. 
 
 229 
his mother disagrees with this practice because he already has “a life” and “a heart” and 
does not need another one. 
 Mike’s family communicates in Uyghur at home, except when non-Uyghur 
speaking Kazakh and Han Chinese colleagues are present. Family members speak 
Mandarin if the guests cannot speak Uyghur. Mike’s father sometimes invited his foreign 
(e.g. American, Canadian, British, Japanese, Korean) Uyghur-language students to the 
family home; conversations were in Uyghur and English. He said, “They were very 
surprised when I speak English better than them.” Mike’s father sometimes demanded he 
and his brother to practice their English with each other. 
 Mike’s parents did not teach him how to read and write in Uyghur. Once, some 
Uyghur mínkăomín neighborhood children asked Mike if he could write his name in 
Uyghur. He admitted that he could not and was “shocked” by this experience. Mike said, 
“I wondered – I really can’t use my mother language to write my own name.” Mike asked 
his mother to teach him how to write his name, the alphabet and some words. His mother 
responded by giving him a Uyghur illustrated alphabet. Mike learned some of the Uyghur 
alphabet from this book, how to write his name and the names of his immediate family 
members.51 
 Han Chinese, Kazakh and Uyghur were the most populous ethnic groups in 
Mike’s hometown. These ethnic communities occupied certain spaces in the city; Mike 
grew up in an area that was predominantly Uyghur. His father allowed him to go to the 
                                                
51 Mike’s present Uyghur literacy skills are weak. Once, at a restaurant, I asked him to read the menu. He 
tried and failed to identify letters. 
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Uyghur and Kazakh parts of town, but he was prohibited from entering the Han Chinese 
areas. In numerous stories Mike told me about his youth, his friends were all Uyghur. He 
recalled some confrontations with Han Chinese, several of which resulted from stealing 
apples from trees, but these were rather brief. 
He attended a preschool that had both Uyghur and Han Chinese teachers; 
Mandarin was the language of instruction. He was watched over by Uyghur teachers 
because his mother “did not give the baby to Chinese.” 
 Mike attended a primary school where Mandarin was the language of instruction. 
His classroom was multi-ethnic throughout grade school; most of his classmates were 
Kazakh, some were Han Chinese, and a few were Uyghur. His parents decided on a 
mínkăohàn education for Mike because, by this point, Uyghur was no longer a language 
of instruction at the tertiary level.52 Mike initially struggled with Mandarin; he found it 
difficult to learn Chinese characters. His teacher once had a conference with Mike’s 
father, and said that Mike was “stupid” for his slow progress in learning Mandarin. 
Mike’s father explained that Uyghur and Mandarin were different language systems, and 
lectured the teacher on some of the areas in which these systems differed. He said that 
Mike would require time to learn this second language. From then on, Mike’s teacher 
stopped criticizing him. Mike spoke Mandarin in class most of the time in school, but 
would chat in Uyghur with his Uyghur desk-mate. Among Uyghur schoolmates, he used 
Uyghur during break-time. Mike was thankful for attending a Han Chinese school 
                                                
52 On several occasions, Mike lauded his parents for “thinking ahead” and predicting the Mandarin-
Uyghur language shift in the Xinjiang education system. 
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because English was part of the curriculum; English was not offered at Uyghur primary 
schools. Mike started learning English in first grade. 
 Mike attended middle and high schools where Mandarin was the language of 
instruction. He maintained a consistent set of language practices at school, speaking 
Mandarin when addressing his teacher or entire class, chatting with his desk-mate in 
Uyghur, and conversing with Uyghur schoolmates in Uyghur. Outside of class, he spoke 
Uyghur with neighborhood friends and family members. He took the natural science 
track in high school, and the corresponding mínkăohàn version of the college entrance 
exam. He continued to study English as a foreign language throughout grade school. 
 Growing up, Mike’s friends sometimes teased him as being “half Chinese, half 
Uyghur.” They would say, “You have no rights to speaking something here. They said I 
was a 57th mínzú (ethnicity).” When having a group discussion, and a friend wanted to 
tease Mike, they might tell Mike to be quiet and that they would translate the content of 
the conversation for him later. This was all in jest – he was not treated any differently 
than other Uyghurs in his peer group. 
 Mike enrolled in a college in his hometown. He studied physics for one year, but 
decided to change majors because the school had no equipment with which to conduct 
science experiments. Mike then decided to become an English major, a strategic move, 
and part of a long-term goal to study in Europe. Mike’s parents helped him obtain a 
passport, but in Beijing there was a problem with the paperwork necessary for his visa. 
Because he needed to make several trips to Beijing in order to clarify this matter, he 
moved to Urumchi and enrolled in a public university. 
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 In his current college, Mike uses Mandarin in class and Uyghur outside of class. 
In Urumchi, he was surprised to meet many Uyghurs who had a predilection to converse 
in Mandarin outside of class. Mike terms Uyghur mínkăohàn who communicate 
predominantly in Mandarin “hànkăohàn.” The term “hànkăohàn” is a neologism, and a 
play on “mínkăohàn.” It literally means “Han Chinese testing in Mandarin.” Thus, to call 
a Uyghur a “hànkăohàn” is to say that the Uyghur is a monolingual Mandarin Han 
Chinese. Mike said, “In my eyes, Uyghur Urumchiliq53 is also Han…I got a mínkăomín 
friend in my hometown – he saw me like a Han.” This person would call Mike “half 
Uyghur, half Han Chinese.” After coming to Urumchi to attend college, and meeting 
Urumchiliq Uyghur mínkăohàn, this friend reappraised Mike. He said that Mike may be 
half Uyghur and half Han Chinese, but that Urumchiliq Uyghur mínkăohàn were entirely 
Han Chinese. Mike identified Uyghur language competence as one marker of 
membership in the Uyghur ethnic community, but said that other practices were of equal 
importance, such as funerary customs (i.e. Uyghur entombment versus Han Chinese 
cremation), and greeting and parting conventions. For example, if someone were to arrive 
in a rush, Mike said that Uyghur customs favor artful greetings like “What wind brought 
you here?” as opposed to direct questions like “Why did you arrive in a rush?” Mike said 
that Uyghur conversation is like an art form. 
Mike said that Uyghurs in his hometown resisted assimilation because it is older 
and geographically isolated; mountains and quicksand provide natural barriers. He also 
said that the ancestors who populated his home region were soldiers who had come from 
                                                
53 The term “Urumchiliq” refers to residents of Urumchi.   
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Turkey, and thus were versed in the art of warfare. People in his hometown maintain 
local customs through the practice of endogamy. Mike said that if he were to marry a 
Uyghur woman from another place in Xinjiang, his father would say, “Don’t come back” 
and command him to move to his in-law’s home. 
Mike recounted many stories told to him by older relatives. One of the most 
interesting stories was a history of the toponym “Urumchi.” Chinese sources claim that 
the name “Urumchi” originates from the Mongol language, meaning “beautiful pasture.” 
However, according to Mike, this place name is derived from the Uyghur word “Örüme” 
(braid). Uyghur craftspeople lived in the area that corresponds with modern-day Urumchi 
and produced braided leather products (e.g. saddles, whips). Mike said that the word 
“Örüme” was suffixed with “chi” (a morpheme signifying the agent of an action, as in “a 
person who braids”) to form “Ürümchi.” 
 Mike spoke with regret about the influx of Han Chinese and the changing 
demographics of Xinjiang. According to Mike, Uyghur people were too gracious to the 
early Han Chinese settlers, with land and food. Now that Han Chinese are populous, 
Uyghurs are being pushed out. According to Mike, in earlier times, Han Chinese settlers 
would ask Uyghurs for permission to set up a homestead, but after forming a critical 
mass, the negotiations stopped. 
 Although Mike hopes to move to Europe, his backup plan is to return to his 
hometown and teach Mandarin to Uyghur mínkăomín. However, he said, “Uyghur school 
have no future in now. In the future, in the next few years – maybe fifteen or twenty years 
– I think the Uyghur school will be disappeared totally.”  
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 According to Mike, Uyghur mínkăomín have fewer prospects than Uyghur 
mínkăohàn on the job market. Mike said, “If you don’t know Mandarin, the Han Chinese 
says you are no knowledge. A fact is different. If I don’t speak your language, I’m not 
stupid – just I don’t know your language. That’s okay, but in this country is not okay.” 
Mike stated that many of the available jobs are for manual labor, where language skills 
are not requisite and “anybody can do it.” However, according to Mike, Uyghurs must 
beg for employment, “just like a dog ask for food.” Mike dismissed assertions by the 
CCP that Mandarin proficiency would make Uyghurs more competitive on the job 
market. He said, “so many guys say, ‘Learning can change your life,’ but after they 
graduate will say, ‘I learnt for fifty years but I didn’t change my life.’” 
5.5.1 Expressive vocabulary assessment: Mike 
Mike completed the expressive vocabulary assessment in the spring of 2009. He 
wrote lexical items in Uyghur Latin Yëziqi but with no diacritics. Mike produced the 
correct Uyghur lexical item [N=147] for over 90 percent of the items [N=156] in each 
category [N=10]. He misidentified some items [N=15], but was able to produce the target 
lexical item upon verbal specification. Like Möshük, Mike wrote the Mandarin borrowed 
lexical items for several lexical items [N=8], including eggplant, mushroom, pepper, 
orange, table, and television. He was able to produce the Uyghur-language lexical items 
for all of these objects when verbally given their equivalent in English. 
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 total items items correct incorrect (item #) 
Section    
1: Animals 12 12  
2: Body & Face 25 24 5 
3: Family 15 15  
4: Nature 20 19 17 
5: Food 19 17 7, 15 
6: Jobs 20 18 12, 19 
7: Furniture & Appliances 12 10 5, 11 
8: Transportation 12 12  
9: Numbers 13 13  
10: Colors 8 7 7 
 156 147 (94%)  
Table 5: Expressive vocabulary assessment: Mike 
5.6 DISCUSSION 
 The four case study participants were selected because they experienced typical 
forms of language education for Uyghur young adults. From the first set of consultants 
interviewed in the fall of 2008, it was apparent that Mandarin (mínkăohàn) and Uyghur 
primary/Mandarin-Uyghur secondary (mínkăomín/shuāngyǔ) language education 
backgrounds were typical for the current generation of Uyghur college and university 
students in Xinjiang. However, this is not to say that these two forms of language-
mediated education are representative of the language education backgrounds of all 
Uyghur young adults in Xinjiang. Local education policies in Xinjiang are “subject to 
local ideologies and economic resources” (Dwyer, 2005, p. 37; Zhou, 2004), meaning 
that administrative divisions are not uniform in their implementation of education policy. 
The purpose of this discussion is to examine variables associated with language 
ecology (e.g. contextual and environmental factors) as related to Bourdieu’s forms of 
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capital (1986). This discussion will proceed with a focus on fields, moving from the 
domestic to the academic. Although the language ecologies of these contexts are explored 
in turn, this is not to suggest that fields are bounded units. Capital can be accumulated, 
reproduced and converted across fields (C. Calhoun, 2003) 
Messi, Athena and Mike were raised in domestic fields where language-mediated 
social practices were conducted in monolingual Uyghur. Mandarin exposure was limited 
to media such as television and movies. These consultants’ peer groups were entirely 
Uyghur, although Messi had a formative experience in his childhood in which he engaged 
in Mandarin language-mediated activities with Han Chinese playmates. Experience in 
this social context, though brief, contributed to the emergence of a Mandarin social 
identity (Bourdieu, 1991; B. Norton & Toohey, 2001). As the only Uyghur child among 
many Han Chinese children, Messi accommodated his language practices (Giles, 1973) in 
order to access social relationships (i.e. build social capital) with Han Chinese children 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). 
Athena, Möshük and Messi were from cities where the Uyghur population 
comprised between 13-16 percent of the total population. Athena and Möshük lived in 
multi-ethnic neighborhoods, while Messi lived in a predominantly Uyghur neighborhood. 
Mike was from a city where Uyghurs comprised nearly half of the population and lived in 
a predominantly Uyghur neighborhood. These population factors and ethnic demography 
data is important because they form part of the language ecology. Möshük was the only 
case study participant who indicted frequent positive interactions with Han Chinese 
neighbors, indicating a low degree of social distance (Schumann, 1976). 
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The Uyghur young adults who participated in this study were all raised in 
populous urban environments. However, the demographic factors of their communities 
differed. The following graph, from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Bureau of 
Statistics (1999) presents total population and ethnic percentages in 1998 of the three 
cities where the case study participants were raised: Urumchi (Athena and Möshük), 
Korla (Messi), and Ghulja (Mike). The case study participants would have been in their 
youth at this time. 
City Population Uyghur (%) Han Chinese (%) 
Urumchi 1,391,896 13 76 
Korla (Bortala) 204,704 16 66 
Ghulja 332,022 48 36 
Table 6: Xinjiang Urban Ethnicity, 1998  
 
As Och’s proposed in her theory of language acquisition (1988), “Children’s 
language practices are partially engendered by grammatical, discourse, sociocultural, and 
general cognitive structures. However, these structures of knowledge are created in part 
through children’s participation in temporarily and spatially situated practices/activities” 
(E. Ochs, 1988, p. 17). It appears that the sociocultural context of Möshük’s multi-ethnic 
neighborhoods in Urumchi, coupled with a predominantly Han Chinese classroom, 
allowed Möshük opportunities to access a variety of conversations in Mandarin, 
providing for the emergence of a dynamic multilingual social identity (B. Norton & 
Toohey, 2001). Möshük’s code-switching may be seen as an empowering process 
because this activity allowed her to “make use of [her] diverse knowledge and language 
systems, and negotiate cultural and linguistic capital” (Makin, Diaz, & McLachlan, 2008, 
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p. 208). The practice of code-switching emphasizes agency and can be used strategically 
by a speaker to maintain multiple social identities. 
Mike, though educated as a mínkăohàn in a predominantly Han Chinese 
classroom, indicated a high degree of social distance (Schumann, 1976) from his Han 
Chinese peers. Mike was able to develop Mandarin communicative competence (Hymes, 
1966), but consciously resisted demonstrating Mandarin strategic competence when 
communicating with Han Chinese (Lakoff, 2005). Mike’s behavior may be interpreted as 
the performance of an oppositional social identity (Dwyer, 2005). His disinclination to 
follow Mandarin-mediated Han Chinese conventions of appropriateness may also be 
interpreted as contributing to Uyghur social capital, as reiterations of these oppositional 
encounters may strengthen relationships with other members of the Uyghur ethnic 
community (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
This ethnographic case study consists of information, collected from interviews 
with consultants, on the diachronic (i.e. historically constituted) nature of language use 
and language education in domestic and academic fields, and synchronic data on 
language practices. Each case study narrative revealed interactions between objective 
social relations (e.g. family, friendship and peer groups) and the habitus through which 
consultants imagine and inhabit social spaces. Linguistic habitus, which comes into being 
through language use in a particular context or field, are “features of language, and 
consequent thoughts, individuals are disposed to have and acquire in the course of their 
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own upbringing and trajectories through life” (Grenfell & James, 1998, p. 73). Language 
is also “an objectifiable structured structure that is also structuring in practice” (Grenfell 
& James, 1998, p. 73). In the final chapter, I synthesize and analyze the collected data, in 
reference to the relevant literature, present findings and offer suggestions appropriate to 
the sociocultural context of Xinjiang (Blommaert, 2005) .
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Chapter six: Discussion 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I use a diagnostic tool, the Language Vitality and Endangerment 
guidelines (2003) to assess the vitality of the Uyghur ethnolinguistic community of 
Xinjiang. I then discuss what it means for Uyghur young adults to possess, and attempt to 
convert, Mandarin linguistic capital in a social context where symbolic power between 
interlocutors is unequally distributed. Drawing on data, I illustrate what it means to be an 
“illegitimate” speaker of a “legitimate” language (Bourdieu, 1977a, p. 648). I then 
suggest what can be done to maintain the vitality and intergenerational transmission of 
Uyghur, placing the responsibility on the family unit. Finally, I indicate what this study 
contributes to the discipline of applied linguistics, a field concerned with using linguistics 
to make informed language decisions. 
6.2 UYGHUR LANGUAGE VITALITY ASSESSMENT 
This section consists of a review and application of Language Vitality and 
Endangerment (2003), a document produced by the UNESCO Ad Hoc Expert Group on 
Endangered Languages. This document consists of five sections: a preamble emphasizing 
the urgent need for reliable information about the situation of minority languages; 
background on UNESCO initiatives to promote languages as instruments of education 
and culture through partnerships with endangered-language communities; the role of 
speech communities and external specialists in supporting endangered languages; nine 
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factors for characterizing a language’s overall sociolinguistic situation; and concluding 
remarks on the shared responsibility of individual language specialists, local speaker 
community, NGOs, and governmental and institutional organizations in language 
maintenance and perpetuation. 
The UNESCO Ad Hoc Expert Group on Endangered Languages identified nine 
factors to assess language endangerment and urgency for documentation. The first six 
factors evaluate a language’s vitality and state of endangerment: Intergenerational 
Language Transmission; Absolute Number of Speakers; Proportion of Speakers within 
the Total Population; Trends in Existing Language Domains; Response to New Domains 
and Media; and Materials for Language Education and Literacy. Two factors assess 
language attitudes: Governmental and Institutional Language Attitudes and Policies, 
Including Official Status and Use; and Community Members’ Attitudes toward Their 
Own Language. And one factor evaluates the urgency for documentation: Amount and 
Quality of Documentation. In the remainder of this section, I assess the Uyghur language 
of the Uyghur ethnolinguistic community of Xinjiang according to the above factors. 
In terms of the Intergenerational Language Transmission, I assessed Uyghur as 
bordering on “stable yet threatened” and “unsafe.” Uyghur is being transmitted from one 
generation to the next, but in some Uyghur households, members code-switch from 
Uyghur to Mandarin and/or Mandarin is frequently used. Mandarin is replacing Uyghur 
as the language of instruction in the Xinjiang education system. 
The Absolute Number of Speakers of Uyghur, extrapolated from the 2000 census, 
is around 8.6 million (Statistics Bureau of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, 2002). 
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However, it should be noted that the demographics of Xinjiang are rapidly changing. The 
Han Chinese population, at 7.5 million, grew at 31.6 percent during the 1990s, twice the 
15.9 percent rate of local ethnic minorities. 
The Proportion of Speakers within the Total Population is “unsafe” because 
“nearly all speak the language.” I observed that some Uyghurs did not possess adequate 
Uyghur language competence to be able to discuss a wide range of topics in Uyghur. I 
also observed that some Uyghur mínkăohàn were reluctant to communicate in Uyghur 
with Uyghur mínkăomín because ashamed of their deficiency in Uyghur and a desire to 
avoid criticism. The expressive vocabulary assessment indicated that Möshük’s Uyghur 
lexicon was deficient; this low level of Uyghur language competence impedes her ability 
to speak Uyghur. 
In reference to Trends in Existing Language Domains, I assessed Uyghur as 
having “multilingual parity” with Mandarin, but having “dwindling domains.” Mandarin 
is the primary language in most official domains: government, public offices, and 
educational institutions. Uyghur language services are available in most official domains 
because there is a substantial number of monolingual Uyghurs, generally senior citizens. 
The coexistence of Mandarin and Uyghur results in Uyghurs’ using each language for a 
different function (diglossia), whereby Mandarin is used in public domains and Uyghur is 
used in private and the home domain. Again, Uyghur is losing ground to Mandarin 
because in some Uyghur households, members code-switch from Uyghur to Mandarin 
and/or use Mandarin frequently in their everyday interactions. Some Uyghurs are semi-
speakers of their own language (receptive bilinguals). 
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The factor Response to New Domains and Media, is assessed to be “dynamic” 
because Uyghur is “used in all new domains.” However, this factor should be qualified. 
Uyghur is well represented in broadcast media and the Internet, but these technologies are 
regulated by the CCP. I did not observe Uyghur young adults watching Uyghur-medium 
news, or any news for that matter. Nor did I observe Uyghurs who were literate in 
Uyghur visiting Uyghur-medium websites. Many Uyghur young adults do not trust CCP 
authored materials, so despite Uyghur being “dynamic” in terms of new domains and 
media, I would contend that this factor is marginal in the given context. 
The factor Materials for Language Education and Literacy is also of dubious 
value. In some regards, Uyghur could arguably be given a high grade because “there is an 
established orthography, literacy tradition with grammars, dictionaries, texts, literature, 
and everyday media.” However, the written language is restricted in mínkăomín 
education to Uyghur literature and grammar; for Uyghur mínkăohàn, Uyghur literacy 
education is not a part of the school curriculum. It is interesting to note that xīnhuá 
shūdiàn – a countrywide bookstore chain that has several locations in Urumchi – has a 
large section of Uyghur books, including specialized dictionaries. As I encountered so 
many Uyghurs who were illiterate in Uyghur, and with knowledge that Mandarin is the 
language of instruction in higher education, I still struggle to understand why the CCP 
made this investment in Uyghur translations of Chinese language materials. 
In reference to the two factors that assess language attitudes, Governmental and 
Institutional Language Attitudes And Policies, Including Official Status and Use legally 
guarantee “equal support” (Chinese Communist Party, 1982, 1984), however, in practice, 
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the Uyghur language is being subject to a combination of “passive” and “active 
assimilation.” The dominant group (i.e. the Mandarin linguistic community) is indifferent 
as to whether or not Uyghur is spoken among Uyghurs. But when Uyghurs interact with 
Han Chinese, they must use Mandarin. The CCP is also encouraging Uyghurs to abandon 
their languages by providing education (starting in kindergarten) for Uyghurs in 
Mandarin.  
Uyghur Community Members’ Attitudes toward Their Own Language, by 
contrast, is highly positive. However, Messi did surmise that some Uyghurs perceived the 
Uyghur language to be “not modern.” All of the Uyghurs I encountered saw their 
language “as a cultural core value, vital to their community and ethnic identity” and 
wished to see it promoted (UNESCO Ad Hoc Expert Group on Endangered Languages, 
2003, p. 14). However, this attitude did not always translate to practice, as the Uyghurs I 
knew to be illiterate in Uyghur did not make efforts to learn how to read and write in 
Uyghur. 
The Amount and Quality of Documentation is difficult to gauge. Comprehensive 
Uyghur grammars, dictionaries and extensive texts are abundant. Uyghur language 
materials are readily accessible. However, there is a need for more transcribed, translated, 
and annotated audiovisual recordings of natural speech. The Uyghur language has three 
main dialects (Yakup, 2005); all need more documentation. Further research also must be 
conducted on Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching in order to learn about the Mandarin 
language features (e.g. lexicon, syntax, morphology) that are influencing Uyghur. 
The UNESCO Ad Hoc Expert Group on Endangered Languages notes, “A 
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language is in danger when its speakers cease to use it, use it in an increasingly reduced 
number of communicative domains, and cease to pass it on from one generation to the 
next” (2003, p. 2). The Language Vitality and Endangerment diagnostic tool reveals that 
the Uyghur language, despite being spoken by a linguistic community of 8 million, is 
threated. The CCP’s “China Western Development” policy, analogous in some respects 
to the American 19th century Manifest Destiny, is implementing a strategy to integrate 
and assimilate Chinese minorities into the Han majority. This strategy is referred to as 
“mixing sand,” whereby the local minority population is diluted by high numbers of Han 
Chinese migrants (Moneyhon, 2003). The influx of Han Chinese poses a threat to the 
Uyghur language because Han Chinese are increasing in number in so many 
communicative domains. The intergenerational transmission of Uyghur is under threat. 
6.3 LINGUISTIC CAPITAL AND “ILLEGITIMATE” SPEAKERS 
In this section, I analyze the case study participants’ language practices using 
Bourdieusian thinking tools (1977b). I first focus on the domestic and academic domains 
as structuring structures. I explore the role of these fields in naturalizing the linguistic 
habitus of my consultants (Bourdieu, 1991). I then describe Xinjiang in terms of a 
linguistic market that is shifting toward Mandarin, and where Uyghurs are “illegitimate” 
speakers of Mandarin (Bourdieu, 1997). Finally, I discuss Uyghurs’ instrumental and 
integrative motivations for English language learning (Gardner & Lambert, 1972). 
The four consultants were raised in multilingual homes where language practices 
included Uyghur, Mandarin, and Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching. Athena, Mike and 
 
 246 
Messi were raised in homes where Uyghur was the primary language of communication. 
Möshük was raised in a home where members practiced a combination of Uyghur, 
Mandarin and Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching. None of the consultants’ families 
implemented a language policy for their respective domestic domains. Möshük’s father 
did tell his daughters to “speak Uyghur at home,” but did not model this directive; thus 
undermining the authority of the policy. 
This study suggests a relationship between consultants’ parents’ language-of-
instruction in education and consultants’ Uyghur speaking skills. Mike and Messi’s 
parents were mínkăomín; these two consultants were highly proficient Uyghur speakers. 
Athena’s father was mínkăomín. Her mother was mínkăohàn in primary school although 
her formal education ended with the onset of the Cultural Revolution; Athena challenged 
her mother’s self-ascribed mínkăohàn identity. Athena was a highly proficient Uyghur 
speaker. Möshük’s parents were both mínkăohàn; she assessed her Uyghur speaking 
skills as weak in relation to Mandarin and English. A large-scale study on Uyghur 
parents’ language-of-instruction in education and their child’s Uyghur phonology, syntax, 
morphology and lexicon would elucidate this relationship. 
The interview and participant-observation data indicates phonological and 
linguistic awareness among the consultants and their family members. Athena and her 
father sometimes teased Athena’s mother when she made “mistakes” pronouncing 
Uyghur words. Athena’s mother was a “legitimate” speaker of Uyghur because her social 
position imbued her with this authority. Yet, according to Athena and her father, 
Athena’s mother’s utterances were, if systematic, not a “normalized” product (Bourdieu, 
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1991). Möshük’s father demonstrated linguistic awareness by calling Uyghur-Mandarin 
code-switching “modern sentence” formation. Möshük’s father appeared to be 
legitimizing this language practice by classifying it as “modern,” a term that had a highly 
positive connotation in Möshük’s family. 
This study suggests that shame may play a factor in shaping the language 
practices of Uyghur young adults. On several occasions, I witnessed Messi ridicule 
Möshük on account of her limited Uyghur lexicon. These situations would occur when 
the three of us were together and I would ask the name of something in Uyghur. If 
Möshük was unable to produce the accurate Uyghur lexical item, Messi would call 
attention to her limited Uyghur lexicon and sometimes chastise her for “not knowing her 
own language.” These situations always made me feel uncomfortable. I stopped asking 
her to provide Uyghur lexical items when Messi was present, but maintained this practice 
when we were alone. If, on these occasions, Möshük was unable to produce the Uyghur 
lexical item, I would often ask her to consult her parents, and report the term later. I made 
these suggestions for her benefit, to develop her Uyghur lexicon, as much as my own. 
Möshük did not always feel comfortable speaking Uyghur, and she confirmed that 
she sometimes avoided using this language in order to avoid ridicule or censure. 
Language avoidance practices may contribute to language attrition, manifest firstly in the 
L1 lexicon (Schmid & Köpke, 2008). Möshük’s score on the expressive vocabulary 
assessment was relatively low (62%), compared with Athena (100%), Messi (99%) and 
Mike (94%), suggesting that the process of L1 attrition may be underway. As noted 
above, Uyghur-Mandarin code-switching is a common practice in Möshük’s family. Of 
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note, she enjoys linguistic interactions with other mínkăohàn because all interlocutors 
have “poor” Uyghur, thus alleviating any fear of ridicule or censure. When among 
mínkăohàn, Möshük does not need to spend cognitive energy to produce “pure” Uyghur. 
All of my consultants recognized that some Mandarin lexical items, most of them 
associated with modern technologies, had been borrowed into Uyghur. Athena listed 
some of these borrowings: diànshì (television), shǒujī (cell phone), and duǎnxìn (text 
message). My consultant’s families are not making efforts to resist certain Mandarin 
lexical borrowings. One of my Uyghur teachers explained that these Mandarin 
borrowings were shorter than their Uyghur equivalents, and that Uyghur equivalents were 
created after the Mandarin borrowings had been established. In addition to technological 
terms, Mandarin borrowings also proliferate sociopolitical and scientific terminologies, 
dislodging Uyghur, Arabic, Persian, and Russian words (Bruchis, 1998). This study 
indicates that Mandarin terms are also dislodging Uyghur terms for common household 
items, such as zhuōzi (table). Future studies might systematically investigate Mandarin 
lexical borrowing. 
All of my consultants and their family members communicated in Mandarin when 
non-Uyghur speakers (e.g. co-workers) visited their homes, a necessary linguistic 
accommodation because Mandarin was the lingua franca. When Mike’s father brought 
foreign students to their home, Mike would communicate with them in English, but I 
believe the effect was to demonstrate his English language skills as opposed to using this 
language for any type of sustained dialogue. The use of Mandarin as a lingua franca with 
Han Chinese is remarkable because this practice has been normalized. My Uyghur 
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consultants accepted the burden of linguistic accommodation as if it were expected. And, 
indeed, this is expected because Han Chinese who are conversant in Uyghur are a rarity.  
Mandarin had a significant presence in the homes of some of the consultants 
through the telecommunication medium of television: 
Consultant/Language Mandarin English Uyghur 
Athena 80% 19% 1% 
Messi 50% 20% 30% 
Möshük 70% 20% 10% 
Mike 80% N/A 20% 
Table 7: Television language program percentiles 
 
All of my consultants self-reported watched more Mandarin language programming than 
the other available options. This practice may be explained by the higher proportion of 
Mandarin language channels or a preference for the types of programs broadcast on 
Mandarin language channels. I often watched Uyghur language animated cartoons in 
order to develop my Uyghur language skills and noticed few options. In contrast, 
Mandarin language channels featured a broad range of animated cartoons. I also noticed 
that Uyghur language channels frequently broadcast advertisements for abortion clinics. I 
am a pro-choice proponent, but felt uneasy watching these advertisements repeatedly. 
Also of note, pirated DVDs are abundant in Urumchi, sold in shops and from street-side 
carts. There is a broader range of Mandarin than Uyghur-dubbed DVDs. 
Consultants’ language ideologies, defined as “sets of beliefs about language 
articulated by users as rationalization or justification of perceived language and use” 
(Silverstein, 1979, p. 193), might be reflected in their self-reporting of television viewing. 
 
 250 
Möshük explained that Mandarin language programming was more “modern” because 
current television genres, movies, and news were broadcast in Mandarin. She said that 
news programs in Uyghur were less current than Mandarin news programs, compelling 
viewers to watch Mandarin channels for the latest news. Möshük stated that Mandarin 
language competency was requisite to view this “modern” programming, suggesting a 
government-authored reinforcing cycle. The public media positions Mandarin as essential 
and modern, conceptions reinforced by the education system, specifically that the Han 
Chinese language is “relatively rich in terminology” (Zhou, 2003, p. 361). 
My consultants exhibited a variety of Uyghur literacy competencies and practices. 
Neither Möshük nor Mike’s parents taught them Uyghur literacy skills. Möshük could 
not read the Uyghur alphabet until I taught her. Mike could recognize a few Uyghur 
letters but not read. Messi was literate in Uyghur but admitted that his academic writing 
was stronger in Mandarin. Athena possessed strong Uyghur literacy skills, but despite 
this, kept her diary in Chinese. This data indicates that a literacy shift is occurring.  
All of the consultants expressed sorrow at the specter of Uyghur-Mandarin 
language shift. Both Messi and Möshük pointed out that Uyghur children communicated 
in Mandarin when at play; I too observed this language practice. Athena consistently, and 
Messi early on, displayed degrees of condemnation toward Uyghur mínkăohàn. This 
condemnation was a mixture of negative feelings about Uyghur mínkăohàn language 
practices, consisting of censure directed at the person for not using “their” language in 
communicative contexts absent of Han Chinese and disapproval of not maintaining group 
solidarity (i.e. low ethnic consciousness). 
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Some Uyghurs may believe that Mandarin-dominant Uyghurs are making 
conscious decisions to use Mandarin instead of Uyghur. In fact, the Mandarin-dominant 
Uyghur may not possess the skill to communicate in Uyghur. Thus, a language practice 
may be misidentified as indexing a particular allegiance when no such intention existed. 
All of my consultants were pessimistic toward the vitality of the Uyghur language, and 
predicted that this language will disappear within a few generations. 
When discussing the mínkăomín contempt for mínkăohàn, Messi once said that 
Uyghurs needed to question “why” mínkăohàn demonstrate markers of Han Chinese 
assimilation. However, this appeal for the examination of (socio-political and socio-
historical) factors occurred after discussions on the consequences of subtractive 
bilingualism for Uyghur mínkăohàn. I believe that during the course of our friendship, 
Messi became more sensitive and sympathetic toward Uyghur mínkăohàn. 
Mike identified a subgroup of Mandarin-dominant Uyghurs as “hànkăohàn,” an 
epithet that cuts to the core of ethnolinguistic identity. It connotes that you possess only 
the façade of a Uyghur – that you are essentially Han Chinese. Here, language is almost 
secondary because it is a given that a Han Chinese would be a Mandarin-speaker. The 
existence of this epithet is remarkable because there must have been some critical mass to 
provoke its inception. Mike’s etymology also deserves remark because it emphasizes the 
importance of the relativity of context to considerations of Han Chinese assimilation. 
Mike was considered “half Uyghur, half Han Chinese” by a friend while in their 
hometown, but once these two men relocated to Urumchi, his friend encountered 
Urumchiliq Uyghur mínkăohàn – individuals who displayed more Han Chinese linguistic 
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and cultural traits. This experience forced Mike’s hometown friend to restructure his 
conception of Han Chinese assimilation and reposition Mike as less-Han Chinese than 
Urumchiliq Uyghur mínkăohàn on his Sinification continuum scale. 
When discussing assimilation, my consultants expressed not only linguistic 
anxiety, but anxiety over the loss of Uyghur ways of speaking. Messi indicated that 
Uyghur mínkăohàn often do not say Essalamueleykum (Peace be upon you) when they 
cross a threshold into a house. He lamented that mínkăohàn “don’t follow these rules.” 
He attributed this behavior to Han Chinese socialization, habitus structured through 
interactions with Han Chinese at school. However, Messi added that senior family 
members do have the power to influence practices. Mike pointed out that Uyghurs had a 
particular metaphorical style of speaking and could identify a mínkăohàn on account of 
not using a poetic style, and favoring directness when communicating. 
Möshük and Mike were both mínkăohàn, but their conception of this term 
differed. Möshük’s conception of mínkăohàn was somewhat negative. She said, “Neither 
Chinese nor Uyghurs accept us. It is said mínkăohàn group is a separate ethnic. Chinese 
are afraid of us, because we are smarter, stronger, more open, we are getting into 
advanced level in Uyghur world. While Uyghurs, I mean mínkăomín, are jealous of us, 
because we can speak Chinese fluently, we know more modern technology and so on. So 
we are getting into an embarrassing position.” Mike appraisal of mínkăohàn was neutral. 
He was educated in Mandarin, but due to the dense Uyghur social network in his 
hometown neighborhood, his education did not result in feelings of alienation from his 
ethnicity. 
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Möshük and Mike also expressed different perspectives on assimilation. Möshük 
felt that she had been assimilated, that “Mínkăohàn Uyghurs have been assimilated in 
behaviors, dress, appearance and language… From going to school with [Han Chinese] 
and being with them all the time, I’ve become like them.” As to how she felt about this, 
she said, “Sometimes it’s okay. Sometimes I feel disgust. I feel bad. Some of my 
weakness from Chinese, like pouring food on table.” Mike, conversely, rejected the 
proposition that he had been assimilated. He even asserted that he used Uyghur more 
expertly than some mínkăomín because he could chaq-chaq (joke) better than them. 
Möshük and Mike demonstrate that it is a fallacy to automatically associate mínkăohàn 
with Han Chinese assimilation. There is a tendency for some Uyghurs to flatly 
characterize Uyghur mínkăohàn as “the 57th ethnic group.” Aside from being a simple 
insult, this condemnation, as said by Messi, comes at the peril of dividing the Uyghur 
community. 
Uyghur young adults are in a difficult position because they possess the linguistic 
capital (i.e. Mandarin language competence) requisite for exchange on the Xinjiang 
(increasingly Han Chinese) market, but ethnic discrimination undermines the value of 
this currency, negating their ability to reap profit. Concurrently, as a result of the 
processes of language attrition and incomplete language acquisition, some Uyghur 
mínkăohàn have a depleted stock of Uyghur linguistic capital. The following examination 
of the Mandarinization of the Xinjiang education system, along with CCP rhetorical 
support of this policy, seeks to explore the experience and perspective of “illegitimate” 
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speakers of a “legitimate” language who are residing in a social context where symbolic 
power is unequally distributed (Bourdieu, 1977a, p. 648). 
The Uyghur-Han Chinese school consolidation movement intensified in 2004 
(Dwyer, 2005; Radio Free Asia, 2004). When Uyghurs are placed in a majority Han 
Chinese school, as was Messi’s case, laws permitting Uyghur as a language of instruction 
can be circumvented (Bewicke, 2009). Messi’s teacher put it bluntly, “Our education is 
facing a really big threat because you guys are the experiment of the changing.” Messi 
offered a metaphor comparing Uyghur students to white rats in a science experiment. 
Messi suggested that the purpose of this experiment was “assimilation, to be one China.” 
The CCP claims that Mandarin proficiency will help ethnic minority students be 
“more competitive in the workplace” (Jia, 2009a). My four consultants challenged this 
assertion. They stated that a Han Chinese job applicant would be selected over a Uyghur 
job applicant if both possessed equivalent qualifications and language skills. Some of my 
consultants felt that Han Chinese job applicants had better employment prospects over 
Uyghur competitors who possessed better qualifications and language skills.54  
Möshük said, “The Chinese government say they want to offer jobs for Uyghurs 
so Uyghurs must learn Chinese. So they produce mínkăohàn.” She was doubtful of the 
CCP’s altruistic motive because “Uyghurs have no jobs now.” She concluded, “They 
                                                
54 Möshük stated that discrimination was a fact of life in Xinjiang, with “nationalities discrimination and 
sex discrimination” being the most prevalent. She said if she were to compete for a job with a Han Chinese 
woman, “they must take the Chinese girl because I am Uyghur, they don’t want me.” If she were in 
competition with a man, she asserted that the man would be selected over her. However, she claimed that a 
Han Chinese woman would be selected over a Uyghur man, indicating that ethnic discrimination was more 
pronounced than sex discrimination. 
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want to kill us, kill our language. Gradually change us to Chinese so we never give them 
trouble because we will be Chinese one day.” Here Möshük described a form of top-
down language death (Nettle & Romaine, 2000). 
All of these responses indicated ethnic discrimination in hiring practices, 
something thoroughly documented by the Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China (2006a, 2009b, 2009d). In the past, scholars have suggested that “Han bosses 
discriminate in favor of workers with whom they share a language and culture” (Wiemar, 
2004, p. 188), but the contemporary situation differs in that many Uyghurs are proficient 
in Mandarin. Uyghur young adults possess Mandarin linguistic capital, but ethnic 
discrimination undermines the currency of this capital and disrupts its conversion into 
other types of capital (Bourdieu, 1991). Uyghurs accept that their language has no value 
in the current Han Chinese system and have agreed to invest in the development of 
Mandarin, the “legitimate” form of linguistic capital, but as “illegitimate” speakers are 
seeing little return on their investment.  
One explanation for the durability of ethnic discrimination in Han Chinese society 
might be found in the Marxist categorization of the stages of societal development 
(Harrell, 1995). On this scale, ethnic groups are ranked according to level of 
development. For example, Han Chinese are ranked above Uyghurs because Han Chinese 
possess more of the symbolic capital of “development.” This societal development scale 
is pernicious because it lends “scientific” validity to Han chauvinism. This conception of 
societal development is a structuring structure because it engenders a mental disposition, 
what might be called a “hierarchical way-of-thinking.” 
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This is a useful entry point when interpreting certain statements from Xinjiang 
CCP officials, such as “The languages of the minority nationalities have very small 
capacities and do not contain many of the expressions in modern science and technology, 
which makes education in these concepts impossible” (Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service, 2002). According to this mode of thought, languages exist on a hierarchical 
scale, with some having more or less inherent capacity. This is form of symbolic violence 
against minority languages. 
Xinjiang CCP officials have tied Mandarin proficiency to campaigns promoting 
patriotism, ethnic unity and stability (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
2009a, 2010b), explicitly linking Mandarin language education to the fight against 
terrorism. In June 2009, Xinjiang CCP chairperson Nur Bekri stated that “[t]errorists 
from neighboring countries mainly target [Uyghurs] that are relatively isolated from 
mainstream society as they cannot speak Mandarin. They are then tricked into terrorist 
activities” (Jia, 2009b). I argue that when the mother tongue of an ethnic minority group 
is criminalized through association and conflation with terrorism, the members of the 
targeted community may be compelled to abandon their language as a symbolic gesture 
to affirm non-criminality. The supposed inverse relationship assigned to Mandarin 
language proficiency and terrorist potential has placed the Uyghur language in a 
precarious position. 
All of the consultants perceived that the linguistic market of Xinjiang was biased 
in favor of Han Chinese speakers of Mandarin; they believed that their Mandarin 
language competency was undermined by their “illegitimacy” as speakers (Bourdieu, 
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1991). Consistent with Benson (2004), I found that my highly-educated consultants had 
high expectations, yet were unable to convert their academic capital into economic 
capital (Bourdieu, 1984). Messi, Möshük and Mike expressed a desire to leave Xinjiang 
and China, to escape a context where symbolic power was unequally distributed. Athena 
harbored this desire at an earlier time in her life, but this aspiration has weakened because 
of financial concerns.55 Messi, Möshük and Mike indicated that their drive to learn 
English was sustained by an instrumental motivation (Gardner & Lambert, 1972) – the 
desire to emigrate to a Western, Anglophone country where employment prospects might 
not be undermined by ethnic discrimination. Messi, Möshük and Mike all indicated a 
willingness to teach Mandarin abroad, signaling no animosity toward the Mandarin 
language per se.  
All of my consultants displayed a combination of local/ethnic Uyghur and 
Western idealist interests and affiliations (Dörnyei, 2005; Lamb, 2004; Bonny Norton, 
2000). They identified with Western ideals and expressed fondness for Western, 
Anglophone culture; these positive feelings, and the desire to index affiliation with 
Western, Anglophone speech communities, may have contributed toward an integrative 
motivation to learn English (Gardner, 1985; Gardner & Lambert, 1972). The strength of 
this identification may be reactionary to the bombardment of “messages calculated to 
heighten [Chinese] national pride” that students are subjected to at school (Vickers, 2009, 
p. 79). Teachers are expected to inculcate patriotism and develop students’ identification 
                                                
55 Other social factors may be at play here. Uyghur parents are sometimes reluctant to allow daughters to 
go far from home. 
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with collective national achievements, goals and interests, but, instead of absorbing these 
messages, some Uyghurs reject (or resist) them. Uyghurs may be positioning Western 
ideals (e.g. democracy, human rights and freedoms of religion, speech, press, assembly) 
as a counterbalance to the Chinese state.56 This is a case of something strange happening 
on the way to Hanification.  
Future research might explore how colonized or minority ethnolinguistic 
communities index their ethnic identity after they have lost their language. All of the 
consultants identified language as an important, if not the most important, marker of 
Uyghur ethnic identity. Messi strongly supported the notion that Uyghur cultural 
practices, ways of thinking and ways of being, must be habitualized through the medium 
of Uyghur. The strength of his assertion may have been buttressed by a reactionary stance 
toward one of the “benefits” of the mastery of Mandarin, that “minorities can teach Han 
Chinese about minority culture through Mandarin.” Möshük had a more nuanced 
perspective, recognizing that “culture includes many parts. Language is most important. 
But without language you can still teach customs, habits and taboos.” 
Möshük, having limited Uyghur language skills, indexed her Uyghur ethnic 
identity through many other practices including cleanliness (e.g. use of personal spoons 
and chopsticks in “Chinese” restaurants), diet (e.g. avoidance of pork), and food 
                                                
56 On one occasion, I was with a friend, a Uyghur young man, at a bar. During our conversation, he told 
me that he wanted to go to the U.S., “because in the U.S., you can speak what is on your mind.” Later that 
evening, while we were in a taxi, I asked him what happens to people who speak their mind in Xinjiang. He 
said, “They will put you in a cage.” To emphasize his point, he pulled on the bars that partitioned the front 
and back areas of the cab. That image of an animal in captivity has remained with me. 
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consumption (e.g. refusal to eat or drink while walking)57 and storage (e.g. bread placed 
crust-side down). Möshük explained all of these practices as parts of Uyghur culture and 
was resolute to maintain them. Chen’s study of Muslim Uyghur Students in a Chinese 
Boarding School (2009) does identify a set of durable Uyghur social practices as 
mitigating again Han Chinese assimilation, an approach that deserves replication in 
settings throughout Xinjiang. 
6.4 WHAT CAN BE DONE? 
The Uyghur speech community of Xinjiang faces a number of challenges to the 
intergenerational transmission of the Uyghur language. The primary challenges can be 
classified as assimilation via dilution, where through a twin-channel influx of Han 
Chinese and exodus of Uyghur, Uyghurs are increasingly surrounded by a mostly-Han 
Chinese population that does not speak Uyghur, and for the most part, has no need to 
learn this language. Uyghurs are compelled to linguistically accommodate Han Chinese 
because Han Chinese are the dominant ethnic community, empowered by their 
association with the CCP civilizing center, and Mandarin is the legitimate language of the 
PRC (Bourdieu, 1991; Harrell, 1995). 
A second major threat to the intergenerational transmission of Uyghur is unstable 
diglossia, a condition that has resulted from the dislocation of Uyghur as a language of 
instruction in the Xinjiang education system. In the scholastic domain, Uyghur 
mínkăohàn are educated entirely in Mandarin; Uyghurs educated in bilingual schools 
                                                
57 In Uyghur culture, one must eat or drink while seated because to lose any of the food or spill any of the 
drink would cause offence to Allah (God), who provided that nourishment. 
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learn core subjects in Mandarin and Uyghur as a second language. Uyghur is not a 
component of the college-entrance exam, and consequently has lower status than tested 
subjects. This devaluation of Uyghur in the scholastic domain threatens the vitality of the 
language because Mandarin, as the dominant language of instruction, is being positioned 
as the language of educational and economic opportunity. Another consequence of 
mínkăohàn and bilingual education is that Uyghurs are becoming more comfortable in 
Mandarin, are code-switching from Uyghur to Mandarin, and some Uyghur lexical items 
are being replaced by Mandarin borrowings. 
So what can be done to maintain the vitality of the Uyghur language, and to 
ensure that this threatened language does not become an endangered language? Here, I 
invoke Blommaert’s ethnographic-sociolinguistic approach to linguistic rights whereby 
the author argues that scholars take a hard look at a language as used in a given society, 
and utilize ethnographic data as a starting point from which to discuss what can actually 
be done, as opposed to starting with an ideal or static conception of language in society 
(2005). This perspective compliments Bourdieu’s historicized and diachronic 
understanding of language because suggestions of activities to sustain language practices 
(i.e. interventions) must consider the socio-historical and socio-political context if they 
are to have any chance for applicability. In the following paragraph, I critique approaches 
to CCP language policy in the Xinjiang education system that invoke national legislation 
or international treaties and agreements, or PRC President Hu Jintao’s socio-economic 
vision of a xiǎokāng (basically well-off) and héxié shèhuì (harmonious society) (W. Chen 
& Zhong, 2004). I then present three tactics for the maintenance of Uyghur language 
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vitality, all at the level of the family unit (Spolsky, 2005), and one program that I feel 
would be possible to implement. 
Many scholars and human rights activists recognize that by forcing Uyghur 
children to study in Mandarin, a language that is not their mother tongue, the CCP 
violates its own laws and agreements, including Article 4 of the PRC Constitution, the 
Compulsory Education Law and the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (Chinese 
Communist Party, 1984, 2005). The CCP has also signed and ratified a number of 
multilateral treaties and agreements which protect the language rights of ethnic 
minorities, including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, (Bewicke, 2009; Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2009b). CCP 
language policy in the Xinjiang education system does violate the linguistic rights of 
Uyghurs because the Uyghur linguistic community was not consulted as to whether or 
not they desired for Mandarin or Uyghur to be the language of instruction. In the 
Xinjiang education system, Mandarin was imposed by CCP edict.  
Suggestions have been made that the CCP or international community intervenes 
in order to protect the Uyghur language (Bewicke, 2009; Uyghur Human Rights Project, 
2009b). Recommendations include appeals to the CCP to maintain existing schools, from 
pre-school to the university level, that use Uyghur as a language of instruction; to 
reinstate Uyghur as a language of instruction in schools that have adopted other language 
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education formats; to expand Uyghur as a language of instruction to additional schools; 
to promote Uyghur language learning among non-Uyghur populations, including core 
academic classes offered in both languages. These policies would allow for the return of 
a segregated Uyghur and Chinese education system, developments that some suggest 
would improve ethnic relations and enable social stability in Xinjiang. 
An ethnographic-sociolinguistic approach to linguistic rights begins with a 
consideration of the socio-historical and socio-political context of a given language. For 
the Uyghur language, a historicized and diachronic description must take into account the 
priorities of the CCP: economic development, the maintenance of territorial integrity, and 
the achievement of harmonious society (Bovingdon, 2004a; Fan, 2006; Fravel, 2008). 
Appeals for the protection of Uyghur linguistic rights that invoke national legislation or 
international treaties and agreements are likely to go nowhere. The concept of “law” in 
China is a fascinating and complicated topic involving debates between Confucian and 
Legalist schools of thought, and conflict between the rule of law and the rule of the 
Communist Party. Orts calls the nature of law in China deeply “ambiguous” (2000). 
“Laws are seen as a way to manage the economy and people’s lives, rarely to protect 
them from the state or enshrine individual rights” (BBC, 2011). 
The second approach links the re-establishment of Uyghur as a language of 
instruction in the Xinjiang education system with the alleviation of tension and advance 
toward a basically well-off (i.e. moderately prosperous) and harmonious society. I find it 
highly unlikely that the CCP will reverse the Mandaranization of the Xinjiang education 
system, a policy that is being supported by substantial financial investment 
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(Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2010b; Jia, 2009a). My conviction is 
that the CCP is cognizant that the twin forces of Han Chinese colonization, along with 
increasing competition for scare resources will result in some social discord, but is 
willing to tolerate this condition as a temporary friction on the way to achieving ethnic 
integration and national unity.  
Consistent with Fishman (1972), I argue that Uyghur families should take an 
active role in maintaining the intergenerational transmission of Uyghur. I support this 
position, in part, because it seems more viable than calling on the CCP or international 
community to intervene and enforce a language policy for Uyghur that is consistent with 
the guarantees provided in national legislation and ratified international treaties and 
agreements. In the words of Athena, “Parents are your first teachers – not the teachers at 
school.” The domestic field is a domain where language competence is developed and 
language practices are naturalized as habitus (Bourdieu, 1991). In a context characterized 
by unstable diglossia (Fishman, 1972), the legitimate, dominant language may encroach 
upon the illegitimate language through a variety of linguistic processes, including, as 
demonstrated by this study, lexical borrowing and code-switching. Therefore, if a 
linguistic community is interested in maintaining the vitality of their language, they must 
adopt a language policy situating the illegitimate language as the primary language of the 
domestic field (Spolsky, 2005). 
The family can do this by exercising the traditional four basic language skills: 
speaking, listening, reading and writing. Parents interested in transmitting their language 
should speak in this language and require their children to do the same. If parents fail to 
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require their children to speak in the language, they will possibly become receptive 
bilinguals of the language (Romaine, 1995); if children do not practice using the 
language, the vitality will be compromised. Receptive bilinguals may understand a 
language but do not produce it comfortably (C. Myers-Scotton, 2006), a condition that 
would be problematic for the transmission of language to subsequent generations. 
Listening is coupled with speaking in interpersonal communication; through this practice, 
children (learners) learn to discriminate between sounds, recognize words, identify 
grammatical groupings of words, identify expressions and sets of utterances that act to 
create meaning, connect linguistic cues to non-linguistic and paralinguistic cues and use 
background knowledge to predict and later to confirm meaning and recall important 
words and ideas (Rost, 1990). 
Parents must make an effort to transmit literacy skills. It is not enough to do as 
Möshük’s father, to recognize the importance of Uyghur literacy skills, but do nothing to 
help develop these skills. Nor can a parent, like Mike’s mom, simply hand an alphabet 
book to a child, and expect the child to learn to read and write. Uyghur parents must read 
to their children and teach their children to read Uyghur, and the associated set of skills 
including phonological awareness, phonics (decoding), fluency, comprehension, and 
vocabulary (National Reading Panel, 2000). Uyghur parents must teach their children the 
Uyghur alphabet and the symbols representing individual language sounds. Parents must 
model reading practices, make books available in the home, and provide bracketed 
periods of time for free voluntary reading (Krashen, 2004). To foster writing skills, 
Uyghur parents should devise a home literacy plan (Tse, 2001), however, given the 
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intense requirements of school, it seems impractical to expect that parent or child to 
maintain a writing plan. In a context where a linguistic community possessed basic 
human rights, such as freedom of religion, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, a 
community language school, operated by educators and retirees, might be a practical 
suggestion for instruction and the intergenerational transmission of literacy skills. An 
international organization might assist the development of writing skills among Uyghurs 
by organizing an essay competition, divided by grade-levels with winners awarded cash 
prizes and certificates of participation. 
Linguists, educators and activists might provide assistance to the Uyghur speech 
community of Xinjiang by providing basic linguistic and pedagogical training (UNESCO 
Ad Hoc Expert Group on Endangered Languages, 2003). Parents might be provided texts 
on basic Uyghur linguistics, teaching methods and techniques, curriculum development 
and teaching materials development. Information must be disseminated in order to dispel 
misconceptions about bilingualism and bilinguals, such as bilingualism will delay 
language acquisition, a fear that bilingual children will mix or confuse their languages, or 
that bilingualism will negatively effect cognitive development (François Grosjean, 2010). 
While these misconceptions are typical, research must identify the specific reasons why 
Uyghur parents are not passing down Uyghur literacy skills. Linguists, educators and 
activists must supply that information and knowledge that will help parents feel confident 
assuming the role of language teacher. 
Uyghur primary and secondary school teachers might invest in approaches to 
support Uyghur language development among their student populations. One activity 
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might target Uyghur mínkăohàn, students who receive no Uyghur language education. 
Uyghur teachers may volunteer to teach Uyghur language skills (e.g. reading, spelling, 
literature, and composition) to Uyghur mínkăohàn. To ensure that this is a community 
effort, and to spread the teaching load, the Uyghur teachers might work as a team, with 
one teacher focusing on one aspect, each day a week. A second approach might be, for 
Uyghur literature arts teachers of Uyghur mínkăomín students, to create a classroom 
atmosphere where the Uyghur language is part of a culturally relevant curriculum 
(Spring, 1994). Teachers may utilize content-based instruction consisting of texts on 
Uyghur heroes, Uyghur historical figures and famous contemporary Uyghurs; family 
history research; and reflective writing (where students write about beliefs and cultural 
assumptions). 
The research community, including university professors based in Xinjiang, might 
take several approaches to support the use of Uyghur as the main medium of education 
for Uyghur first-language students. The first approach might include referencing recent 
research on mother–tongue medium education in discussions with education officials. 
Important studies to cite include Thomas and Collier’s (2002) longitudinal study of 
210,000 minority students in rural and urban settings in the U.S., which found that among 
many different education models, “the strongest predictor of L2 student achievement is 
the amount of formal L1 schooling. The more L1 grade-level schooling, the higher L2 
achievement” (p. 7); and Ramirez’s (1991) study which found that among 2,352 students 
grouped into English only, early-exit (one or two years of Spanish-medium education, 
followed by a transition to English-medium education), and late-exit (four to six years of 
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Spanish-medium education, followed by a transition to English-medium education) 
programs, the last-exit group achieved the best results in English and in educational 
achievement in general. A second approach might entail conducting empirical 
comparative studies where the role of language teaching is a variable. The variety of 
bilingual education programs in Xinjiang would provide for rich comparison. A third 
tactic might include lobbying the central government to include a minority language (e.g. 
Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Mongolian, Xibe, Salar…etc.) as a component of the college 
entrance exam. If minority language competency is part of the college entrance exam, 
this will function to elevate the status of minority languages, and encourage Han Chinese 
and other minority students to develop competence in a minority language. In closing, I 
advocate an approach in line with Strawbridge (2008), who stated, “working within the 
system, and in collaboration with government partners in Xinjiang…is the best way to 
influence regional bilingual education practices, and bring changes that help to restore the 
place of mother tongue in Xinjiang minority schools and communities.” 
6.5 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
Different factors limited my ability to effectively answer my research questions. 
The first is related to access to different settings. As a Western researcher, I did not have 
access to some spaces that would have provided rich information on language practices in 
multi-ethnic and multilingual settings. I could not embed myself naturally in dormitories 
and classrooms. For information about language practices in these naturalistic spaces, I 
had to rely on reported data. To address this limitation, I suggest replication by a Uyghur 
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researcher. A Uyghur researcher, fluent in both Uyghur and Mandarin, would be able to 
observe the language practices of friends, peers and relatives, in a wider variety of 
settings. An insider would also have a wealth of a cultural knowledge with which to 
recognize and describe subtleties associated with how Uyghurs use language to index 
identities (e.g. political, gender, ethnic…etc.). 
A second limitation concerns the type of consultant who contributed to this study. 
The data gathered in this study was not based on large, randomly sampled populations; I 
selected participants purposefully (Patton, 2002). All of the consultants were college or 
university students. All of the case study participants came from urban, middle-class 
homes where at least one parent was college-educated. The case study participants were 
all multilingual, fluent in English, Uyghur and Chinese. While these individuals 
represented a certain class of urban, financially stable, and educated Uyghur young 
adults, data on the language practices from other populations of Uyghur young adults 
would complement the present study.  
A third limitation is related to access to the CCP decision making process that 
dictates language policy in Xinjiang. As this study explored the language ecology of 
Xinjiang, including political conditions, a more robust study would have included a state-
level perspective. However, CCP deliberations on language policy are not part of the 
public record. CCP language policy and ideology can only be inferred from the prepared 
statements of public officials, anecdotal evidence, and promulgation. 
A fourth limitation of the study is related to the scope of the area under 
investigation. This study was situated in Urumchi. Future studies might explore a variety 
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of local language ecologies in Xinjiang in order to achieve a more comprehensive 
understanding of the particular historical, political and cultural currents that influence 
language practices. 
6.6 FINAL THOUGHTS 
 The ideology of a common national language as bound to a national culture, and 
requisite for modernization and economic progress, came into existence with the rise of 
the 19th century European nation-state (Nettle & Romaine, 2000). The nation-state, a type 
of imagined community, was imposed by colonial force around the globe (B. Anderson, 
1983). As of 2011, there are 204 internationally recognized sovereign and independent 
states. Compare that figure with 6,909 – the number of living languages catalogued by 
SIL International (Lewis, 2009). A nation-state ideology that promotes a single language 
per state does not bode well for minority languages lacking institutional support 
(Fishman, 1989; Woolard & Schieffelin, 1994).58 
This dissertation is a product of applied linguistics, “the academic discipline 
concerned with the relation of knowledge about language to decision making in the real 
world” (Cook, 2003). This study demonstrates how socio-historical and socio-political 
forces contribute to the devaluation of minority linguistic capital in a linguistic market, 
and how a language policy in the domestic field, as the primary structuring structure, may 
be utilized to stabilize diglossia and maintain the intergenerational transmission of a 
minority language. National governments and international organizations should not be 
                                                
58 Krauss concluded after a numerical review that “the coming century will see either the death or the 
doom of 90% of mankind’s languages,” meaning that only about 600 are safe (1992). 
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relied upon too strongly to maintain the vitality of minority languages – the family unit 
should take this responsibility. This knowledge may prove useful to those who feel that 
linguistic diversity is an important component of human heritage, those interested in 
patterns of language shift and resistance. Finally, I hope that the members of minority 
linguistic communities use this knowledge in order to make informed decisions on 
language practices.
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol #1 
1. What language(s) did you use with your family at home? 
2. What language are you most fluent in (i.e. your strongest language)? 
3. Was your class mínkăohàn, mínkăomín, or bilingual? If you attended different 
types of schools, please describe the transition. 
4. What language(s) did you use with your friends at school? 
5. Do you think that fluency in pǔtōnghuà will help you get a job after graduation? 
6. A mínkăohàn told me that even though her Uyghur is poor, she still strongly 
identifies as Uyghur. But some say that mínkăohàn are just like Chinese. How do 
you feel about that? 
7. Do you ever feel that mínkăohàn are a separate ethnic group, different from 
Chinese and Uyghur? 
8. If you have children, what types of school(s) will you send them to? 
9. *For mínkăohàn and bilingual educated students: How was your experience with 
Mandarin as the language of instruction? 
10. *For mínkăohàn and bilingual educated students: What was the decision-making 
process that resulted in you attending such schools?
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol #2 
Family background (28 questions) 
 
1. Where are your father and the paternal side of your family from?  
2. Was your father mínkăohàn or mínkăomín? 
3. What language(s) does your father speak/write? 
4. How was he employed? 
5. How do you address your father? 
6. Do you have any nicknames, or know of any nicknames, for your father? 
7. Where were your paternal grandparents born? 
8. How were your paternal grandparents educated? 
9. What language(s) do your paternal grandparents speak/write? 
10. Where are your mother and the maternal side of your family from?  
11. Was your mother mínkăohàn or mínkăomín? 
12. What language(s) does your mother speak/write? 
13. How was she employed? 
14. How do you address your mother? 
15. Do you have any nicknames, or know of any nicknames, for your mother? 
16. Where were your maternal grandparents born? 
17. How were your maternal grandparents educated? 
18. What language(s) do your maternal grandparents speak/write? 
19. What types of social events do your parents participate in? 
20. Does your mother or father perform any rituals or activities that are specific to 
your culture? 
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21. Do you have any siblings? 
22. Do they have any nicknames? 
23. Describe their education. Did it differ from your own? 
24. What are they doing now? 
25. How does your family celebrate traditional Uyghur holidays? 
26. Do you attend class during traditional Uyghur holidays? 
27. Is it a custom in your family to pray upon completing a meal?  
28. Do you fast during Ramadan? 
Language Practices: Domestic field (11 questions) 
 
1. What is the significance of your name? 
2. Did your parents have any policies about language use at home? 
3. Did your parents teach you to read and write in your mother tongue? 
4. What language(s) do you use at home? 
5. What is the balance of languages used? 
6. Does code-switching occur? (If yes, solicit an example) 
7. What are family members’ perceptions on code-switching? 
8. Does linguistic behavior change if/when other interlocutors are around? 
9. What types of variables influence choices regarding language use at home?  
10. Describe the neighborhood and your neighbors. 
11. What languages did you use with neighbors? 
Language Practices: Academic field (27 questions) 
 
Kindergarten 
 
1. Where did you attend kindergarten? 
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2. What was the language of instruction? 
3. What was the ethnicity of your teacher/classmates/friends? 
4. Describe the home to kindergarten transition. 
5. Were there any linguistic or cultural issues in this transition? 
Primary school 
 
6. Where did you attend primary school? 
7. What was the language of instruction? 
8. What was the ethnicity of your teacher/classmates/friends? 
9. Why did your parents choose a mínkăohàn or mínkăomín education? 
10. What did you learn about Uyghur culture? 
11. Do you remember any teacher-talk about language? 
Junior secondary school 
 
12. Where did you attend middle school? 
13. What was the language of instruction? 
14. What was the ethnicity of your teacher/classmates/friends? 
15. What did you learn about Uyghur culture? 
16. Do you remember any teacher-talk about language? 
Senior secondary school 
 
17. Where did you attend high school? 
18. What was the language of instruction? 
19. What was the ethnicity of your teacher/classmates/friends? 
20. What did you learn about Uyghur culture? 
21. Do you remember any teacher-talk about language? 
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22. Did you choose the Science or Liberal Arts track? 
23. Which version of gāokăo did you take? 
College/University 
 
24. Where do you attend college/university? 
25. What is your major? 
26. What is the language of instruction? 
27. What is the ethnicity of your teacher/classmates/friends? 
Language Practices: Dormitory (6 questions) 
 
1. What languages are used in your dormitory? 
2. If multiple languages are used, what is the balance? 
3. Does code-switching occur? 
4. What are roommates’ perceptions on code-switching? 
5. Does linguistic behavior change if/when other interlocutors are around? 
6. What types of variables influence choices regarding language use in your 
dormitory? 
Language competence self-assessment (4 questions) 
 
1. Assess your Uyghur, English and Chinese levels of proficiency in four skill areas 
(reading, writing, listening and speaking).  
2. What language can you best express your emotions in?  
3. If you were in a new city and got lost, what language would you feel most 
comfortable receiving directions in? 
4. If you see a street sign in Uyghur, Chinese and English, which language (script) 
would you read?  
Language practices: Private domains (4 questions) 
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1. What script do you text in? 
2. Do you prefer the Yëngi Yezik (Latin), Kona Yekiz (Modern Arabic) or UKY 
script? 
3. If you had or have a romantic partner (e.g. boyfriend, girlfriend, husband or wife), 
and you were to call them using a “term of endearment,” what word would you 
most likely use and in what language? 
4. Of television viewing, what percentage is in Uyghur, Chinese and English? 
Perceptions of mínkăomín and mínkăohàn (8 questions) 
 
1. What are your ideas about mínkăohàn and mínkăomín? 
2. Are mínkăohàn a separate ethnic group? 
3. Why might some people think that mínkăohàn have been assimilated? 
4. Do mínkăohàn and mínkăomín have equal opportunities for employment? 
5. If you were a parent, given the available options, what type of school would you 
send your child to? 
6. If any choice was available, what type of language education would you choose 
for your child? 
7. What is the future of the Uyghur language? 
8. Is it possible to transmit culture without language? 
Online activities (2 questions) 
 
1. Do you regularly visit any Uyghur-script websites? 
2. Do you use social networks to connect with other Uyghurs? 
  
Future and aspirations (3 questions) 
 
1. Where do you want to live? 
2. What profession do you want to enter? 
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3. Do you imagine that your language practices will change in the future? 
4. What is your conception of fate?
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Appendix C: Expressive vocabulary assessment 
Instructions: In the space provided, write the Uyghur word for the item. You can write in 
Uyghur or Roman script. Spelling doesn’t matter. Do not use a dictionary or ask a friend 
for help. This exercise is to be done alone. If you don’t know the Uyghur word, write 
down the Chinese or English word. If you can’t identify the item, write an “X” on the 
space. 
 
تۆDەندٮكٮل%.نٮڭ ئۇ9غۇ.چ% ئٮسمٮنى 89زٮڭ*لوغ%تك% قا.ٮمما+*خ%قتٮن سو.ٮما+*مۇست%ققٮل 
3@زٮڭ.ئ%گ%$ بٮلمٮسٮڭٮز خ%نز)چٮسٮنى 3اكى ئٮنگٮلٮسچٮسٮن 3اسسٮڭٮز بولٮد).ئ%گ%$ #"! 
 نى ,ا*سٮڭٮز بولٮد!‹x›بٮلمٮسٮڭٮز
 
O7ib'n8%Z^dp3h2 `pM=Jq
KK%Yf4C{{ `=$Js@[S0dB+_j
>IUXo;VeGW`pzg2`\JyQ;V
(&P^17ib8%“X”/2 
 
SECTION 1: ANIMALS 
 (ا)ۋ&ناتال!
*^ 
1.  2.  3.   4.  
______________   ______________  ______________ ______________  
5.  6.  7.  8.  
______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ 
9.  10.  11.  12.  
______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ 
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SECTION 2: BODY & FACE 
ب$#ە! #ۈ!-  
&< 
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SECTION 3: FAMILY 
 ئائٮل!
?D? 
 
 
 
 
1. ________________________ 
 
2. ________________________ 
 
3. ________________________ 
 
4. ________________________ 
 
5. ________________________ 
 
6. ________________________ 
 
7. ________________________ 
 
8. ________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. ________________________ 
 
10. ________________________ 
 
11. ________________________ 
 
12. ________________________ 
 
13. ________________________ 
 
14. ________________________ 
 
15. ________________________ 
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Section 4: Nature 
 ت"بٮئ"!
v] 
 
1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  
  __________   __________    __________   __________        ___________ 
 
6. 7. 8. 9. 10.  
  ___________   ___________   ___________   ___________ ___________ 
 
11.  12. 13.  14. 15.   
  ___________    ___________    ___________    __________  ___________ 
 
16. 17. 18. 19. 20.  
   ___________   ___________    ___________   ___________   ___________ 
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SECTION 5: FOOD 
 'ٮم%كلٮك
^ 
 
1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  
__________    __________  __________  __________     __________ 
 
6.  7.  8.  9.  10.  
   __________       __________     __________   __________   __________ 
 
11.  12.  13. 14.  15.  
   _________    __________      __________   __________       __________ 
 
 16.  17.  18.  19.  
     __________     __________     __________        __________ 
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SECTION 6: JOBS 
 خٮزم"تل"!
t 
 
1.    2.    3.    4.    5.  
 ___________  ___________   ___________   ___________   ___________ 
 
6.   7.    8.    9.  10.  
___________  ___________  ___________    ___________   ___________ 
 
11.  12.  13. 14.  15.  
 ___________    ___________   ___________   ___________  ___________ 
  
16.  17.  18.  19.  20.  
 ___________  ___________   ___________      ___________   ___________ 
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SECTION 7: FURNITURE & APPLIANCES 
سا)مانلٮر! ئۆ!  
?#&?a 
1.   2.     3.   4.   
___________       ___________       ___________         ___________ 
 
5.  6.    7.      8.  
___________        ___________    ___________          ___________ 
 
9.  10.  11.  12.  
___________        ___________        ___________     ___________ 
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SECTION 8: TRANSPORTATION 
قو'&للٮر! تر'نسپو"!  
A# 
 
1.   2.   3.   4.  
___________        ___________       ___________       ___________ 
 
5.   6.   7.   8.   
___________    ___________           ___________       ___________ 
 
9.   10.  11.  12.  
___________         ___________       ___________       ___________ 
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SECTION 9: NUMBERS 
 سانال!
L=  
Instructions: Write down the number, in Uyghur, of the number of units. Again, spelling 
does not matter. If you don’t know the Uyghur word, write down the Chinese or English 
word. 
O7ib'n8`pM=zgZL=K%Yf4]{
;VeGW`pzg2]`\JyQ 
 
1. Number: 0  English: zero  Chinese:   Uyghur: __________ 
2. Number: 11  English: eleven Chinese: 	,	 Uyghur: __________  
3. Number: 22  English: twenty-two Chinese: , Uyghur: __________ 
4. Number: 33  English: thirty-three Chinese: , Uyghur: __________ 
5. Number: 44  English: forty-four Chinese: 5,5 Uyghur: __________ 
6. Number: 55  English: fifty-five Chinese: , Uyghur: __________ 
7. Number: 66  English: sixty-six Chinese: "," Uyghur: __________ 
8. Number: 77  English: seventy-seven Chinese: 
,
 Uyghur: __________ 
9. Number: 88  English: eighty-eight Chinese: !,! Uyghur: __________ 
10. Number: 99 English: ninety-nine Chinese: , Uyghur: __________ 
11. Number: 100 English: one hundred Chinese: 	c Uyghur: __________ 
12. Number: 1,000 English: one thousand   Chinese: 	- Uyghur: __________ 
13. Number: 1,000,000 English: one million  Chinese: 	c Uyghur: __________ 
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SECTION 10: COLORS 
 !ەڭل"!
x 
 
Instructions: Write down the color, in Uyghur. Again, spelling does not matter. If you 
don’t know the Uyghur word, write down the Chinese or English word. 
O7ib'n8`pM=zgxK%Yf4]{;V
eGW`pzg2]`\JyQ 
 
1. What is the color of this text?  
________________ 
Fmd=.)Px
d 
ۇ خ*تل*&نٮڭ &ەڭگى؟ب  
 
2. What is the color of this paper? 
________________ 
FmPxd   
   ق+غ+*نٮڭ &ەڭگى؟
3. What is the color of wood? 
________________ 
T:Pxd 
-اغاچنٮڭ &ەڭگى؟   
 
 
4. What is the color of the sky? 
________________ 
9iPxd 
ئاسمننٮڭ &ەڭگى؟
 
Please refer to the food items on page 6 to answer the following questions. 
rEk6d“^”6l 
 ب+تنى ئ$چٮپ 8ٮم+كلٮك+ قا-'& تۆ)ەندٮكٮل+-گ+ جا)'& ب$رٮڭ-6
 
5. What is the usual color of item 1? 
________________ 
k	^	wPxd 
1ئا%ەتت! گى؟#ەسٮمدٮكى ن)#سٮنٮڭ #ەڭ-  
 
6. What is the usual color of item 2? 
________________ 
k^	wPxd 
2ئا%ەتت! &ەسٮمدٮكى ن+&سٮنٮڭ &ەڭگى؟-  
 
7. What is the usual color of item 4? 
________________ 
k5^	wPxd 
4ئا%ەتت! &ەسٮمدٮكى ن+&سٮنٮڭ &ەڭگى؟-  
 
8. What is the usual color of item 7? 
________________ 
k
^	wPxd 
7ئا%ەتت! &ەسٮمدٮكى ن+&سٮنٮڭ &ەڭگى؟-
 
If you have any questions, comments or observations, please write them below or on the 
back of this page: 
كو*سٮڭٮز بولٮد! E&)كاندCD سۇئالٮڭٮز=پٮكٮرٮڭٮز=%اكى >ٮم&كچى بولغٮنٮڭٮزنى بولسا تۆ.ەندٮكى %&)گ& %$زٮپ : 
;VRH|J~}%7FmdNJu:
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Appendix D: Expressive vocabulary assessment key 
Section 1: Animals 
1. cat   ۈشۆم!     müshük 
2. dog   ئٮت    it 
3. horse   !ئا    at 
4. cow   كاال    kala 
5. snake   !ٮال$    yilan 
6. bird   !قۇشقا! ,قۇ   qush, qushqach 
7. fish   لٮقب$     bëliq 
8. monkey  !ما$مۇ    maymun 
9. rabbit   !توشقا    toshqan 
10. sheep   !قو    qoy 
11. dinosaur  !"#$ٮنو(    dinozawr 
12. spider   !ئۆمۈچۈ    ömüchük 
 
Section 2: Body and Face 
 
Body 
 
1. head   !با    bash 
2. ear   !قۇال    qulaq 
3. chest   !م$#دە  ,كۆكرە   kökrek, meyde 
4. elbow   !"ج"$ن    jeynek 
5. thigh   وتا$    yota 
6. leg, lower leg    !پاقالچا! ,پاچا   pachaq, paqalchaq 
7. ankle   !ئوشۇ    oshuq 
8. foot   !پۇ    put 
9. fingers   !با$ما    barmaq 
10. hand   !قو    qol 
11. shoulder  مۈ"ە    müre 
12. arm   !"بٮل    bilek 
13. stomach, belly  !قو$سا    qorsaq 
14. knee   تٮز    tiz 
  
Face 
 
1. hair   !چا    chach 
2. forehead  !پ%شان    pëshane 
3. eyebrow  !قا    qash 
4. eyelash  كٮرپٮك    kirpik 
5. eye   !كۆ    köz 
6. cheek   م$ڭٮز    mengiz 
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7. nose   !"#بۇ    burun 
8. lip   !كالپۇ    kalpuk 
9. teeth   چٮش    chish 
10. chin   !"ئ$ڭ    ëngek 
11. neck   !بو#ۇ    boyun 
 
Section 3: Family 
 
1. grandfather  !"!" #بو"! ,چو   chong dada, bowa 
2. grandmother  موما ,چو$ ئاپا ,چو$ ئانا  chong ana, chong apa, moma 
3. aunt   امما  ,كٮچٮك ئاپا ,چو$ ئاپا$   chong apa, kichik apa,hamma 
4. uncle   كٮچٮك ئاتا  ,تاغا    tagha, kichik ata 
5. father   !"!"    dada 
6. mother   ئاپا  ,ئانا     ana, apa 
7. younger brother  ئٮنى ,ئۇكا   uka, ini 
8. younger sister  سٮڭٮل    singil 
9. older brother  ئاكا    aka 
10. older sister  ئا"! ,ئاچا    acha, ada 
11. sister-in-law  ق'&نسٮڭٮل ,ق%$ناچا   qëynacha, qëynsingil 
12. brother-in-law  باجا ,ق)'ٮنئۇكا ,ق'&ٮنئاكا  qëyinaka, qëyinuka, baja 
13. nephew  جٮ)'& ئوغلى   jiyen oghli 
14. niece   !جٮ'&% قٮر   jiyen qiri 
15. cousin   ن$#"ە     newre 
 
Section 4: Nature 
 
1. tree   !ە#ە$    derex 
2. leaf   !وپۇ$ما(    yopurmaq 
3. flower   !گۈ    gül 
4. mountain  !تا    tagh 
5. hill   ئ&گٮزلٮك ,تۆپٮلٮك   töpilik, ëgizlik 
6. lake   !كۆ    köl 
7. ocean   ٻڭٮز%    dëngiz 
8. island   !"#ئا    aral 
9. beach, seaside  ٻڭٮز بو"ى ,*ٻڭٮز سا$ٮلى)  dëngiz sahili, dëngiz boyi 
10. river   ە#"ا%    derya 
11. waterfall  شا)قٮر$تما    sharqiratma 
12. sun   !كۈ! ,قۇ#ا   quyash, kün 
13. moon   !ئا    ay 
14. star   !ۇلتۇ%    yultuz 
15. cloud   !بۇلۇ    bulut 
16. rain   !امغۇ&    yamghur 
17. planet   پالن#تا    planëta 
18. snow   !قا    qar 
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19. desert   !قۇملۇ    qumluq 
20. forest   !ئو$ما    orman 
 
Section 5: Food 
 
1. apple   ئالما    alma 
2. banana   !بانا    banan 
3. corn   !قونا! ,كۆممٮقۇنا   kömmiqunaq, qonaq 
4. eggplant  !"چ#"ە ,پٮدٮگ   pidigen, cheze 
5. hamburger  امبۇ() بولكٮسى.   hamburg bolkisi  
  hamburg qatlam   +امبۇ'& قاتال!    
   hamburk toqichi   -امبۇ)' توقٮچى    
6. noodles  !ل"غم"! ,چۆ   chöp, leghmen 
7. cabbage  !"كا&كب"س   kallekbesey 
8. carrot   س$#"ە    sewze 
9. mushroom  !موگو  ,گۈمب$م$#ە    gümbemedek, mogo 
10. onion   !پٮ#ا    piyaz 
11. pepper   !ال"!  ,مۇ    much, laza 
12. tomato   !"شوخال  ,پ&مٮد    pemidur, shoxla 
13. grapes   !"#ئۈ    üzüm  
14. melon   غۇ!قو     qoghun 
15. orange   ئاپ%لسٮن    apëlsin 
16. potato   نگگە!!ب! %اڭ"ۇ  ,    berengge, yangyu 
17. meat    !گۆ     gösh 
18. rice   !"#گۈ    gürüch 
19. bread   !نا    nan 
 
Section 6: Jobs 
 
1. painter   !ەسسا&    ressam 
2. astronaut  ئال() ئۇچقۇچٮسى   alem uchquchisi 
3. repairer, mechanic  م&خانٮك ,ت$خنى ,)ٻمونتچى  rëmontchi, tëxni, mëxanik 
4. baker   !"#بولكٮچى ,نا   naway, bolkichi 
5. businessperson, cadre !"كا#ٮر ,سو%ٮگ   sodiger, kadir 
6. butcher  !قاسسا    qassap 
7. dentist   !"چٮش '&ختۇ   chish doxturi 
8. nurse   !س&ستٮر    sëstira 
9. mailperson  وچتٮك"!پ  pochtikesh, pochtaliyon  پوچتالٮ#و! ,
10. teacher       مۇئ%للٮم    muellim 
11. veterinarian  !"مالد&ختۇ   maldoxturi 
12. fisher   ب&لٮقچى    bëliqchi 
13. farmer   !ٻ$قا&    dëhqan 
14. waiter   كۈتكۈچى    kütküchi 
15. cook, chef  !"ئاشپ    ashpez 
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16. doctor   !كتۇ%&    doktur 
17. shepherd  پا$ٮچى    padichi  
18. barber   !"ساتٮر    satirash 
19. plumber, pipe worker ٻمونتچى ,تۇ*(با ئٮشچٮسى(  turuba ishchisi, rëmontchi 
20. policeperson  ساقچى    saqchi   
  
Section 7: Furniture and Appliances 
 
1. bed   !"#$كا    karwat 
2. bookcase  كٮتا) جا&ا$ٮسى   kitab jahazisi 
3. table   !"ئۈست    üstel 
4. sofa    سافا     safa 
5. desk   پا#تا    parta 
6. refrigerator  توڭالتقۇ    tonglatqu 
7. stove   !ئوچا    ochaq 
8. television  !"ت&ل&ۋٮز   tëlëwizor 
9. computer  كومپ%ۇت"ر   kompyutër 
10. closet (wardrobe) !"كٮ(ٮم ئٮشكا   kiyim ishkawi  
11. microwave  !مٮكر' )'لقۇنلۇ   mikro dolqunluq 
12. chair   !"ئو%"ند    orunduq 
 
Section 8: Transportation 
 
1. bus   ئاپتوبۇسى    aptobusi 
2. helicopter  !تٮك ئۇچا    tik uchar 
3. fire engine  ئو/ ئۆچۈ*() ماشٮنٮسى  ot öchürüsh mashinisi 
4. motorcycle  موتو ,موتسٮكلٮت   motsiklit, moto 
5. train   پو#ٮز    poyiz 
6. plane   !ئا'ر%پٮال    ayropilan 
7. car   !ماشٮنا ,پٮكا   pikab, mashina   
8. van    !"ماشٮنا ,بولكٮۋ    bolkiway, mashina 
9. bicycle   ٻلٮسٮپٮت'    wëlisipit 
10. ship   !پا%$خو! ,ك#م   këme, paraxot 
11. subway, metro  !ر!م"ت  ,$-, ئاستى پو$ٮز   yer asti poyizi, mëtro 
12. taxi   تاكسى ,كٮر+ ئاپتوموبٮلى  kira aptomobili, taksi 
 
Section 9: Numbers 
 
1. zero   !نۆ    nöl 
2. eleven   ئو$ بٮر    on bir 
3. twenty-two  ٮگٮرم% ئٮككى)   yigirme ikki 
4. thirty-three  !ئوتتۇ$ ئۈ   ottuz üch 
5. forty-four  !قٮرٮق تۆ    qiriq töt 
6. fifty-five  !"ئ"للٮك ب   ellik besh 
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7. sixty-six  !ئاتمٮش ئالت   atmish alte 
8. seventy-seven  !تمٮش $!تت!$   yetmish yette 
9. eighty-eight  س%كس%' س%ككٮز   seksen sekkiz 
10. ninety-nine  !توقسا' توققۇ   toqsan toqquz 
11. hundred  !ۈ#    yüz 
12. thousand  مٮڭ    ming 
13. million   !مٮلٮ#و    miliyon  
 
Section 10: Colors 
 
1. black   !"قا    qara 
2. white   !ئا    aq 
3. brown   !كا)ٮشنا#"! ,قوڭۇ   qongur, karishnaway 
4. blue   !كۆ    kök 
5. red   قٮزٮل    qizil 
6. yellow   س$رٮق    sériq 
7. purple   !بٮن!چش! ,سۆسۈ   sösün, binechshe 
8. green   شٮل$%    yéshil 
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